

## ABSTRACT

Title of Document: OUT OF SIGHT, OUT OF MIND: HOW LATINO  
SEGREGATION AFFECTS POLITICAL  
PARTICIPATION AND POLICY OUTCOMES

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This dissertation evaluates the intersection of place and politics as it pertains to the effect of residential segregation on the civic engagement and political power of Latino Americans. Famously described by W.E.B. Du Bois as the problem of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, racial segregation persists in the United States, and while residential segregation has declined marginally for African Americans over the past 15 years, it has increased significantly for Latinos during this same period. Using a variety of data sets and methodological approaches, I investigate the socio-political consequences of this growing residential divide. I argue that segregation not only precludes socioeconomic mobility for Latinos, it also decreases their likelihood of civic engagement and political participation. Latinos who live in residential isolation are more likely to be economically marginalized and less politically powerful than their less segregated counterparts. Further, the marginalization of the Latino community has political consequences. Segregation concentrates Latinos into political jurisdictions where they must compete for

resources with more politically powerful groups. As a result, their neighborhoods and needs are ignored by politicians and bureaucrats. To correct their under-representation in the political arena, participation among Latinos is essential. The findings of this dissertation call into question the stability of democracy if Latinos do not start participating at a higher rate, with the fate of the nation resting in part on the political and social mobility of its largest and fastest growing minority group.

OUT OF SIGHT, OUT OF MIND: HOW LATINO SEGREGATION AFFECTS  
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AND POLICY OUTCOMES

By

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## Dedication

To my husband, Erik Christiansen, who has endured this thing with me.

## Acknowledgements

This dissertation was made possible with the support, encouragement, criticism, and counsel of many people. Countless friends, colleagues, family members, elected officials, and professors offered me guidance and insight on this project. My work is stronger and more rigorous because of their feedback.

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Never having been a particularly good student in my formative years, I also am indebted to the teachers who believed in me and taught me that I could overcome the difficulties I faced with communication and memorization. I am thankful for my teachers at Sandy Spring Friends School, particularly Ari Pruess and Arlene Horowitz, and my many professors at Hampshire College. I also am in the deepest debt to Luciano Colonna for his guidance and attention during my time as his intern. Luciano played a critical role in helping me develop a thorough understanding of the interaction between public policy and social phenomena—particularly in the areas of health and education.

The last five years in the Graduate Program in Government and Politics have been extremely challenging but also endlessly rewarding. I am grateful for the investment that several professors made in me and their dedication to my graduate training. From my first days in the program, Professors Irwin Morris and Wayne Macintosh helped me

develop my skills as a political scientist and publish my first article as part of an ongoing research project they were conducting. Irwin continued to play an active role at every step of my graduate career, providing me with prompt and thorough feedback on my projects and psychological (and administrative) support, as well as the occasional baked good. I am and will continue to be in his debt for many years to come. His multidisciplinary knowledge and passion are inspiring. Wayne also continued to be a supportive figure and often aided me with a cup of coffee and a good laugh.

Beginning in my second year, Professor Jim Gimpel took me under his wing. Jim encouraged me to be the best political scientist I could be. He took the time to read and help me improve upon early drafts of research papers and encouraged me to go outside the discipline to find theories and research that directly applied to my interests. Jim's door was always open to me and he always found the time and the energy to encourage me to persevere on projects that I would long since have abandoned without his support. His excitement made me want to produce good work—and kept me to a very productive schedule. I do not think any other professor could have made me *want* to work on every Saturday, Sunday, and holiday for over two years. I do not understand how he manages to be such an amazing mentor and also be so exceptionally productive.

Were it not for the incredible dedication and encouragement of Professor Karen Kaufmann, I never would have finished this project and felt confident enough to turn it in. It was in her graduate class on urban politics that I first came up with the theory for this dissertation, and it was her enthusiasm for the project and her ongoing encouragement that enabled me to write it. She sacrificed hundreds of hours reading drafts, talking out ideas, and providing counsel for me during frustrating times. She

worked with me to overcome roadblocks in my theoretical development and methodological hurdles, and to organize a sometimes-unwieldy amount of information. Karen also helped me to secure funding so that I could dedicate my final semester in graduate school to writing. In addition, she nominated me for several awards that went a long way toward meeting my financial needs while I devoted almost all of my waking hours to my research. Karen has an unmatched capacity to help students translate fledgling ideas into testable hypotheses—an ability that was particularly valuable to me. For her love, support, and attention, I am grateful, and I look forward to many years of collaboration.

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## Chapter 1: Introduction

*During the 1970s and 1980s a word disappeared from the American vocabulary. It was not in the speeches of politicians decrying the multiple ills besetting American cities. It was not spoken by government officials responsible for administering the nation's social programs. It was not mentioned by journalists reporting on the rising tide of homelessness, drugs, and violence in urban America. It was not discussed by foundation executives and think-tank experts proposing new programs for unemployed parents and unwed mothers. It was not articulated by civil rights leaders speaking out against the persistence of racial inequality; and it was nowhere to be found in the thousands of pages written by social scientists on the urban underclass. The word was segregation.*

Douglas Massey and Nancy Denton  
1993, 1

*If 1970 to 2000 trends continue, Latinos will overtake Blacks as the most segregated racial/ethnic group by the end of the present decade.*

Jeffrey M. Timberlake and John Iceland  
2008, 359

### *The Importance of Segregation for Understanding Latinos in the United States*

Is the United States a racially segregated society? Ask almost anyone on the street and the answer usually will be a hesitant “no,” followed by the observation that “segregation is illegal.” However, from 1970 to 2000, although segregation declined marginally for both African Americans and Asians, segregation among Latinos rose dramatically (Timberlake and Iceland 2008). In 1960, less than half of the Latino population lived in a highly segregated city; by 2000, over two-thirds did.

The 2000 Census revealed that for the first time in U.S. history, Latinos were hypersegregated in two cities (New York and Los Angeles)—up from none in 1990 (Wilkes and Iceland 2004). In new Latino immigrant destinations such as Lexington, Kentucky, and Sanford, North Carolina, segregation is on the rise. In many places, Latinos, particularly in new destinations, are more segregated than we would expect on



the basis of their socioeconomic status. Segregation in new areas is partly a product of white flight, suggesting that white preference for homogeneous neighborhoods continues (Wahl, Breckenridge, and Gunkel 2007). Regardless of what we call it—de facto or de jure—the fact remains: beyond a very low threshold, Latinos are unwelcome in white communities.

In addition to simple segregation by race, Latinos and African Americans are much more likely to be concentrated in more disadvantaged neighborhoods than are whites or Asians (Timberlake and Iceland 2008, 348). Racial segregation is tantamount to poverty concentration. Even middle class minority communities house more impoverished people than do white communities.<sup>1</sup> In short, for Latinos and African Americans, living in segregated communities often means living in communities with far fewer economic resources. In this respect, America remains a racially *and* economically segregated society.

In their landmark 1993 book *American Apartheid*, Douglas Massey and Nancy Denton argued that residential segregation was the "missing link" to the formation and perpetuation of a black urban underclass. Segregation, they maintained, "constrained black life chances irrespective of personal traits, individual motivations, or private achievements" (3). At the time, several other theoretical approaches explained persistent poverty in the black community as a consequence of a "culture of poverty" and the availability of welfare (Lewis, 1965; Banfield 1970; Mead 1986). Each of these theories placed blame on individuals for the perpetuation of black poverty in the United States and

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<sup>1</sup> For example, Massey and Fisher (2003) find that blacks are far more likely to live in concentrated poverty neighborhoods, and Iceland and Timberlake (2004) find that both African Americans and Latinos are more likely to live in concentrated poverty neighborhoods regardless of personal incomes.

disregarded the structural constraints, primarily residential segregation, that limit socioeconomic mobility.

Today, similar theories purport to explain Latino socioeconomic stagnation. Politicians and pundits blame Latinos, particularly Latino immigrants, for the economic woes of state and local governments, and for the decline of American cultural identity. In books such as Pat Buchanan's *State of Emergency: The Third World Invasion and Conquest of America*, MacDonald, Hanson, and Malanga's *The Immigration Solution*, Otis Graham's *Unguarded Gates*, and Samuel Huntington's *Who Are We?*, academics and political pundits argue that Latino immigrants come to the United States to abuse the social safety net. They cite their low earnings and the lower than average educational attainment of the second generation to argue that Latinos have personal and cultural failings.<sup>2</sup> However, as was the case for theories explaining African American socioeconomic immobility, these commentators overlook how important structural constraints are to the social status of Latinos living in the United States.

As a result of this mentality, policies aimed at the Latino community are intertwined with the politics of immigration. Conservative politicians and commentators such as former U.S. Representative Tom Tancredo, Rush Limbaugh, Pat Buchanan, Lou Dobbs, U.S. Representative Duncan Hunter, and former California Governor Pete Wilson, to name a few, have singled out Latinos as second class immigrants whose personal failings warrant changing our (admittedly broken) immigration policy to reduce or eliminate immigration from Latin America. In response to studies showing low

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<sup>2</sup> Not to mention Carol Swain's (2007) edited volume in which she and several colleagues argue that, as a result of sharing a border with a poorer nation, the United States finds itself "endlessly battling illegal immigration and unassimilated foreigners who reject the culture and values of the host nation" (4).

socioeconomic mobility in the Latino community, these elected officials and pundits almost never call for increased school funding, job training programs, affirmative action, and inclusionary zoning policies to facilitate the residential and social integration of Latino communities. Instead, they favor policies that would increase immigration by "model minorities," such as Southeast Asians, and limit immigration from undesirable countries south of the U.S. border. They advocate mass deportations of Latino immigrants and changing the U.S. Constitution to eliminate birthright citizenship.<sup>3</sup>

Many commentators say that the slow assimilation and socioeconomic advancement of the Latino community shows that Latinos fail to take full advantage of the opportunities the United States offers to those who want to succeed (not unlike the criticisms of African Americans addressed by Massey and Denton). Further, this contention is used to give credence to new immigration proposals that end family unification and all but end permanent legal immigration and citizenship attainment for Latinos (such as the introduction of a new guest worker program). Buchanan, Dobbs, and Limbaugh may be the loudest proponents of such reforms, but these arguments are heard on both sides of the aisle and also permeate the academy. Perhaps the most famous scholarly argument to take this approach is that presented in Samuel Huntington's (2004) *Who Are We?* Huntington argues that in the past, immigrants quickly adopted the "American creed" and assimilated and blended into the middle class. He posits (187) that *even* southern and eastern Europeans who came with very low levels of education (and often were considered racial minorities) became as evenly distributed in upper and

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<sup>3</sup> The "Model Minority" argument was cited recently in Forbes Magazine to justify the exclusion of Latino immigrants. Differences over whether to create a path to citizenship or conduct massive deportations probably led to the failure of the 2006 immigration reform bill. In 2007 alone, several states passed bills calling for Congress to repeal the birthright to citizenship. This also has been a major battle cry of Pat Buchanan.

middle class occupations as “other Americans.” Thus, he argues, the failure of Latinos, particularly Mexicans, who make up the majority of Latino immigrants to the United States, to assimilate to the socioeconomic middle class norms of Anglo Protestant Americans shows that they are a lower class of immigrant—one that needs to be excluded or else the future of the United States will be imperiled.

Huntington bases his conclusion on the overwhelming number of Latino immigrants in the United States consolidated into isolated ethnic enclaves. White immigrants of the past, he argues, while nestled in ethnic enclaves, generally lived in areas where several immigrant groups resided and tended to melt into their “urban environment in the course of two or three generations” (Huntington 2004, 244). While there may have been one predominant language for a few blocks, another dominated on the next few. As a result of the relatively small numbers of any one ethnic group in the larger immigrant area, the move toward English was quick and assimilation rapid.

Huntington contends that race is no longer a meaningful dividing line in America:

By the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century...ethnicity virtually disappeared as a defining component of national identity. So did race, following the achievements of the civil rights movement and the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965. Americans now see and endorse their country as multiethnic and multiracial. As a result, American identity is now defined in terms of culture and creed (Huntington 2004, 38).

However, as is clear from Huntington’s own conclusions—that Mexicans are not as deserving of U.S. citizenship as European immigrants—as well as the research on racial profiling, and research suggesting the continued importance of skin color to job acquisition in the U.S., this clearly is not the case (Romero 2006; Espino and Franz 2002; Hill 2000; Hughes and Hertel 1990; Mason 2004; Telles and Murguia 1990; Hunter

2007). Race and ethnicity still matter, and the darker the skin (that is, the more clearly minority the individual), the less likely he or she is to move up the economic ladder (also see Zweigenhaft and Domhoff 2006; Iceland and Nelson 2008). Just as Massey and Denton argued that cultural theorists missed the structural constraint imposed by segregation on individual life chances, so too do scholars and commentators such as Huntington who see segregation as the consequence of individual failings and not the result of larger structural constraints that limit the upward mobility of Latino immigrants. In short, segregation remains the missing link, the word that disappeared or, more precisely, *never* appeared to help policy makers understand Latino mobility.

Recently, Timberlake and Iceland (2008, 359) speculated on the consequences of the changes in segregation in the United States and found that it was difficult to reach conclusions as to whether the changes represented “‘good’ or ‘bad’ news.” The erosion in African American segregation, they argue, indicates that white resistance to living with African Americans may be decreasing. Given that there has not been the same antipathy toward living in proximity to Latinos as to African Americans (Emerson, Chai, and Yancey 2001; Krysan 2002), the relative increase in segregation simply may be a result of high levels of immigration (Alba and Nee 2003; Fischer and Tienda 2006; Gimpel 1999; Alba and Logan 1991) and may, therefore, be relatively short-lived. However, if high levels of segregation continue, “we may observe a slowing down of the typical process of Latino assimilation. Put simply, large barrios of first generation immigrants may prove more difficult to ‘escape’ than the smaller, more heterogeneous (with respect to nativity) ethnic enclaves of the past” (Timberlake and Iceland 2008, 31). As a result,

the moderate assimilation rates of Latinos into American society (Alba and Nee 2003) could decline as immigrants become further isolated from the broader society.

We have a good idea about the consequences of segregation for African Americans, and most of the theoretical expectations I develop are derived from what we know about segregation and its pernicious impact on this group. Thus, much of the literature informing my expectations is drawn from the African American experience and is discussed in the next chapter. However, as noted above, segregation is a recent phenomenon among Latinos (Wilkes and Iceland 2007; Massey and Denton 1993); therefore, the consequences of segregation for Latinos are not well understood. Since the Latino population is predominantly immigrant and second generation, many social scientists deem Latino segregation to be little different from what was experienced by past waves of immigrants. However, whether Latino neighborhoods do mirror the immigrant enclaves of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries or are more similar to segregated urban ghettos remains an empirical question.

White ethnic enclaves facilitated immigrant incorporation, whereas black ghettos isolated African Americans and concentrated poverty, producing a racially defined underclass (Massey and Denton 1993). Understanding the appropriate model for segregated Latino communities is fundamental to setting effective housing and urban/suburban policy. Likewise, segregation is important to study because of its effect on the racialization, stereotyping, and socialization of Latinos as “others.” Segregation has been considered an important causal mechanism in the development of stereotypes about African Americans and Latinos as undeserving, unemployable, unintelligent, and lazy (Dixon and Rosenbaum 2004). Scholars also find that segregation increases white

antipathy toward Latino immigrants (Rocha and Espino Forthcoming). The impact of segregation on Latino socioeconomic mobility, political incorporation, and discrimination are understudied.

The purpose of this dissertation is to show that segregation is the missing link in explaining why Latinos fare more poorly than whites and other immigrant groups in the United States and why they are a handy political scapegoat for politicians to blame in hard times. Gunnar Myrdal wrote in 1944 that Black-white segregation:

Exerts its influence in an indirect and impersonal way: because Negro people do not live near white people, they cannot—even if they otherwise would—associate with each other.... Residential segregation also often becomes reflected in uni-racial schools, hospitals, and other institutions.... It further permits any prejudice on the part of public officials to be freely vented on Negroes without hurting whites (618).

Little has changed, except segregation now is never officially written into policy. There are no "whites only" signs in apartment buildings, schools, or polling places, no racial covenants outlawing the sale of homes to minority buyers. Instead, America has a much more pernicious form of residential segregation—an extensive web of policies that limit the likelihood of minorities ever even considering moving into predominantly white middle class neighborhoods. By labeling segregation "de facto," we have rendered invisible the government's role in perpetuating powerless communities and placed the responsibility on individuals when, in fact, structural barriers persist (Massey and Denton 1993, 97).

The structural barriers of segregation are particularly prevalent in Latino communities. Most Latino areas lack upwardly mobile jobs and contain overcrowded and underfunded school systems. Political parties systematically disregard Latino areas for mobilization because their participation in the political process is so low. In this

dissertation, I argue that these barriers keep Latinos from progressing up the socioeconomic ladder and hinder Latino political participation, leaving Latino communities both economically and politically disadvantaged.

I address a previously unstudied question: How does segregation affect the political incorporation of Latinos? I explore the impact of residential segregation on the experiences of Latinos in the United States. I seek to understand the affect of where Latinos live on their lives and the way governments respond to them.

I see this relationship as a complex path dependent phenomenon that results in a vicious self-perpetuating cycle. Latinos in segregated environments have low levels of socioeconomic mobility because their neighborhoods house few opportunities for education and economic growth. As a result of low socioeconomic status, Latinos participate in politics at a much lower rate than higher income whites and African Americans. Low aggregate political participation has important consequences. Elected officials are less accountable to areas that have muted political voices (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). Because they are highly motivated by reelection (Mayhew 1975), elected officials are primarily concerned with delivering both symbolic policy gestures and government monies and assistance to those who could deny them their seat in the next election.

In recent years, Latino immigrants have become a popular scapegoat for many problems facing the United States. State, local, and federal officials blame Latino immigration for skyrocketing social service budgets. Republican members of Congress have explained their oppositional votes on popular bills in terms of immigration: They argue that SCHIP (the State Children's Health Insurance Program) would give medical



coverage to immigrant children (and children of immigrants), or that the stimulus package would give jobs to illegal immigrants in the construction trades.<sup>4</sup> Popular academics and pundits alike blame Mexican immigrants for the decline of American culture. Commentators from both the right and the left claim that Latino immigration threatens the commonality of the English language in the U.S.<sup>5</sup> As the number of things for which to blame immigrants has escalated, anti-*immigration* voices have become vehemently more anti-*Latino*. State and local anti-illegal immigrant policies have taken similar anti-Latino messages to a large audience, and, according to the Southern Poverty Law Center, anti-immigrant fervor in the U.S. has led to a sharp rise in hate crimes committed against Latinos (Crary 2008).

When Latino voices lack a place in pluralistic government discourse, they are likely to be punished for their absence. As Robert Dahl (1961) noted, although low-income citizens may partake less in some forms of pluralistic government discourse, they still have power in government through the ballot box. However, when demonized and underprivileged communities abdicate their ballot power by failing to participate, they lose their voices in the formation of public policy. As a result, Latinos bear the brunt of anti-immigrant legislation that stands to further erode their communities. In this way, residential segregation creates a feedback loop. *Because Latinos in segregated environments are relegated to the worst schools and their neighborhoods house the fewest opportunities for economic growth, they lack political power. Because they lack political power, Latinos are on the receiving end of punitive legislation that adds more*

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<sup>4</sup> See Frank Sherry's argument at [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/frank-sherry/when-will-the-gop-ditch-t\\_b\\_162375.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/frank-sherry/when-will-the-gop-ditch-t_b_162375.html), site visited on January 29, 2009.

<sup>5</sup> See, for example, [http://www.ontheissues.org/Celeb/Pat\\_Buchanan\\_Immigration.htm](http://www.ontheissues.org/Celeb/Pat_Buchanan_Immigration.htm), site visited on March 29, 2009

*barriers to socioeconomic mobility and leads to further degradation of their neighborhoods.*

There is nothing inherently wrong with ethnic enclaves, barrios, or isolated Latino communities. Places where people feel comfortable and where cultural practices are widely shared are beneficial to building social capital and strengthening communities (Putnam 2000; 2007). We all want to be surrounded by people with whom we identify. Few of us want to spend our lives in environments where we feel like an “other,” where we constantly wonder if our actions are acceptable, or where we stand out in a crowd. Furthermore, racially homogeneous places facilitate the development of bonding social capital, which is critical to neighborhood life and vibrant communities (Putnam 2007). If racial and ethnic segregation did not come with other consequences—if segregated neighborhoods were indeed separate *and* equal—this dissertation would be unnecessary. Unfortunately, the United States is not yet a land of equal opportunity for every person in every neighborhood.

Despite the many psychological benefits of living in homogeneous communities, segregation may work against people who are otherwise disadvantaged. Arguing in favor of integration is not meant to be an endorsement of all things white or a condemnation of minorities. Unfortunately, despite the economic and political gains minority communities have made over the last twenty years, whites continue to hold the power, the wealth, and the resources that minority groups in the United States—be they African American, Latino, Asian, or Native American—require to compete on an equal footing in politics and the economy. In other words, if racial and ethnic segregation were not coupled with poverty, strained resources, and dilapidated schools in neighborhoods where

residents are more likely to see a scam artist than a candidate going door to door, integration would be less imperative.

Having introduced my basic argument, in the rest of this chapter I discuss how segregation harms the economic and political prospects of the Latino community. First, I expand on the consequences of economic immobility and low educational attainment in segregated communities. Second, I discuss how segregation contributes to political inequalities between whites and Latinos. Third, I discuss briefly why I focus my investigation on Latinos. The final section outlines the chapters of my dissertation and describes the data and methods employed in the analysis.

### **The Economics of Segregation**

In the United States, minority neighborhoods are distinct from white neighborhoods due to the pronounced socioeconomic disparities between the wealth held by whites and minorities. It is not my intention to suggest that socioeconomically stable minority communities are inherently flawed. To be sure, where they have been able, minority groups have set up strong middle class enclaves where they can reap the benefits of residential homogeneity *and* provide educational and economic opportunities to their children, but these locations are few and far between. Furthermore, even middle class suburban enclaves such as majority African American Prince George's County, Maryland, or majority Latino Montebello, California, are not as wealthy as white suburbs made up of people with identical incomes. Even when minority workers have the same income, the total assets held by minority families tends to be significantly lower due to differences in generational transfer of wealth (Blau and Graham 1990; Gittleman and

Wolff 2004).<sup>6</sup> Therefore, African Americans and Latinos generally do not possess the amount of economic capital that facilitates buying a home in a more expensive neighborhood; as a result, concentrated minority neighborhoods are less wealthy and stable than their white counterparts.

In 1999, before the 2001 recession hit, the median household net worth of Latino families was \$10,495, about \$2,000 more than the median net worth of African American families (\$8,774) but \$76,000 less than the median for white households (Witte and Henderson 2004). The acquisition of wealth—not income—is how savings are accumulated and where people find money to purchase homes, fix up properties, and make long term investments. Such investments increase wealth in the future and raise neighborhood property values. Immediately following the economic downturn at the beginning of this decade, Latino and African American net worth took a significant plunge. By 2002, the median family net worth of Latinos had decreased to \$7,932 (\$5,998 for African Americans), while white family net worth continued to rise, albeit at a slower pace (Witte and Henderson 2004). This example shows how Latino and African American neighborhood resources decline substantially when the economy sours.

Economists and historians agree that “wealth begets wealth” (Witte and Henderson 2004). Stocks pay dividends, houses increase in value (at least typically, over time), and these assets offset the pernicious effects of unexpected costs on family budgets; medical emergencies, college tuition, and temporary unemployment all are less harmful to families with substantial wealth, regardless of income. Families without significant assets are closer to falling into the poorhouse regardless of their education

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<sup>6</sup> Amy Orr (2003) argues that the difference in wealth, not income, between minority households and white households explains a large percentage of the educational achievement gap as well.

level or their current earnings statement. Whatever wealth is left at the end of one's life can be passed on to the next generation, giving inheritors an extra financial boost to reinvest and continue the cycle of wealth accumulation. This means that even middle class minority enclaves usually have more renters with little to no investment in the community, less wealth, and less stability in times of economic downturn like the one we are enduring today.<sup>7</sup> Thus, concentrated minority neighborhoods are less likely to weather fluctuations in the economy or to accumulate value at the pace of white neighborhoods.

All of this is to say that segregated housing patterns contribute to income inequality between whites and minorities among the middle class and, even more so, for the poor. Racial minorities simply have a harder time escaping poor neighborhoods because they do not have the financial capital to help them purchase or rent homes in higher priced areas. Segregated racial and ethnic enclaves usually are marked by significantly higher poverty rates, lower employment, and, as a consequence, fewer opportunities for their residents. For these reasons, racial and ethnic segregation in the United States *is* a problem. It is not because minorities have personal or cultural failings, as suggested by political scientists such as Samuel Huntington, but because when they

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<sup>7</sup> It also is important to note that, on average, minorities pay higher interest rates on their mortgages, even when controlling for income and assets, and are more likely to be given subprime loans. The Federal Reserve showed that of mortgages given in 2005, about 46 percent of Latinos and 55 percent of African Americans got higher-cost loans. The rates among whites and Asians were only 17 percent. The rates among high-income Latinos and African Americans were even more striking. In Boston, one study estimated that over 70 percent of high-income African Americans and Latinos who live in minority areas received subprime loans in 2005 (Kirchhoff and Keen 2007). Given that these mortgages run a higher risk of foreclosure, the impact on the entire neighborhood can be extreme. Some experts estimate that a single foreclosure can decrease the value of other homes on a block by about 1 percent (Melia 2005). In fact, as a report by the Woodstock Institute illustrates, minority neighborhoods, regardless of their median income, have been disproportionately affected by the foreclosure crisis (Immergluck and Smith 2005).

live in isolated neighborhoods that have been ignored and disinvested in by society, these forces produce structural disadvantages that, for most residents, no amount of internal social capital or personal motivation can overcome (Massey and Denton 1993, 3). The cumulative advantage of the white middle class rolls over into cumulative economic advantages for white middle class neighborhoods (see DiPrete and Eirich 2006, 287 for a review of cumulative advantage in neighborhoods).

### **The Political Consequences of Segregation**

Impoverished populations produce impoverished governments. Funding for schools, public health, and other essential community services is often tied to local tax bases that are protected from the redistributive powers of the state. By giving county and city governments sole responsibility for both running and funding schools and providing other social goods and services, state governments often create unequal localities with inequitable opportunities (Massey 1996; Massey and Fischer 2003).

Segregation thus benefits some locales over others by vesting them with good schools, small classes, and new equipment. The localized structure of education funding in most of the United States guarantees that places with lower income earners will have schools with less funding, while places with concentrated wealth will have the best educational facilities. As Massey and Denton (1993) found, even middle class minorities are more likely to attend a school with many more impoverished students and fewer resources than their white counterparts. Since economic segregation is greater for Latinos and African Americans than for whites, poor white students are more likely to attend a significantly richer school than poor black and Hispanic students (Boger 2005). In this way, segregation still creates a situation in which some are granted opportunities

to move up the socioeconomic ladder and have more economically diverse social networks, while others are left to fend for themselves.

Educational opportunities are critical for the socioeconomic mobility of the Latino community. While discrimination continues to hamper individual life chances for minorities in the United States, even more consequential is the absence of working class jobs that served as stepping-stones for the immigrants of the past—jobs that did not require high levels of education. Those jobs and the socioeconomic ladder they presented no longer exist. Today, if Latinos are to surpass their parents' economic status, they first must attain a quality education. As a result of the bifurcated economy, we judge Latino socioeconomic assimilation over a single generation against the multi-generational assimilation process of white ethnics (see Huntington 2004).

Perhaps this judgment is justified or at least arguable. With the advent of an economy in which jobs are clustered at the unskilled and highly skilled tails, the socioeconomic ladder is no longer evenly spaced; instead, it is a series of leaps and bounds. "Increasing labor market inequality implies that to succeed socially and economically, children of immigrants today must cross, in the span of a few years, the educational gap that took descendants of Europeans several generations to bridge" (Portes and Rumbaut 2001, 58), and when they cannot, the second generation is left with few opportunities for advancement. The post-industrial economy confronts everyone with only two simple but unfortunate alternatives: join the ranks of the working poor or the un- or underemployed *or* get a college degree and join the middle or upper-middle class. There are few paths by which individuals can surpass the socioeconomic standing of the previous generation without significantly surpassing their educational attainment.

Because segregation results in augmented (or concentrated) poverty in minority areas and little to no poverty in others, many white areas have the means and the tax base to fund good schools while barrios and ghettos are left behind. Thus, the concentration of Latinos into neighborhoods with impoverished minority schools, and where the government lacks the resources to provide the students the services they require, in turn precludes socioeconomic mobility.

Segregation also increases the political distance between minority and white communities. The unequal distribution of resources across neighborhoods contributes to unequal revenues for state and local governments, which in turn creates parochialism among state politicians and competition for state funding (see Oliver 2001, 17; Massey and Fisher 2004).<sup>8</sup> Perhaps a story from my own experience will illuminate this dynamic.

During the 2007 session of the Maryland General Assembly, I was working as legislative director for a state delegate. To help solve the state budget shortfall and to fund the state's program to help impoverished governments with additional monies for public education, the governor proposed a new tax on high-earning individuals. This meant that Montgomery County, the richest in the state, would be hit hardest by the new tax because of its overwhelming concentration of wealthy constituents, while Baltimore City, the most impoverished jurisdiction, would benefit most through increased state investment in the city's schools.<sup>9</sup> In a closed-door session of angry lawmakers, one typically progressive Montgomery County delegate criticized the plan, saying, "Let

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<sup>8</sup> Oliver argues that the problem with the public choice argument in which individuals "shop" neighborhoods to find the best services, schools, parks, etc. is that it applies only to the wealthy, since those without great wealth do not have the financial means to shop between municipalities.

<sup>9</sup> As of 2005, only 3 percent of family incomes in Baltimore were over \$200,000 a year (about 4,000 families). In Montgomery County, over 18 percent of family incomes were in this top income bracket (about 42,000 families).



Baltimore raise their own taxes, *we* shouldn't be funding *their* programs.” I later pointed out to him that raising taxes on the wealthy in Baltimore would result in little increase in tax revenue, given the low median income of Baltimore City residents, and that raising state revenue was the *only* way to increase funding for the city's school system. His response was, “That's their problem.”

Just as individual states do not like to give more to the federal budget than they get back in return, counties and cities protect their own interests. The result is a system that rewards parochialism and exacerbates inequality. Rich areas get richer and their already superior services get exponentially better. Wealthy counties benefit from their resource advantages in more than just tax dollars. Because of their wealth, they gain reputations for good schools, services, and quality of life. Because of these reputations, they are able to recruit the best teachers, police chiefs, and administrators. They receive awards and kudos for being the “best schools in the state,” “best place to live,” and “most effective government.” Their advantages over their neighbors give them strength and prestige. In an attempt to hold on to these rankings and perform for their constituents, even the most progressive state legislators become resistant to redistributive policies that benefit other communities at the expense of full funding for their own priorities.<sup>10</sup>

While some of these wealthy communities institute progressive housing plans such as inclusionary zoning (like those found in Montgomery County, Maryland) to increase economic and racial diversity *within* their borders (Rust 1999), they do so only

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<sup>10</sup> The Montgomery County delegate described above explained to me why he believed his jurisdiction shouldn't help the Baltimore schools. To summarize his argument: Montgomery County money was needed at home—mainly for transportation projects. Without equal funding for their pet projects, the Montgomery delegates felt slighted by the idea of raising a progressive tax that would largely hit their county when they would not reap the rewards. The fact that the lines between counties are arbitrary was of no consequence.

because they can afford it. Their neighbors who have higher poverty rates and lower tax bases cannot afford the luxury of taxing and regulating businesses and developers; instead, these governments find themselves forced to provide incentives to entice corporations and investors in order to attain or retain any economic vitality. In so doing, they deplete the tax base further and give away their only chance of increasing government revenue.

Segregation has other political consequences as well. While some concentration can enable unrepresented or underrepresented minorities to achieve political empowerment via the election of co-ethnics, over-concentration can dilute their influence by taking the concerns of minorities out of the reelection constituencies of the majority of the legislature. This paradox has led some to speculate that there is a tradeoff between increasing the number of minority officeholders and enacting legislation that promotes minority group interests (Hill 1995; Cameron et al. 1996; Lublin 1997). The debate remains: Which is more effective for passing pro-minority bills: a few more minority legislators or many more legislators who are accountable to minorities?

#### *Why Study Latinos? Who Are They and Why Do They Matter?*

By 2000, the year of the last Census, Latinos had become the largest minority group in the United States. By 2025, it is expected that Latino Americans will make up almost a quarter of the population. Because they represent such a large proportion of the populace, it is important that we understand what barriers the Latino community faces. As of 2000, almost 71 percent of Latino adults had never attended college. Just over 10 percent had a college degree. While much of this discrepancy is due to low college education rates among adult immigrants, Latino children continue to lag behind the

national average in terms of high school completion and college enrollment—a statistic commonly associated with the concentration of Latinos in high poverty segregated schools. Latinos also have lower turnout rates in elections and are less likely to be politically engaged.

More importantly, Latinos do have political interests. About two-thirds of Latinos are either first- or second-generation immigrants. Immigration policy and policies that single out immigrants for punitive action affect the Latino community more than any other group. In addition, the low aggregate socioeconomic status of the Latino population means that education and fiscal/labor policies have a substantial impact on the Latino community. Perhaps most significantly, as anti-immigrant rhetoric has flared, Latinos have become more likely to experience discrimination and outright hostility. It is clear that studying Latinos is both meaningful and necessary.

It is important to note, however, that the terms “Latino” and “Hispanic” are American political artifacts, a concept produced for the sole purpose of categorization by statisticians. These terms capture neither the array of circumstances and identities among the many subgroups commonly *called* “Latino” nor the lack of group membership felt by many individuals officially classified *as* Latino (Idler 2007). So, why study these individuals as a group?

To say the least, the diversity within the Latino community is vast—so much so that the factors dividing that community can sometimes appear to make the term “Latino” meaningless. The forces in various sending nations that prompt immigration to the United States differ widely, and how and when individuals and their families immigrated is extremely important as well. These differences have inhibited the development of a

meaningful pan-ethnic identity among much of the Latino population (Kaufmann 2003). But while the interests of groups within the Latino community may be distinct, depending on their members' specific ancestry or the circumstances under which they immigrated, in political terms, more policies unite the Latino community than divide it. Any survey of Latino public opinion will reveal a high degree of agreement on policy issues across Latino communities (Leal 2008).

Despite differences in national origin, for purposes of the Census, the U.S. government has decided to classify these many immigrant groups as encompassing a single ethnic group: Latino or Hispanic. Moreover, the average American can no more distinguish between Latino subgroups than she or he could pick out a member of the Supreme Court in a crowd. Thus, Latinos, having been placed by the federal government in a distinct ethnic category, likewise have been defined as a distinct group within the population. If nothing else, despite the divisions within the Latino community, it is important to understand how policies and socioeconomic forces affect the largest minority population in the United States, which now comprises more than 45 million Americans.<sup>11</sup>

### Chapter Outline

In the subsequent chapter, I develop a theory of how segregation affects Latino socioeconomic mobility and political power. Drawing on literature from demography, political science, and sociology, I build the argument that segregation negatively affects Latino sociopolitical outcomes. Chapter Three presents a summary of how elected officials, community activists, and organizers view the problems facing the Latino

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<sup>11</sup> According to the latest Census projections, in 2007 there were just over 45 million Hispanics in the United States.

community. This chapter presents a first-hand account of the barriers to social mobility and political participation witnessed by individuals actively working in the Latino community. In their own words, Latino elected officials and activists describe the effects of segregation. Although almost all of my interview participants note both benefits and drawbacks to neighborhood concentration, the interviews I conducted and my experiences in these communities led me to conclude that integration, while certainly not without its own problems, benefits Latinos far more than concentration.

My quantitative investigation of the link between residential segregation and sociopolitical mobility begins in Chapter Four. Here, I consider how residential segregation is affecting the socioeconomic mobility of the Latino population. I find evidence that segregation erects five specific barriers: in segregated areas 1) Latino immigrants are less likely to become citizens and 2) less likely to have sufficient English skills; 3) U.S.-born Latinos have lower educational achievement; 4) all Latinos have lower incomes; and 5) more isolated social networks.

Chapter Five takes the analysis to the political level, empirically investigating the link between segregation and political participation. This chapter tests the hypothesis that Latinos living in segregated areas are less likely to be civically engaged, less likely to be interested in political affairs, and, as a result, less likely to be politically active. I find support for the hypothesis that the connection between segregation and political participation works through education, citizenship, English ability, and income. To be clear, segregation indirectly constrains political interest and activity by limiting socioeconomic mobility but does not directly constrain political activity. However, segregation has a large direct effect on civic engagement. Segregated communities are

socially flat-lining, indicating that isolation prevents the creation of vibrant community institutions in Latino neighborhoods that could cultivate political participation.

In Chapter Six, I expand my investigation of segregation and Latino politics to consider the effect of Latino concentration in states (as opposed to cities). Historical and recent immigration trends have resulted in some states housing the majority of the Latino population while other states are home to very few. In this chapter, I attempt to develop a theoretical understanding of why some states respond to Latino immigration by passing punitive immigration legislation while others do not. I find that legislatures are more likely to introduce and pass punitive immigration bills as a response to large increases in the Latino population.

Chapter Seven extends this analysis to investigate where Latinos find representation in state government. Residential segregation has made the political empowerment of Latinos and African Americans easier to achieve (Massey and Denton 1993), and these symbolic victories have been critical to the political incorporation of both groups (Browning, Marshall, and Tabb 1986). However, the substantive impact of political empowerment is less clear. Studies of the legislative behavior of Latino elected officials certainly have shown that they are more likely to introduce and vote for legislation that benefits the Latino community, particularly in areas such as education, poverty, and anti-discrimination measures (Bratton 2006). This chapter extends the study of Latino legislative empowerment to investigate the behavior of Latino legislators on immigration bills that could lead to discrimination in the Latino community—legislation that could *harm* Latinos. I find that empowerment is not necessarily always beneficial to Latinos. Although segregation does enable political empowerment, the benefits of

empowerment when Latinos are segregated appear to be contingent upon the political context and history of the state. Simply put, empowerment is not always worth the socioeconomic price of segregation. Chapter Eight concludes this analysis and discusses the future of Latino socio-political incorporation.

### *Data Overview and Methodological Approach*

I approach my research questions using several sources of data. Each has its strengths and weaknesses, which I will discuss in turn. By drawing on multiple data sources, I hope to validate my findings. Traditional data sets used by political scientists and sociologists to investigate social mobility and political participation, such as the GSS and ANES, fail to survey enough Latinos to produce confidently valid results. Other data sets fail to include geographic codes that enable researchers to investigate contextual effects. Thus, there are limited resources to turn to in order to investigate the impact of residential context on Latino political behavior.

For this reason, I employ several sources of data, including qualitative interviews with Latino elected officials, activists, and community organizers. I use a mixed-methods triangulation approach in an attempt to confirm and cross-validate my findings. Utilizing both qualitative and quantitative methods helps to offset the inherent weaknesses of each method when used alone (Creswell 2003, 217). The quantitative and qualitative data were collected and analyzed concurrently. Although more pages are devoted in the dissertation to the quantitative data, I give equal weight to the contributions made by both data sources.

## **Qualitative Research on Latino Mobilization and the Policy Process**

I obtained Institutional Review Board approval to go out into the field and interview individuals who work in Latino neighborhoods and who represent Latino areas in the policymaking process. The interviews were conducted in three locations: the metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) of Washington, DC, Baltimore, Maryland, and New York City. These three places were chosen because they represent different types of immigration destinations. New York City is a traditional “gateway” city. It also has one of the highest levels of Latino residential segregation in the country (Wilkes and Iceland 2004). New York City has a Latino isolation score of .68—the 15<sup>th</sup> highest in the country for Latinos—and it houses the nation’s second largest Latino population. It is one of only two cities in the U.S. to be considered “hypersegregated” for Latinos (Wilkes and Iceland 2004). The Washington, DC MSA is considered a “new gateway” city. About 8.2 percent of its population is Latino, and with an isolation index of .35, its Latino population is the 80<sup>th</sup> most isolated in the country. Baltimore is a brand new destination for Latinos. Baltimore’s isolation index is .075, making it the 235<sup>th</sup> most isolated in the country. Only 2.4 percent of Baltimore’s population is Latino.

Initial interviews were conducted with Latino elected officials and organizers of high-profile Latino interest groups. At the end of each of these interviews, I asked the participant for references to other individuals in the community to whom they believed I should speak. This technique worked fairly well and quickly expanded the scope of the interviews, allowing me to find community activists I would not have found on my own. The interviews took approximately one hour, and follow-up interviews were conducted



with some subjects if they were warranted. I conducted more than 20 interviews. The IRB documents are available in Appendix A.

### **U.S. Census 2000 and U.S. Census Current Population Estimate, Voter Supplement 2000**

The quantitative data for this project come from a variety of sources. Data on tract level Latino isolation is derived from the 2000 U.S. Census. Data on Latino socioeconomic mobility is derived from the U.S. Census Current Population Survey (CPS).<sup>12</sup> This data set contains 50,000 individuals and almost 3,000 Latinos across the United States. The CPS sample is scientifically selected to represent the total population of the United States. Published data are available for those ages 16 and over. The CPS is well suited for this study, as it includes information on country of origin, immigration status, citizenship status, educational attainment, income, and English proficiency. Unfortunately, the lowest geographic code available for the individuals in this data set is the MSA. Thus, for models incorporating the CPS, I rely on MSA isolation estimates for the Latino community generated from the 2000 U.S. Census as developed by Massey and Denton (1993) and reproduced by Iceland, Weinberg, and Steinmetz (2002).<sup>13</sup> Although this is not the ideal contextual measure, it does correlate well with isolation measures produced at the tract level.

The CPS includes information on registration and voting, but because it does not include a number of the other variables pertinent to the theory I have developed, I do not use this data set to investigate the relationship between context and civic and political

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<sup>12</sup> Data are available from: <http://www.census.gov/cps/>

<sup>13</sup> These data are available from:  
[http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/housing\\_patterns/front\\_toc.html](http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/housing_patterns/front_toc.html)

engagement. Instead, for this investigation, I turn to the Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey, 2000.

### **Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey, 2000**

The Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey, 2000 (SCBS), conducted by the Saguaro Seminar at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, is the largest study on civic engagement in the United States. Implemented in 2000, the survey contains over 3,000 Latinos. By obtaining Institutional Review Board permission and permission from the Roper Center, I was able to gain access to the census tract geographic identifiers for the respondents included in the survey. The SCBS contains information on civic and political engagement as well as on friendship diversity and social and political trust.

### **State Policy Data**

The American states are an important arena for immigrant incorporation. In fact, state and local governments create most contemporary immigrant and economic integration policies (Fix et al. 2008). State governments also have become more active in immigration policies that are particularly meaningful to Latinos (NCSL 2007). The Migration Policy Institute produced a data set of all the immigrant-related legislation introduced in state legislatures in 2007. Using this collection, I identified bills that were pertinent to the Latino community. After cataloguing the data, I used state legislature websites to retrieve detailed information about each bill, including whether it came to a vote and which legislators supported or opposed it.

### **State Legislative Data**

For the final substantive chapter in this dissertation, I compiled district and individual information on state legislators from four states: Texas, Arizona, Georgia, and Montana. In addition to the legislation used in the previous chapter from the Migration Policy Institute, I utilized immigration law data from the National Conference of State Legislatures to expand the sample to include bills passed in states in 2006 and 2008. Also, I conducted key word searches on the four states used in the case studies to ensure that I had a full list of immigration bills for the three-year time span. I then added individual legislator and district data. For this, I drew upon a multitude of sources, including state legislature websites and state redistricting websites, the Almanac of State Legislative Elections (2007), and Kathleen Bratton's state legislature data. A full and complete description of the data sources is included in the chapters in which they are used and in the appendices for each chapter.

## **Chapter 2: Residential Isolation and Latino Sociopolitical Incorporation: A Theory**

### *Why study Latino Participation*

#### **The Importance of Participation for Democracy**

*“Given that past studies have shown that minority representation has consequences not only for improving racial and ethnic relations but also for the distribution of public goods in cities, there is a real possibility that minorities are losing out” (Hajnal and Trounstein 2005, 531).*

In the American republican system, citizen participation determines the composition of political leadership and its responsiveness to citizen concerns. Political participation, particularly non-electoral participation, provides the forum in which citizens can communicate information about their interests, preferences, and needs to elected and appointed officials, and apply the political pressure necessary to generate meaningful and substantive policy responsiveness (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). In U.S., elected officials are most responsive to those who participate at the highest levels (Dahl 1961; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). Since election and reelection are vital to politicians’ career ambitions, pleasing (or appeasing) mobilized interests is first and foremost on most elected officials’ list of things to do (Mayhew 1974). Democracy implies both responsiveness by elected officials and broad consideration of public interests; thus, it is important that every group participate at more or less equal rates. Moreover, because groups participate in a battle for resources when they vote (or work) for different political regimes in local and urban elections (Kaufmann 2004), unequal participation can result in the exclusion of groups from both the democratic process and the resources provided by government that are vital to their economic and social well-being. In addition, individuals participate in political and non-political forums that can

determine the quality of service delivery that is necessary for daily lives, and contribute to the overall quality of their neighborhoods and the socioeconomic mobility of neighborhood residents. Contacting an elected official when the trash has not been picked up or attending a PTA meeting or school board meeting to improve the quality of the local school can have positive effects on the daily life of the individual and the future socioeconomic status of the next generation. If citizens contact public officials, they are more likely to get the basic services that their communities require (Berry, Portney, and Thompson 1993).

At its core, democracy rests on citizens participating in the political process. However, Americans do not participate in large numbers, especially compared with other developed democracies. In the United States, in a national election, roughly half of eligible citizens participate; in local elections, as few as ten percent of adults may vote (Bridges 1997; Hajnal, Lewis, and Louch. 2002). The numbers for nonvoting acts of participation, such as attending town meetings, volunteering for campaigns, or writing to elected officials, are far lower (Putnam 2000; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). Even recent rosy pictures of the state of participation in the United States (including voting), point to the uneven distribution of participation across class, racial, and ethnic groups (National Conference on Citizenship 2006).

Study after study bemoans the fact that the people who turn out to vote, call their legislators, write letters to the editor, and volunteer their time and money in campaigns look very different from the general public (Piven and Cloward 2000; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Verba and Nie 1972; Verba et al. 1993). As Hanjal and Trounstein (2005,

515) note, “the skewed nature of the vote raises real concerns about how well the interests of different groups are served in democracy.”

This assumes that electing representatives who make promises and seem to represent a community is enough to guarantee substantive policy returns and adequate services. Unfortunately, elections alone are unreliable information conduits. Why one individual voted for one candidate over another is impossible to determine based on their push of a single button in the voting booth. In order for elected officials to gauge the interests, needs, and desires of various constituent groups, individuals representing various constituencies must participate in actions that communicate clear desires. Without significant engagement by members of minority and low income communities in these higher “quality” political activities, public policies will likely remain skewed in favor of the white upper class (Burns 2006; Lowi 1969; Schattschneider 1975; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995).

Most studies on the factors that influence political participation look primarily at whites and, through the use of statistical controls, wash away the effects of racial group dynamics (Leighley 2001). As Jan Leighley (2001, 6) notes, “our theories of participation assumed to be generalizable across racial and ethnic groups are tested primarily on Anglos and typically ignore the contextual characteristics emphasized in theories of minority participation, while theories of group mobilization are rarely tested empirically in a systematic fashion across racial and ethnic groups.”

This omission has severe consequences for the explanatory power of contemporary theories of political behavior. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, 67.4

percent of the residents of the United States in 2004 were non-Hispanic whites.<sup>14</sup>

Although whites currently are the majority in this country, they have the lowest immigration rates into the United States and the lowest per-capita birthrate of all racial groups. It will not be long before whites are no longer the majority. The immigration rate into the United States has increased and the origin countries for most immigrants have changed from Europe to Latin American and Asian. Foreign-born individuals make up almost 15 percent of the total population of the United States.<sup>15</sup> For this reason alone, immigrant and minority-specific issues need to be part of our discourse.

Today, Latinos make up the majority of immigrants to the United States and more than fifty percent of Latino immigrants hail from Mexico. As of 2006, Mexico alone sent 31percent of all new immigrants to the United States. Latino Americans on average have more children than either whites or African Americans, making them the fastest growing racial group in the United States. As of 2006, there were over 44 million Latinos living in the United States and that number is growing.<sup>16</sup> According to the 2000 U.S. Census, Latinos comprised fewer than 13 percent of the U.S. population and census projections estimate that by 2006 the Latino population in the United States had increased by 25 percent since 2000.<sup>17</sup> Thus, if what is known to be true about whites does not apply to

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<sup>14</sup> The U.S. Census Bureau defines non-Hispanic whites by combining two questions. The first question asks for the race of the individual (white, Black, Native American, Pacific Islander, etc.) and a second question asks if the respondent is Hispanic. Non-Hispanics whites are individuals who checked that they were white and indicated they were not Hispanic.

<sup>15</sup> <http://www.migrationinformation.org/datahub/charts/final.fb.shtml>

Source: The 2006 data are from the 2006 American Community Survey, the 2000 data are from Census 2000 (see [www.census.gov](http://www.census.gov)). All other data are from Gibson, Campbell and Emily Lennon, US Census Bureau, Working Paper No. 29, *Historical Census Statistics on the Foreign-Born Population of the United States: 1850 to 1990*, US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1999. This report is available [on-line](#).

<sup>16</sup> Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2006 American Community Survey

<sup>17</sup> SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau, Population Estimates, July 1, 2000 to July 1, 2006.

Latinos, our research will quickly be outdated and inapplicable to more than a quarter of the population.


Above and beyond their overall numbers in the United States, Latinos are also distinct in several ways from other immigrant groups and native-born whites and African Americans. Latino immigrants come to this country with very low levels of education compared to other groups. Fifty percent of the foreign-born Latino population has less than a high school education, compared to 10 percent of whites and 20 percent of African Americans (PEW 2006). Of Latinos born in the United States, 25 percent lack a high school diploma. While the U.S. born Latino population is moving up the educational ladder, they are still far more likely to drop out of high school than all other racial groups and they are the least likely to attend college (Zhou 2003).

Latinos are also becoming much more residentially concentrated in the United States. Seven states have absorbed most of the influx of Latin American immigrants (Camarota and McArdle 2003; Johnson, Farrell, and Guinn 1999). Figure 2.1 shows how Latino Americans are concentrated in specific states and counties in the United States. As a result of this concentration, not only does Latino political behavior have the potential to drastically affect the political context of the United States, but Latinos have the potential to be the majority stakeholder in a select number of states and localities—many of which are key swing states for presidential elections and control of the Senate. Since Latinos are further concentrated into counties and cities, their role in local governance is herculean.



Figure 2.1 Latino Population in the United States by County.

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Source: U.S. Census Bureau

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Looking specifically at the barriers to participation for minority groups in the United States is essential to understanding governance, opportunities, and political influence. Race transcends the barriers of class in the United States (Massey and Denton 1993; Massey and Mullan 1984; Nelson Jr. 2005; Williams 2004). Simply due to skin color, many individuals are systematically disadvantaged economically and politically.

As William E. Nelson notes,

The existence in the United States of a hierarchical system of white domination and control has served as a crucial barrier to Black and Latino political incorporation and empowerment. What Blacks and Latinos have faced is an enduring system of institutionalized power that promotes white privilege and advancement while simultaneously marginalizing the competitive capacities of non-Whites. The perpetual denial of Black and Latino entrance into the most important sanctuaries of power constitutes a critical contradiction of U.S. democratic principles of freedom, justice, and equality (Nelson Jr. 2005, xiii).

By controlling away the effects of race, we limit our understanding of the barriers to socioeconomic mobility and political incorporation. Inattention to minority group participation is not only a problem with traditional models of political participation; recent research into the effects of context also is guilty of the same omission. Social “homogeneity” theories contend that racial and social group diversity increase conflict and decrease the likelihood of participation (e.g., Alesina and La Ferrara 2000; Campbell 2006; Costa and Kahn 2003; Hero 2003; Hill and Leighley 1999; Masuoka 2006; Putnam 2007; Sanchez 2006). These studies, though, fail to look at how diversity uniquely affects minority groups. I propose that residential “homogeneity” essentially constitutes segregation and social isolation for Latino Americans, the consequences of which constrain the opportunities for political socialization and participation, increase the threat posed by Latino immigrants and their families to local host communities, and undermine their ability to get the quality policy outcomes their communities require.

To summarize, I argue that segregation results in political and social isolation for Latino Americans. Segregation and social isolation constrain socioeconomic mobility, limit access to political information, decrease political efficacy and motivation, and increase feelings of alienation from the democratic process. Because of the negative consequences of segregation, community institutions face great barriers to mobilization. Local communities and elected officials react sharply against Latinos with punitive and discriminatory legislative actions because they have no understanding of the interests and needs of these communities. Cultural differences are exacerbated by social distance, which impedes understanding, empathy, and acceptance.

### **This Study's Contributions**

This dissertation puts these arguments to a test. Is Latino socioeconomic mobility hampered by residential isolation? Are Latinos who live in isolated environments less likely to participate? How does Latino isolation affect the actions of elected officials? How does low Latino political participation affect the quality of representation they receive? While research has shown that whites are more likely to participate in civic activities when they live in homogenous areas (Putnam 2007; Campbell 2006) and are more likely to vote the less diversity they face in their communities (Alesina and La Ferrara 2000; Costa and Kahn 2003; Hero 2003), the evidence for Latinos is less well understood. Preliminary evidence suggests that racial minorities in fact participate *more* in diverse environments (Rubenson 2006). The effects of residential context are still relatively new to political science and are often overlooked or underspecified.

A finding that residential segregation is associated with lower levels of socioeconomic mobility, political participation, and increased anti-Latino sentiment could have important implications for the future of race relations, American electoral politics, and public policy. Such a finding would be a positive contribution to the literature on political participation and contextual effects, one that has largely emphasized the benefits of social homogeneity and the detrimental nature of diversity (Putnam 2007). Politically, at issue is the future of the power of the Latino vote and the Latino “voice” within democratic institutions.

I also contribute to the ongoing discussion about the future of Latinos in the United States. Will they follow traditional patterns of past immigrant groups and work their way up through the generations, finally putting a foot solidly in the ranks of the

middle class? Or will they constitute a new sociopolitical “underclass” that faces extreme hardships and lacks a voice in governmental institutions?

In summary, this dissertation makes two contributions. In addressing the degree to which segregation impedes socioeconomic mobility among Latinos, it subjects a largely untested hypothesis to empirical analysis and thus fills a gap in the literature on Latino socioeconomic mobility and contextual effects. By addressing how these impediments translate into low levels of political participation and political power, it contributes to our understanding of the consequences of segregated residential context on political outcomes.

### *Theoretical Perspective*

Why do some people participate while others do not? Of the factors that contribute to the likelihood of participation, some explain variation between individuals and others explain variation between groups in the aggregate. Individual explanations of participation usually are grounded in socioeconomic status (SES) and the recruitment opportunities that accompany increased levels of social and economic resources. For groups, aggregate levels of trust in government, civic duty/obligation, political efficacy, cynicism or disaffection, political empowerment, group consciousness, and mobilization by political parties and interest groups are found to be important to explaining variation between racial and ethnic groups. Finally, contextual effects research suggests that social networks are constrained by location and that these constraints can have dismal consequences for the political behavior of the resource poor. Each of these phenomena

influences participation differently for Latinos than for other racial groups. In this section, I will discuss each of these factors and how they inform my project.

### **Resource-Based Models of Participation**

Two major factors influence the decision to participate: *motivation* and *capacity* (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). The resource-based model of participation posits that as social and economic resources such as income and education improve, so too does the likelihood of participation (Campbell Converse, Miller and Stokes 1960). This has implications for both motivation and capacity. A rational actor model of participation argues that voting and other acts of participation are more costly for individuals who lack resources. There is a “cost” to gathering the information necessary to participate. The assumption is that the more education one has, the easier it is to understand and draw conclusions from limited information, as well as to take cues and use heuristic shortcuts (Downs 1957; Zaller 1990; Zaller 1992). In addition, the skills necessary to participate beyond voting, such as organizing, public speaking, and writing skills are often gained through formal education (Verba, Burns, and Schlozman 2003; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Verba and Nie 1972; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Verba et al. 1993).

Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995) show that the reason income is such a good predictor of participation has nothing to do with the direct effect of having money—most political acts other than campaign contributions are reliant on time, not cash. Income captures the type of occupation the person is likely to hold. Higher income earning occupations are likely to cultivate the skills necessary to participate. Individuals in white collar positions learn to organize others and speak confidently. Higher income jobs are

also more likely to cultivate networks of politically interested and knowledgeable individuals, which increase the likelihood that an individual in the network will be asked to participate. In short, socioeconomic status often is associated with a friendship/colleague network of politically motivated individuals. These networks cut the costs associated with information gathering and increases the likelihood that people will feel pressure to participate. When participation is expected in social circles, non-participation creates negative social consequences, so socioeconomic status constrains motivation.

Most research to date on the effect of resources on political participation treat all racial groups equally. Hanes Walton (1985) argues that the individual resource model is problematic to the study of racial group participation because it carries with it normative implications for how we interpret minority political participation. With regard to African American political behavior, Walton notes that the “individual-centered behavioral approach in black political behavior has produced a vast literature that proposes the individual weaknesses and imperfections it uncovers are a result of blacks’ individual shortcomings and not the result of any systematic factors under which they have labored” (Walton 1985, 3). The same may be true of the research on SES and Latino American participation. By focusing on individual explanations, we overlook the societal and cultural differences that may produce different participation rates.

African Americans are considered “exceptional.” They over-participate given their aggregately low socioeconomic status because of their unique history of group-based oppression in the United States. African Americans have considerable social cohesiveness and social institutions (Verba and Nie 1972; Shingles 1981; Dawson 1994;

Leighley and Vedlitz 1999; Mangum 2003; Southwell and Pirch 2003). However, the discussion as to whether or not African Americans are “exceptional” assumes that white behavior is a perfect model from which only African Americans deviate. There may simply be additional variables that mitigate the impact of socioeconomic status which vary in importance by race. Racial group identification adds unexplained variance and decreases the applicability of the SES model. There are several reasons why this may be the case.

Given that the individual resource based model in essence relies on the presence of social networks, it affects the aggregate voting behavior of different groups over time. Verba, Burns, and Schlozman (2003) argue that racial and ethnic minorities are “unequal at the starting line.” That is, political socialization and political background are “rooted in the legacy of class...and in the experiences throughout the lifecycle.... [T]he race [for political and economic resources] does not start anew with each generation: instead, parents are able to pass on class status to their offspring and, thus socio-economic stratification persists from generation to generation” (2003, 45-46). Thus, Latinos may be less likely as a group to participate due to their group-based resource disadvantages, even if individuals hold the socioeconomic keys to participation.

One important takeaway point from the resource-based literature is how it predicts the behavior of high SES Latinos. The resource model predicts that individuals with high levels of education or income should live in locations surrounded by other high SES individuals who have political knowledge and interest, but this may not be true of Latinos. Many Latinos who graduate from high school or college and make significant incomes are the first in their family (or even their neighborhood) to do so. Thus, the

social and network resources they attain via their economic and educational status may be much smaller than those of their white counterparts, limited much more to their workplace and not reinforced in the home environment.

Susan Brown (2007) finds that among Latinos, there is “delayed spatial assimilation.” Second and often third generation Latinos are constrained in their social networks and residential context by their economic responsibilities to their (often much more financially disadvantaged) parents and family members and their extended families in Latin America. Because they are helping their families survive, they are more likely to live in higher poverty neighborhoods in multigenerational housing (Brown 2007). In short, Latino social resources may be greatly reduced compared to those of whites with the same level of education and income because their family and friends and their childhood experiences were not accompanied by the socioeconomic resources they later acquire. This may help to explain why many minority groups, particularly Latinos, participate less despite economic and educational advancement (Arvizu and Garcia 1996; De Sipio 1996; Hero and Campbell 1996; Uhlaner, Cain, and Kiewiet 1989; Verba, Burns, and Schlozman 2003; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980).

Even middle class Latinos are more likely to come from immigrant, and working-class or poor families with less political engagement. Thus, socioeconomic status alone does not capture the effects of their social network isolation. For Latinos, social network diversity may be critical to political participation since they are unlikely to gain political knowledge from within Latino and largely immigrant social networks and familial relations. The benefits of exposure to whites may increase participation not because of race-specific variables, but because middle class whites are more likely to have been



raised by middle class parents who were more likely to engage in political discussion at home (Lopez 2003).

Given that most individual-level models, either ignore or control for race, it is assumed that all races and ethnic groups are motivated by a similar set of factors—that if these groups would simply become economically and educationally equal to whites, we would see equal participation rates. Unfortunately, that is neither a realistic solution to the normative problem of unequal participation rates nor a theoretically sound empirical explanation. As the next section explains, due to their minority status in the United States, racial and ethnic groups are motivated by particular factors that have long-term implications for participation even once class taken into account.

Some scholars suggest that “racial differences in participation either: become very small, disappear entirely, or even favor minorities, once SES is controlled” (Berry, Portney, and Thompson 1993, 85). This assertion discounts the fact that minorities are *not* equally distributed across class lines and are unlikely to be in the near future. Scholars that have examined the importance of SES and sociodemographic factors on Latino participation (Hero and Campbell 1996; DeSipio 1996) present a morose picture of the future of Latinos in the democratic process. If SES proves to be the sole key to participation, and aggregate SES remains low for Latinos, their voice within the political process will be considerably constrained.

### **Latino Participation: What We Know**

As with African Americans, the socioeconomic status model has proved limited for explaining Latino political participation (or the lack thereof). Instead, naturalization, length of residence in the United States, English language skills, trust, discrimination, and

the limited role of political parties in Latino neighborhoods are important indicators for Latino turnout and participation. Even controlling for citizenship status and SES, Latinos are much less likely to participate (Arvizu and Garcia 1996; De Sipio 1996; Hero and Campbell 1996; Uhlaner, Cain, and Kiewiet 1989). One important finding is that education, more so than occupation or income, is key to explaining levels of participation among Latinos (Pantoja, Ramirez, and Segura 2001). In addition, Garcia (1982) and DeSipio (1996) find that the relatively limited range of occupational choices and lack of variation in Latino incomes, as well as the higher percentages of foreign-born and limited English speakers, are confounding factors diminishing the applicability of the SES model.

Length of residence in the United States is associated with higher levels of participation, but it still does not eliminate the gap between Latinos and other groups (De Sipio 1996; Highton and Burris 2002; Jones-Correa 1998; Ramakrishnan 2006). For Mexican Americans, although group consciousness per se does not boost participation, increases in political knowledge, a sense of civic duty, subjective group membership, and concern for ethnic issues do seem to increase turnout (Lien 1994; Michelson 2003b; Sanchez 2006). Still, group consciousness appears to motivate Latinos to participate only in activities that are Latino-centered and not directed at the larger political system (Sanchez 2006). However, if Latinos reach out to other Latinos (i.e., direct within group mobilization), political participation, and voter turnout in particular can increase (Ramirez 2005; Shaw, de la Garza, and Jongho 2000). In fact, mobilization efforts seem to be more effective with Latinos than with other racial groups (Hritzuk and Park 2000). Thus, since contact matters but message seems not to, some authors argue that a return to

party-based individual face-to-face mobilization could be very important to the future of Latino political incorporation (Michelson 2003b; Shaw, de la Garza, and Jongho 2000; Wong 2006).

Mobilizing institutions other than political parties are particularly important to the Latino community (Hritzuk and Park 2000). Like African Americans, the church is an important part of Latino life and is very important to the group's political fortunes, but whether the effects of church attendance are positive or negative is not clear. Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995) first noted that while religious institutions are important to Latino political participation, the choice of denomination had consequences for Latino political skill development. In particular, they found that Catholic churches were less likely to provide the opportunities for skill acquisition and development that decrease the costs of participation. This finding came under fire (Jones-Correa and Leal 2001), but recent evidence suggests that Latino immigrant churches sometimes have negative consequences for the political development of their members, regardless of denomination (Foley and Hoge 2007).

In short, while some Latino churches and other membership organizations do mobilize their members, others actually appear to impede social integration and interracial and inter-economic networking. As Martin Luther King, Jr. once said, "the most segregated hour in America is 11am on Sunday morning." Foley and Hoge (2007) find that churches of any denomination that service primarily immigrant congregations often had null or detrimental effects on their congregants' political socialization. Immigrants, they argue, already isolated by language barriers and economic status, find strong communities by attending church, but the networks they find have strong

“bonding” social capital—social capital that increases intra-group networking—and weak “bridging” capital—social capital that facilitates inter-group networking. Thus, immigrants in these situations are unlikely to be privy to costly political information that is available only through the development of interactions with other, more rooted communities.

While the church plays a critical role in the Latino, and particularly the immigrant Latino, community, non-religious based community groups also are essential to the political socialization of these networks. Labor organizations, workers' centers, advocacy and social service organizations, and ethnic voluntary associations engage Latinos and immigrants in political organizing and mobilization efforts (Wong 2006). Janelle Wong (2006, 11) argues that these institutions overcome barriers that political parties and other outside groups face in largely immigrant neighborhoods. "Community groups organize immigrants by recognizing the complexity and multiple aspects of immigrant identity and by being sensitive to the unique histories, traditions, language, and policy needs of local immigrant communities." They have daily contact with their target population, speak the language, and have strong ties to the community, enabling them to apply some social pressure to individuals. Unfortunately, as will be discussed further in Chapter Three, these institutions also often lack the financial resources and staff needed to take on long-term political socialization and mobilization efforts. In addition, since many of these institutions are service providing organizations, who need their financial resources for basic social service provisions, they may not have the expertise required for effective mobilization over time (Krasner and Pierre-Louis 2006; Wong 2006).

Hritzuk and Park (2000) find that Latinos who are exposed to mobilization efforts or affiliated with at least one community organization are more likely to participate at higher levels. Likewise, de la Garza and Lu (1999) found that Latinos in voluntary groups and organizations have higher voter registration rates and turnout. However, access to these institutions is limited. Latinos are less likely to take part in the traditional civic activities in which many Americans learn about participation and through which they are recruited to participate in political affairs in and outside of church (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995, 317; Foley and Hoge 2007).

When discussing the political behavior of a group, there is usually some implicit expectation that individuals within the group identify as group members and that the group holds meaning politically for those individuals (Conover 1984). However, in the Latino community this assumption is complicated by the fact that Latinos do not necessarily identify as members of a coherent political group (Marquez 2006; Kaufmann 2003). Immigration status, generation, and country of origin fragment Latinos into different sub-groups. Mexican Americans in California or Texas have little in common with Puerto Ricans in New York or Salvadorans in Washington, DC. Just as the third generation Mexican American in Monterey, California may have little in common with the undocumented day laborer in Los Angeles. Intragroup differences are detrimental to the development of many of the psychological factors that increase participation for other minority groups, particularly African Americans, such as feelings of linked fate, group consciousness, and responsiveness to group-based mobilization on a national level.

However, many of the constraining factors for Latinos across subgroups are the same. They have aggregately low levels of education and income. They are often from

families and social networks that are new to this country and lack experience with and knowledge of U.S. government institutions, and their social networks are, as a result, unlikely to discuss and be informed about political affairs (Hritzuk and Park 2000). In fact, recent studies of Latino participation show that Latinos, of all nationalities, often report little political discussion and/or interest among their peers (Hardy-Fanta 1993; Lopez 2003; Gimpel, Lay and Schuknecht 2003; Garcia Bedolla 2005). The composition of Latino social networks is more important to their potential political participation than social network composition for other groups, because of Latinos' general lack of political socialization and unfamiliarity with the workings of American political institutions. As Hritzuk and Park (2000, 161) note, "Since Latinos tend to be less familiar with American politics than are their white or black counterparts, having connections to a politically active social network may help provide them with the requisite knowledge and political socialization to facilitate their entry into the political realm." Diverse social networks that include non-Latinos should be more likely to increase exposure to political discussion and mobilization than Latino-only social networks.

Latinos are also likely to have low levels of trust and to be cynical about government as they become more acculturated, experience racism, and are cast as "others" (Michelson 2003a; 2003b). Racial profiling for documentation and the political attacks on immigrants, particularly Latino immigrants, that has proliferated in the past few years are likely to exacerbate these feelings.

From this review, it is clear that Latinos are barred from participating by a multitude of factors, which can be combined into 4 basic groups: 1) individual factors (low socioeconomic status, relatively young aggregate age), 2) social networks factors

(lack of knowledge about the democratic system and low levels of discussion about politics, lack of access to “weak ties” that can increase information and interest), 3) lack of access to mobilizing civic and political institutions and 4) cynicism toward and exclusion from American Government.

### **Why Residential Context Might Matter**

*Politics is a social activity, imbedded within structured patterns of social interaction.... Political behavior may be understood in terms of individuals who are tied together by, and located within, networks, groups, & other social formations that largely determine their opportunities for the exchange of meaningful political information. In short, the environment plays a crucial role in affecting the social flow of political information (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995, 124).*

When scholar James Gimpel and his colleagues went into the schools of Baltimore, Maryland to interview students about their views on political participation, he found that black and Latino student’s political participation faltered due to their local contexts. “If their participation in class is any indication, very little is standing in the way of their good citizenship other than the fact that no one has come along to tell them that their voice matters, that someone is listening. We concluded that in order to become engaged, these youth simply had to be asked” (Gimpel, Lay, and Schuknecht 2003, 5). The problem was, no one was asking.

At least to some extent, social structure determines the values that groups hold and the socialization of children into those value schemes (Blau 1964). By abiding by the social norms in communities, individuals release a certain amount of control to others (Coleman 1990). What type of norms our communities condone and which they rebuke is critical to understanding the starting point for individuals within a community. Social

structure seems to be more critical to individuals located further down the economic ladder.

Technological changes over the past century, particularly in the areas of transportation and communication, have made it increasingly easy for people to move further and further from their social communities, but not everyone does. Higher income professionals have more dispersed networks that transcend their neighborhoods (Dreier, Mollenkopf, and Swanstrom 2001, 2) whereas lower education and income individuals have more spatially constrained social networks (Fischer 1982; Pastor and Robinson Adams 1996). Higher income individuals use “weak ties” to gain information that their immediate family and friendship networks lack (Granovetter 1973; 1974; 1983). Individuals with lower incomes, however, are less likely to own a computer or to have one hooked up to the Internet (Fairly 2004) and are more likely to rely on immediate social ties for job referrals and other information (O’Regan 1993).<sup>18</sup> Their lives are simply more constrained due to their financial hardships (Fischer 1982; Pastor and Robinson Adams 1996).

Place matters for those of higher income status too. While they may have more technological resources and have access to more dispersed social networks, where they choose to live still affects the public policies by which they must abide, where their children go to school, and their friendship networks. In regard to political information, for individuals who are not particularly interested in politics, where we live largely determines the amount of political information we receive (Huckfeldt 1979; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1992; Tam Cho, Gimpel, and Dyck 2006; Gimpel, Kaufmann, and Pearson-Merkowitz 2007). Living in a politically homogeneous area in which only one party has

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<sup>18</sup> This phenomenon appears to be particularly true for immigrants (Waldinger 2001).



the chance to win local, state, or even national elected offices decreases the amount of political information available because there will be no major general election campaigning and people will see the election as a foregone conclusion (Gimpel, Lay, and Schuknecht 2003). This may explain to some extent why Campbell (2006) finds that in politically homogeneous areas, people are more likely to be engaged in civic than political activities. Even congressional candidates who undertake national fundraising efforts restrict their requests for funds to districts with a history of high donations (Gimpel, Lee, and Pearson-Merkowitz 2007), leaving historically dry districts without solicitations that spark interest in candidates and the political process. In short, despite innovations in technology and transportation, place still matters. Where we live is still a critical determinant of our access to information and our socialization.

Context also matters for the policy making process. Many public policies that particularly impact racial minorities are determined at the state and local level. Legislation is introduced and policies are implemented in the midst of the residential context. Policies are generated out of a need or a desire from local communities and residentially biased interest groups. Neighbors and neighborhoods can bind together to ensure equality and redistribution or they can fight for limited resources and protest redistributive efforts that help disadvantaged minorities escape poverty. Unfortunately, at the local level, where community resources are decided, race-based voting prevails (Cataldo and Holm 1983), and state officials appear to “respond” to white constituents and “react [negatively] to” minority constituents in developing and working for legislation (Johnson 2003, 163).

The history of American politics is marked by such racial conflict. In Detroit in the 1950s, whites protested in both peaceful and violent ways when African Americans attempted to integrate suburbs and workplaces. Eventually, whites in these locales passed discriminatory public policies including white-only residential covenants, racially segregated unions, and local zoning ordinances designed to keep African Americans out (Sugrue 1996; Massey and Denton 1993). The social distance resulting from these policies exacerbated animus towards African Americans as a group and objections towards policies that were perceived to disproportionately help African Americans such as welfare, affirmative action, and public housing (Massey and Denton 1993; Gilens 2000).

Today, communities are protesting the presence of Latinos who move to formerly white neighborhoods (Smith and Furuseth 2006; Singer, Hardwick and Brettell 2008) and there has been another increase in local ordinances that are designed to keep Latino Americans out of otherwise all-white neighborhoods. These ordinances include local regulations on the number of extended family members who can live together in a house and other maximum occupancy regulations (Singer, Hardwick and Brettell 2008). Several cities and towns also have implemented laws mandating that sheriffs begin anti-immigrant raids and to demand identification of “suspected” illegal immigrants. These measures encourage racial profiling and increase suspicion of all people of Latino descent, particularly those with fewer financial resources (Romero 2006). On the state level, proposed regulation attacking Latinos has also been flourishing. For example, there has been a rise in the number of bills that would require government issued

identification for actions for which it was not previously required and bills imposing and increasing penalties for hiring undocumented workers.

These policies are shaped and implemented because of the dynamics playing out in states and locales.<sup>19</sup> Legislators respond to issues that are at the forefront of their constituents concerns. Locations with no minorities are unlikely to lobby for anti-minority legislation. For decades, social scientists have noted the apparent negative correlation between the presence of racial minorities and popular support for (or opposition to) welfare and other programs stigmatized as disproportionately favoring minorities and how this lack of popular support translates into stricter and more stringent social policies in states with the largest minority populations (for a review of this literature, see Johnson 2003). However, it is clear that the presence of minorities means different things in different communities. In one community, having a large minority presence could produce group conflict or threat (Key 1949; Blumer 1958) while in another it can reduce prejudice and increase inter-group empathy (Mutz 2002; Allport 1954; Kinder and Mendelberg 1995). Interracial contact appears to mitigate negative perceptions of racial minorities. To summarize, meaningful interaction among members of different races reduces group threat, racial prejudice, and animosity (Forbes 1997; Carsey 1995; Voss 1996); it also improves race relations and generates support for (or, more precisely, offsets opposition to) social policies that promote inclusion and redistribution (Johnson 2003). It is this dynamic, to which I turn next.

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<sup>19</sup> It is interesting to note that Barack Obama's support among whites flourished in states with little to no historical Black presence, whereas it is more tepid among whites in states with a history of racial conflict. Thus, the historical and current context of a locale can even shape presidential elections when they tap into an issue that penetrates at the local level.

*Residential Segregation, Social Isolation and the Policy Process*

To date, the scholarly literature addressing the causes and consequences of residential segregation primarily addresses its effect on African Americans. Recently there has been a growth in attention to economic residential segregation as well (Dreier et al. 2001; Widstrom 2008). When thinking about Latinos, there are critical lessons to consider from what these scholars observe. Douglas Massey and Nancy Denton (1993) argue that segregation among African Americans was the key component in the making of the “underclass:” “Residential segregation is the institutional apparatus that supports other racially discriminatory processes and binds them together into a coherent and uniquely effective system of racial subordination”(8). They note that segregation creates “barriers to spatial mobility” and that these obstructions create obstacles to socioeconomic mobility because “where one lives determines a variety of latent factors that affect individual well-being: the quality of schooling, the value of housing, exposure to crime, the quality of public services, and the character of children's peers” (150). For African Americans, they argue, segregation has meant bad schools, where children are likely to receive lower quality educations and be exposed to fewer and more constrained life choices, which in turn decreases their chances of achieving economic success. For adults this segregation creates less access to jobs and services as well as dampening support for programs that would help alleviate the poverty and rampant joblessness common in segregated African American communities. Similar findings appear in non-black areas of concentrated poverty (Dreier et al. 2001), indicating that the consequences of concentrated poverty are not unique to African Americans.

It is clear from a plethora of literature on the black experience and housing policy that segregation among African Americans concentrates both poverty and people with similarly bleak life experiences which, in turn, creates lower levels of education and job skills, less access to quality and stable employment, and increased mental and physical health problems (Wilson 1990; 1996; Massey and Denton 1993; Cutler and Glaeser 1997; Popkin et al. 2004; LaVeist et al. 2008).

Key to these segregation-related outcomes is the experience of both children and adults and their access to various types of knowledge and information. Educational outcomes are often considered to be contingent upon the role models available to children. Are their role models high school graduates? Do experiences in their community teach children that high school degrees (or beyond) are useful or necessary for economic and social success? Concentrated poverty or even lower middle class concentration denies many children of the role models necessary to increase educational attainment.

The lessons discussed above are likely to apply to Latinos living in segregated communities. Latino economic fortunes have been found to be negatively affected by residential concentration (Waldinger 2001; O'Regan 1993) and there is good reason to believe that Latinos have lower educational outcomes in residentially segregated environments for reasons similar to those found for African Americans.<sup>20</sup> Schools that are attended by a largely second language majority (or children of limited-English-speakers (LES)) face greater challenges getting children up to speed than schools trying

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<sup>20</sup> See for example, Orfield and Lee (2005) and the other publications of The Civil Rights Project at the University of California, Los Angeles: [http://www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/diversity/diversity\\_gen.php](http://www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/diversity/diversity_gen.php). Cite last visited on April 14, 2009.

to overcome class factors without the complication of limited language skills. As mentioned above, Latinos have lower educational achievement than either African Americans or whites (Pew 2006). So, as Latinos are concentrated into segregated neighborhoods, schools have to battle both language barriers and problems associated with parental education. There is evidence from the Moving to Opportunity (MTO) program that indicates that children of low-SES parents fair far better when they live in higher median SES communities, where they can be exposed to a more mixed-class group of peers, something not available in racially and economically segregated neighborhoods.<sup>21</sup>

The consequences of high levels of segregation have important implications for the socialization of new immigrant Latinos and their children. Portes and Zhou (1993, 82) find that:

"Instead of a relatively uniform mainstream whose mores and prejudices dictate a common path of integration, we observe today several distinct forms of adaptation. One of them replicates the time-honored portrayal of growing acculturation and parallel integration into the white middle-class; a second leads straight in the opposite direction to permanent poverty and assimilation into the underclass; still a third associates rapid economic advancement with deliberate preservation of the immigrant community's values and tight solidarity."

These differing trajectories of new immigrants are largely determined by residential context. In their study of second generation immigrants, Portes, Fernandez-Kelly, and Haller (2005, 1024) find that attending a majority minority school decreases

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<sup>21</sup> More information on the Move to Opportunity Project can be found at: <http://www.hud.gov/progdesc/mto.cfm> MTO is a research based program that combined tenant-based rental assistance with housing counseling to help very low income families find housing in areas not suffering from concentrated poverty.

educational and occupational outcomes as well as reducing overall family income even when controlling for a host of familial and individual characteristics.

The evidence so far suggests that increased segregation of Latino immigrants into both the ranks of the working poor and the geographic isolation of the inner cities or impoverished suburbs may have detrimental effects on the future of the next generation. Recent evidence on second generation Mexican-Americans shows that more recent cohorts have experienced slower economic gains than those before them (when the Latino population was smaller and their segregation almost non-existent) (Waldinger and Feliciano 2004, 396) and that acculturation is accompanied by lower levels of political trust (Michelson 2003) and potentially political efficacy. As Waldinger and Feliciano (2004, 395) ask, “if less skilled immigrants make up a working poor, locked into low wage jobs, and therefore confined to inner cities and their failing school systems, can we expect that their U.S.-born and –raised children will find progress?” The question therefore, is not whether these immigrants and their children will assimilate, but rather to what segment of society will they assimilate to (Portes et al. 2005, 1000)? And by extension, whether they will take on the traits of the civically and political engaged or the disaffected and socially isolated.

The consequences of Latino segregation for political outcomes are likely to be constrained if segregation impedes their socioeconomic mobility. In addition, if segregation results in isolated social networks of other Latinos, as the literature indicates it should (Fischer 1982; McPherson, Smith-Lovin and Cook 2001), Latinos should be more isolated from political discussion than African Americans or whites.

There are, of course, reasons to believe that segregation could produce beneficial outcomes in terms of political participation as well as political capital (see Bledsoe, Welch, Sigelman & Combs 1995). For example, segregation can facilitate the attainment of “political empowerment” via the election of co-ethnics (descriptive representation) at the district/ward, city, and congressional level (Engstrom and McDonald 1981; Grofman and Handley 1989; Lublin 1997; Vedlitz and Johnson 1982). Empowerment has been found to help facilitate certain political outcomes such as more racially diverse and culturally aware police, and to stimulate co-ethnic political participation among Latinos (Barretto 2007). In addition, segregation is strongly linked to widespread racial solidarity among African Americans (Bledsoe et al. 1995), which is thought to increase political participation in segregated black communities. As Alozie (1999) notes in regard to segregation and African Americans, “the very stimulus that is widely entertained as the beacon of institutionalized discrimination, and as retarding Black socioeconomic success, has been the cornerstone of Black political success and group solidarity.” Further, Putnam (2007) argues, that individuals seem to respond to diversity by “hunkering down” and retreating from the community. He argues that communities only flourish when they are culturally and racially homogenous.

From the perspective of ethnic exceptionalism, I do not expect Latinos to walk lock step in the path laid for them by African Americans. They have key differences. For one, group-solidarity is lacking in many Latino communities. Their diverse national origins divide and differentiate Latinos from one another, complicating the emergence of racially based solidarity (Kaufmann 2003; Stokes 2003; Marquez 2006). Moreover, they do not have the histories in the United States that facilitate the passage of civic norms



from parent to child. As Sears and Savalei (2006) note, the unique history of African Americans in their fight for political equality is not shared by the majority of Latinos or other racially distinct ethnic groups: “[T]he often malign treatment of the small pre-1965 Latino and Asian populations may not have produced the strong group consciousness analogous to that of African Americans among today’s far more numerous counterparts” (Sears and Savalei 2006, 898-9).

In fact, just the opposite may be true. While residential segregation among African Americans may produce political awareness, group consciousness, and political efficacy, for Latinos, their lack of experience with the United States political system is likely to delay the production of group-based or individual political participation.

Segregation also has consequences for public policy outcomes. Just as African Americans have suffered politically from the social distance between them and the white majority in terms of policies that could be beneficial to socioeconomic mobility and the overall quality of their neighborhoods, so too should Latinos. Diversity when accompanied with high levels of social interaction increases cross-cultural understanding, but diversity lacking social interaction produces group threat and a competition for resources. As a result, areas with large Latino populations but high levels of segregation may appear more threatening and produce more conflict with their white neighbors than areas in which Latinos and whites interact. When this conflict makes its way to state and local policy makers, legislation may be introduced that has a negative influence on the Latino population. Likewise, they may be unable to gain the passage of and funding for initiatives that benefit their neighborhoods and significant numbers of individuals. In

short, when there is conflict between Latinos and whites or African Americans, and Latinos lack political power, Latinos may be the recipients of punitive public policies.

### *Residential Homogeneity and Mobilizing Institutions*

The thesis of this dissertation contradicts an idea that has gained a large number of scholarly proponents in recent years. This is the notion that residential “homogeneity” (i.e., sharing a neighborhood with all people who are alike) is critical to the “transfer” and development of civic norms (e.g., Campbell 2006; Putnam 2000; 2007; see also Brown 1988; Hill and Leighley 1999; Alesina and La Ferrara 2000; Hero 2003; Costa and Kahn 2003). These theories posit that communication is more difficult in diverse settings. White residents living in all-white communities appear to have higher levels of trust and social capital, both of which increase the amount of communication that occurs between individuals. This in turn fosters the transfer of social and civic norms across members of the community, from one generation to the next. In short, racial segregation is better because it increases (1) communication, (2) trust, and (3) social capital.<sup>22</sup>

The argument that residential racial homogeneity facilitates greater levels of civic engagement relies on the supposition that *all homogenous contexts foster political and civic participation as a social norm*. Residential and network homogeneity certainly do

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<sup>22</sup> Due to limitations of most statistical data sets, most researchers have been forced to aggregate to the state, county, or metropolitan level, which can yield highly misleading representations of real minority segregation. There are few places in the United States that are majority-minority and can also be considered homogenous that are larger than a census tract, but nonetheless, even at smaller contextual levels, minorities can be hyper-segregated to the point where their racial isolation is in effect no different than living in a racially homogenous state (Wilkes and Iceland 2004). Many studies that investigate the effect of diversity on participation focus either on the state (Hero 2003), county (Campbell 2006), or metropolitan area (Alesina and La Ferrara 2000; Rubenson 2006); however, the immediate social context is very important to group perceptions and behavior (Gimpel et al. 2003; Huckfeldt 1986; Kenney 1992; Welch et al. 2001). Thus, aggregating at these large levels can mask the contextual realities in which individuals live.

promote the transfer of cultural norms—such as religious traditions and proper etiquette—as well as in-group affinity. However, residential isolation should not affect all racial and economic groups identically. Whites are part of the governing class. As the majority, they are socialized to feel as if they are a part of the process. Voting and civic engagement have long been an element of their shared experience as part of the dominant group, and homogeneity facilitates communication between those who already hold this norm and new members of the community. In other words, homogeneity facilitates a transfer of the norms the population holds at time 1 (t1) to community members at time 2 (t2).

While it is logical to assume that white homogeneous communities will hold participatory norms at t1 and will pass it along to whites at t2, we cannot assume that Latinos (as well as other minority groups) behave in the same way with regard to the transfer of civic duty and the development of participation as a cultural norm. While at t1 Latinos have cultural norms such as religious beliefs and practices and social etiquette, they do not necessarily have the civic norms that increase participation. Instead, at t1, Latinos generally are immigrants with little information about, or experience with, democracy and U.S. civic institutions, and are seen as outsiders and sometimes invaders. Furthermore, if they move into impoverished neighborhoods they may develop low efficacy, disenfranchisement, lack of trust in government and democratic systems, and possess a heightened awareness of being outsiders to the political process. Whites, by contrast, are more likely to start at t1 with a greater sense of efficacy, trust, etc. Each of these communities produces distinct cultural norms for their members that interact with civic and political participation in different ways. From where should participatory

norms originate for Latino communities? The idea that they should magically bubble up from within is contrary to the way in which socialization processes operate. Thus, without either 1) exposure to participatory groups (whites, higher SES individuals, etc.) or 2) access to mobilizing institutions (civic institutions, education, etc.), it is unlikely that participatory norms will develop.

I have already discussed why segregation decreases social interaction with non Latinos, but why does it affect the likelihood of mobilization by external groups such as political parties? Political parties and most traditional mobilizing interest groups other than labor unions mobilize areas that are likely to turn out with or without mobilizing institutions (Gershtenson 2003). If a group or neighborhood has the resources that historically predict mid-to-high levels of turnout, interest groups, parties, and candidates will focus their attention on them. Thus, mobilization is path dependent and reciprocal in nature. Unfortunately, minorities are, as a group, at a resource disadvantage (Verba, Schlozman, Brady, and Nie 1993). Even in mayoral races where minorities inevitably are important to electoral outcomes, candidates and interest groups are unlikely to start mobilization activities early enough or have the resources to recruit those who are unregistered, and historically, non-participants. Instead, they work from existing voter rolls and concentrate their activities on turning out those who have turned out before.

Thus, context and institutional resources cannot be completely separated. If an individual or a group lacks the desire to participate, requests to participate will largely go unheeded (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). If, as a group, minorities lack the political efficacy and social pressures that facilitate political participation, then minorities and the poor are more costly to mobilize and therefore may be ignored by political parties

and interest groups (Drier, Mollenkopf, and Swanstrom 2001; Leighley 2001).

Particularly if a person lives in a one-party dominant location, if they do not have a history of participation, they are unlikely to ever receive any mobilization requests or information about campaigns. Lacking support from the political parties, primary candidates are often cash strapped. They focus their attention on “super voters” leaving those with a spotty history of participation by the wayside.<sup>23</sup>

To summarize, there are at least three reasons why minority groups are not mobilized by the traditional mobilizing institutions that may compound the fact that minorities are socioeconomically disadvantaged. First, unless they make up a majority of the voting population, elites are not inclined to mobilize a group that usually takes more resources to mobilize (Leighley 2001) and who may threaten the existing coalition (Wong 2006). Second, local community groups may have other, more pressing matters to attend to, such as providing social services, or may lack the resources to engage in long-term political mobilization and socialization campaigns (Foley and Hoge 2007; Skerry 1993; Wong 2006). Third, the attempts to mobilize these groups may go unheeded because there is no social pressure within the group that makes participation a social norm.

Segregation compounds these factors. While segregation can help minorities reach a threshold of the population, at which point political parties require their votes, segregating them away from higher participating populations gives parties, candidates, and interest groups a choice as to whether or not to mobilize them. On the other hand, if neighborhoods were more integrated, minorities would be mobilized as part of existing

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<sup>23</sup> Super voters are defined as voters who regularly vote in primary elections.

mobilization campaigns.<sup>24</sup> Likewise, because parties and groups can ignore entire neighborhoods, it puts additional stress on community groups to provide political socialization and mobilization. For example, when Verba et al. (1995) critiqued Latino churches for not sufficiently socializing Latinos, Michael Jones-Correa and David Leal noted that it may not, in fact, be a problem with the church per se. Instead it follows from the fact that Latinos are generally so isolated from any civic engagement other than the church that the church can only do so much (Jones-Correa and Leal 2001, 766).

### *Policy Consequences*

Segregation also affects the way whites view minorities. Many recent public policies—from desegregated schools and fair housing to Affirmative Action—are predicated on the idea that not only are separate institutions inherently not equal, but also, contact with minorities decreases racial and ethnic tension and reduces prejudice (Lockhart et al., 1996; Dubofsky 1969; Massey and Denton 1993; Bowen and Bok 1998; Hurtado 1999). Despite the vast research investigating the causes and consequences of prejudice, we know little about how white-minority contact actually affects the development of prejudice.<sup>25</sup> Contact theory, as posited by scholars such as Allport (1954) and Sigelman and Welch (1993) purport that contact between whites and minorities challenges anti-minority stereotypes and leads to the development of inter-group understanding and greater cultural awareness. On the other hand, group threat theory posits that living near minorities increases inter-group conflict and heightens

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<sup>24</sup> There is the possibility, of course, that integration could hamper group-specific mobilization by race-based groups because racial minorities would be harder to identify. So if the same messages do not mobilize whites and minorities alike, integration could be detrimental to political communication.

<sup>25</sup> The best study to date was done by Dixon and Rosenbaum (2004).

stereotypes (Blalock, 1967; Bonacich 1972; Olzak 1992; Bartos and Wehr 2002). It is also likely that there is an interaction between the collective images of minority groups and the way in which whites view them—regardless of their contextual proximity (Huddy and Sears 1995; Gilens 2000). Little research has been done on how exposure to Latinos affects the attitudes of whites (but see Dixon and Rosenbaum 2004; Espino and Rocha Forthcoming). Since whites are the governing majority of the country, their attitudes towards the deservedness of Latinos is critical to their support for policies that disproportionately affect the Latino population, just as it is for African Americans (Kinder and Mendelberg 1995).

Dixon and Rosenbaum (2004) found evidence that in 2000, contact in an “interactive setting ameliorated anti-black and anti-Hispanic stereotypes” (257). Critically, contact with Hispanics in a community setting was important for decreasing anti-Hispanic attitudes in particular. However, their study was conducted in 2000 before the press and politicians began a major assault on immigration which focused primarily on Latinos. While immigration certainly played a role in the 2000 election, it became one of the top issues by the 2004 election, causing both major party candidates to visit the U.S.-Mexico border and discuss their immigration enforcement policies. Now that the media have focused heavily on Latinos and their presence has played a major role in political debate, both at the local and national level, it is necessary to revisit the question of how contact affects interracial relations.<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> The perceptions of the majority may also decrease Latino political participation. Quiroga (1997) finds that Latino communities that are perceived negatively participate less and have greater apathy toward government institutions.

The social construction of Latinos also potentially dampens their ability to achieve legislative goals and leads to the introduction and passage of legislation that harms the Latino community. Public perception (or misconception) of target groups affects support for government policies in the public domain as well as in legislatures. Schneider and Ingram (1993) argue that the social construction of target groups affects the tools policymakers choose. Social construction refers to characteristics that differentiate the target group from other individuals. These characteristics include value-laden symbols, stereotypes, and images that society assigns to the group. Policies directed at groups with negative social constructions tend to draw upon more punitive elements than policies directed at groups with positive social constructions. Thus, the stereotypes that permeate the public perception of Latinos affect both the preferences of the public and the policies that legislators will support.

The theory of social construction explains why politicians rally around anti-immigrant initiatives. Because Latinos have little political power and are perceived negatively by the public (as well as in the media), legislators respond by taking up anti-immigrant/anti-Latino agendas (Magana and Short 2002). These perceptions should be dependent upon contextual characteristics. If legislators have voting Latinos in their district, they may be more inclined to support programs that disproportionately benefit Latinos; whereas legislators who are isolated from and fearful of Latinos and immigrants may be more likely to take up the anti-immigrant battle cry.

### Gaps in the Literature

In sum, the existing literature indicates conflicting propositions in two areas: 1) how context affects political participation and 2) how residential integration affects



interracial conflict and policy outcomes. In regard to participation, the literature indicates both that 1) residential homogeneity has beneficial outcomes that facilitate civic and political participation and 2) segregation constrains civic and political participation. The results for proposition 1 are primarily driven by research on whites and the results of proposition 2 are primarily driven by research on African Americans. In regard to policy outcomes, the literature indicates that 1) residential proximity increases inter-group understanding and support for policies adversely affecting minority groups and 2) that residential proximity produces inter-group conflict and group threat resulting in a backlash against policies that help minority groups. The majority of this literature focuses on black-white interaction. Clearly the literature shows that the effect of residential segregation is multifaceted and group-specific. This dissertation attempts to extend our understanding of the way residential context and interracial contact affects Latino political outcomes—from socioeconomic mobility to political participation to policy outcomes.

## Chapter 3: A View from the Ground: How Segregation Affects Latino Lives

Most of the social science research conducted on the effects of residential segregation has focused on the plight of the black community. Perhaps first noted by Gunnar Myrdal in 1944, black segregation produces institutional and structural barriers that feed a “vicious circle.” Social and residential segregation “makes inequalities in politics and justice more possible and seemingly justifiable” (Myrdal, 1944, 642). The consensus is clear: for blacks, residential segregation leads to numerous negative social and psychological outcomes. It precludes high quality educational and economic opportunities, engenders the loss of personal efficacy, and often manifests itself in negative psychological and behavioral adaptations that run counter to larger societal norms (Massey and Denton 1993; Wilson 1996; Jencks and Mayer 1990). On the positive side of the ledger, residential segregation most certainly facilitates the ability of blacks to achieve descriptive representation, yet little evidence exists that political empowerment bestows substantial benefits to blacks who fall below the middle class. Years of research strongly suggests that local black representatives are constrained from delivering poverty-oriented, redistributive programs that could result in meaningful community uplift for the urban and suburban poor. One only needs to consider the condition of poor urban neighborhoods in empowered cities to appreciate the substantial limits to descriptive representation. In the words of Norman Fainstein (1995, 131-132):

Whatever advantages blacks have gleaned from ghettoization—mainly in political representation—constitute a silver lining in an otherwise dark cloud that has negatively affected communal life, economic success, and, most generally, the political situation of blacks and whites alike. For ghettoization is not compatible with racial equality; separation, as it has been established in the

American system, reflects and supports subordination.

Far less research investigates the various effects of residential segregation on poor immigrant communities. There are many reasons to believe that segregation poses social, political and economic challenges to vulnerable immigrant communities that mirrors the black experience in some respects. The history and circumstances of the Latino immigrant community, however, are distinct from the black community in a number of important ways. Many Latino immigrants face language barriers and few come to this country as citizens. In many cases, they come without documentation and are therefore categorized and stigmatized as illegal. Vital resources and skills necessary for the social and economic progress of the Latino immigrant community must be acquired locally. Because language acquisition can be a slow process, naturalization requires information, and school systems often are tied to local budgets, segregation has the potential to both help and hurt Latino immigrants. In some cases, for example, segregated Latino enclaves may provide beneficial short-term support for non-English speaking immigrants and their offspring. These short-term benefits are likely outweighed, however, by the long-term detriments associated with social and economic isolation. To the extent that segregated Latino communities are simply way stations for immigrants as they socially and economically assimilate into the larger society, they may pose only minimal threats to the long-term well being of Latino communities.

Substantial research on the residential trajectory of first and second generation Latino immigrants, however, provides little support for this thesis. Rather, Hispanic immigrants and their offspring often remain trapped in high poverty, ethnically segregated barrios long beyond their initial period of immigration (Brown 2007; Wahl,

Breckenridge, and Gunkel 2007), particularly if they have darker skin (Iceland and Nelson 2008). As the rate of Latino segregation continues to grow rather than dissipate, questions surrounding the consequences of Latino isolation become all the more pressing (Timberlake and Iceland 2007; Zhou 1997).

Drawing from the literature on segregation and the Black community, I set out to explain how segregation affects Latino immigrant communities, particularly in regard to adaptation, socioeconomic mobility, political participation, community relations, and political empowerment. Drawing on interviews with Latino community leaders and observations of organizational meetings in Latino communities, this chapter identifies a number of segregation-related challenges to the Latino community. In this chapter, I use on-the-ground evidence to indicate that the correlative relationships I explore in this dissertation appear in both micro and macro level analysis. In addition, the qualitative evidence provided here provides causal weight to the large-n correlative findings presented in the next few chapters. Based on a set of interviews conducted from January 2008 to February 2009, I highlight a number of serious concerns that correspond with the residential concentration of Latino immigrants. The most deleterious consequences of segregation fall into five main categories that include economic obstacles, the diffusion of fear and institutional distrust within the community, inadequate educational opportunities, and the lack of social capital for political action. Moreover, each of these obstacles is exacerbated by anti-immigrant fervor and the designation of Latino communities as “illegal” by elected officials and street level bureaucrats. To a large extent, the testimony of community leaders confirms and expands upon what little we know about segregation as it pertains to Latino immigrants. In this regard, this chapter

constitutes an important foundation for the empirical analyses I conduct in the remainder of this dissertation but also serves to validate many of my theoretical claims.

### Methodology

Most of my interviews took place between January, 2008 and February, 2009 in three locations: New York City; Baltimore, Maryland; and the Maryland suburbs surrounding Washington, DC. These places were chosen for their proximity (due to my limited research budget) but also for the diversity they offered in terms of their respective Latino populations in terms of size, duration of immigration flow, and nationality. New York City, a traditional immigrant gateway city (Singer et al. 2008) is one of the most segregated cities in the United States for Latinos (Wilkes and Iceland 2007). Although it has traditionally been very segregated for African Americans, over the last twenty years the rapid growth of the Latino population and the limited options for affordable housing have led to a “hyper-segregation” of the Latino community (Wilkes and Iceland 2004). As a traditional immigrant gateway site, numerous community and nationality-specific organizations that focus on organizing and providing services to the immigrant community exist in New York. New York has had sustained Latino immigration over the last century. In 1970, about 20 percent of the population of New York was Latino; today, just over 35 percent of the city’s population is Latino. People from Latin America also make up over half of all the foreign born population in New York. The school system is one of the most segregated in the country. According to the American Communities Project at Brown University, the average Hispanic student in New York City attends a school comprised almost entirely by other Latino students and where over three-quarters

of the children are poor.<sup>27</sup>

The Washington suburbs, on the other hand, are categorized as a new immigrant gateway (Singer et al. 2008). Over the last 30 years, immigrants from almost every nation have made their homes in this area, mainly in the suburbs immediately surrounding the district. Although they are not a majority of the immigrant population, the largest immigrant group is Latinos—primarily from Central America. The inner ring DC suburbs all have large Latino populations and their recent influx into the area has sparked several anti-immigrant initiatives in Northern Virginia. The Latino population of the Washington suburbs has grown exponentially. Although it varies by county, in 1970, Latinos barely registered on the population thermometer. Today, Latinos make up between 20 and 30 percent of the population in the counties that border the District. Several immigrant and Latino-focused interest groups have formed over the last decade to serve the Latino community but few have been around longer than a few years.

Finally, Baltimore's Latino population has been growing quickly but still is extremely small compared to Washington and New York. There are few civic groups focusing on organizing the Latino community. Despite their relative newness, the Latino population of Baltimore has a strong presence and has revived shopping districts that previously held blocks of vacant retail stores. Latinos make up just fewer than 2 percent of the population. Organizations serving the Latino community are rare and those that exist are very new.

These three distinct locations enable me to compare and contrast the benefits and drawbacks of residential segregation for established and newcomer Latino communities. Each area also houses some integrated Latino communities and some segregated Latino

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<sup>27</sup> See: <http://www.s4.brown.edu/schoolsegregation/index.htm> site visited on March 31, 2009.

communities.

The interview and observational data represent a purposeful, not random, sample. Interview participants were chosen for their extensive knowledge and experience working in and with Latino immigrant communities. I identified interview subjects using a snowball method. For each city, I compiled a list of high profile Latino elected officials and elected officials who represent largely Latino communities, Latino/immigrant social service and political organizations, political organizations that lobby on behalf of immigration issues, and organizations listed as affiliates of several national Latino and immigrant interest groups. I sent letters to the elected officials and directors of the organizations requesting an interview. Letters were followed up with phone calls to schedule interviews. At the end of each interview, I asked the interviewees for recommendations for other organizations, elected officials, and activists with whom they thought I should speak. I then followed up with these people, repeating the process at each interview. I also requested from my interview subjects the date and times of community meetings that I could attend.

I should note that starting a project such as this requires some amount of social capital and established relationships with interview participants. My personal experience working in county politics in Prince George's and Montgomery County, Maryland and in Maryland state politics gave me prior knowledge of and experience with the most high profile Latino leaders in Maryland. To be clear, my pre-existing social networks made my quest for interview participants in Maryland far easier. Several Latino elected officials and lobbyists made calls on my behalf to help me set up interviews with people I did not previously know. In addition, during the first 5 months of this dissertation I

worked in the House of Delegates in Annapolis, which enabled me to attend committee hearings addressing immigration and I used these hearings as a networking opportunity in which I could approach members of interest groups for interviews.

Setting up interviews in New York proved to be more difficult. My initial phone calls and emails were successful in only a few cases. Several friends and professors at universities in New York City, thankfully, helped me establish connections with a few critical community organizations. Once I established relationships with a few people in New York through these means, they were happy to help me establish contacts with others who they believed could provide valuable insights.

Finally, I signed up for several community listservs to identify other meetings that I could observe. I attended as many community meetings as my schedule allowed. Due to travel and budget constrictions, I only attended community meetings in Baltimore and the DC suburbs.

My interviews were generally conducted either in or near places in which my interview subjects were employed. As a result, I was able to spend many hours observing the activities in the front offices of community organizations and government offices. This enabled me to witness the goings-on of community organization and learn who sought the ears of Latino elected officials. Because many community organizers and activists lack personal office space, I enjoyed the added benefit of getting to eat at my subjects' favorite restaurants and sample many local cuisines (and on more than one occasion was invited into people's homes for home cooked versions). It was not uncommon to meet at a community organization and then walk to a local restaurant or café. This permitted me to get a feel for the neighborhood and often get at least a partial



tour of the important meeting places and the largest geographic problems facing the community. All of the interviews were conducted in person and each lasted between one and two hours. All interviews were conducted in English, except one. For the one exception, a town mayor and a ten year old child served as translators. The formal interviews were tape recorded and later transcribed. Discussions held while on walks around a neighborhood or elsewhere were not recorded, but I did my best to note the exact wording of what people said immediately after the conclusion of the discussion. At community and organizational meetings I took detailed notes about the topic and tone of discussions, including if there were interpreters present and who participated in the discussion.

The interviews were conducted in an "open-ended" interview format. A list of basic pre-established questions is available in Appendix A as part of the IRB approval. These questions led the discussion but at all times I encouraged participants to elaborate on points they made in response to questions and allowed the conversation to move to different areas of discussion so as to allow the participants to give their thoughts about Latino communities uninhibited by the structure of the questions.

To evaluate the data gathered through the interviews, I read all of my transcripts and notes looking for themes that consistently arose in the interviews. I coded interview results by these themes, noting when the participant's response was contrary to other view points. Contrary viewpoints were given separate theme codes. For example, if a participant discussed English language learning, the response was given an English code. A sub code was then given if they were discussing how segregation benefited English acquisition and another sub code if they were explaining how segregation hurt English

attainment. Although I employed a coding scheme, I did not attempt to translate my qualitative data into a quantitative data set. The coding simply helped organize the project for interpretive purposes and to validate my interpretations of the frequency of various themes. Unfortunately, due to space restrictions I am unable to address all of the themes that came up during my interviews. Here I only present the themes that were most relevant to the questions I set out to answer and that were the most prevalent themes in the interviews.

Given the sensitivity of the information provided by my interview subjects, and as a means to increase the comfort they felt with me, I agreed not to release the names of the interview subjects. The few times I refer to names in the text, I have changed them so as to protect their identity. In general, I refer to my interview participants solely by their titles (elected official, community activist, etc.). I have also removed the names of other elected officials mentioned in the interviews as well as geographic identifiers. I am greatly indebted to the time that my interview subjects granted me despite their overwhelming work schedules and extremely demanding jobs.

In the following pages, I first discuss the drawbacks of segregation and how problems that are common among immigrants and the poor are compounded by segregated housing patterns. In particular, I focus on the psychological and socioeconomic consequences of segregation. In the second section, I evaluate the benefits that segregation confer to Latinos—primarily the rewards of co-ethnic empowerment and the ease of mobilization. In the final section, I discuss the fact that my interviews indicate that the drawbacks of segregation appear to far outweigh the advantages.

*The Disadvantages of Segregation: Psychological, Socioeconomic, and Political Participation*

**The Psychological Consequences of Segregation**

Segregation stigmatizes and leaves scars on the psyches of Latinos coming of age in segregated areas. Mary Romero (2006) argues that because immigration control mechanisms require the use of phenotypes to profile for potential illegal immigrants, Latinos, particularly poor Latinos, are under constant suspicion from police as well as business owners and others in positions of power (also see Aguirre 2004; Espino and Franz 2002). Accordingly, because the Latino poor are often segregated in urban and suburban barrios, racial profiling contributes to “identifying urban space racially” (Romero 2006, 469) where whole neighborhoods become suspicious and are targeted for ongoing immigration raids. According to Romero, the use of profiling instead of probable cause in immigration control, combined with the relative concentration of the Latino poor, results in a “petite apartheid” (also see Georges-Abeyie 2001):

Immigration law enforcement in US cities is not structured around systematic or random checking of identification but rather a pattern of citizenship inspection that maintains the landscape of suspicion. Given the class and racial segregation perpetuated by exclusive residential zoning, the INS targets ethnic cultural spaces marked by Mexican-owned businesses, agencies offering bilingual services, and neighborhoods with the highest concentration of poor and working-class Latinos. Within these areas, INS agents engage in ‘typing’ suspected aliens (Romero 2006, 453).

Their association with illegal immigrants hurts Latino neighborhoods. When Latinos, citizens and foreign nationals alike, are isolated together by restrictive housing opportunities, whole communities become suspect by police and employers as potentially being “illegal.” Macro discrimination results in a significant number of second generation Latino immigrants who see little place for themselves in the economy and who have little optimism of their chances of success in the United States (Portes and

Rumbaut 2001).

When discrimination is common against a population and that population is confined in a designated geographic location, the effects of discrimination multiply exponentially. Everyone in the community begins to live under the radar. Residents distrust police and other members of the establishment, are less likely to report crimes and other abuses, and become pessimistic about their ability to change their situation or get authorities to listen.

The fear associated with living in segregated Latino neighborhoods was a consistent theme in the interviews I conducted. Without being prompted, almost every interview subject, regardless of location, mentioned the psychological consequences of segregation to the Latino community.

Several community organizers noted how the fear of calling attention to their families and their neighborhood complicated community organizing, making it difficult to convince people to take part in the political process, or even to stand up for their basic rights with landlords or employers. One organizer said, “People definitely come with all sorts of fears, like the fear of making their families vulnerable. Sometimes there is the fear of being exposed to the police, things like that.” Another noted that “with the immigrant community, they’re worried about who they are going to talk to, what they’re going to say, and where that person is going to bring that information.” A local community activist in New York noted that when they organize, they first have to convince people it is safe, which can be very a very difficult task. “If you are living in constant fear that you’re going to be picked up, of course that’s going to affect people because they’re going to worry about coming out. The question we often get when we’re

going somewhere is ‘Is it going to be ok? Is it going to be safe?’” One community organizer suggested that people fear that if they participate in politics there will be “repercussions.” Another noted that these fears were justified because there had been a major uptick in raids in their neighborhood after they organized a protest.

The fear that Latino immigrant families face rolls over into interactions with their landlords and employers. Unpaid and underpaid wages are so common, that several of the organizations I met with have assigned staff exclusively to helping people claim their wages. All of them expressed that the number of reported wage issues was far lower than the actual number of unpaid wage cases. Underreporting was always attributed to the fear that immigrants faced. If they complain about their wages, they might lose their jobs and many feared that the employer could even report them (documented or not) to the police. Even among documented immigrants, many have so little grasp of their rights that they fear that employers will have sway over citizenship decisions. Moreover, since Latino immigrants often feel disenfranchised, they tolerate a very high level of abuse. Several community organizers and elected officials commented that, in effect, the immigrants they worked with thought of unpaid wages as a tax for their status.

Landlord abuse is even more rampant and leads to whole apartment complexes maintained in a state of dilapidation. One community organizer that worked particularly on tenant rights explained that the Latinos living in concentrated Latino housing developments often do not know their rights, but even when they do, they are afraid that if they complain to management there could be retaliation. Either the landlord would evict them, or call Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). Even if they were citizens and did not fear for their own status, the knowledge that they could be putting

others at risk weighs heavily.

Several interviewees also noted that the fear of repercussions is not isolated to the undocumented or documented non-citizen population. “There is a general reluctance found for people who are eligible, naturalized, to become more connected because of family members or others who may not be here with proper documentation...I think there is a little bit of pressure to stay in the shadows.” Another posited that, “Even naturalized citizens fear deportation because of loopholes in the law. So people just stay out of the public, they stay quiet. Fear is a big issue.”

The impact of this fear of attention on children was a major concern of many of the people I interviewed. Segregated communities increase the chances that parents will be picked up by the police and detained while they check for immigration violations. Several interview subjects noted that in the most segregated neighborhoods, the children were on constant alert and were very fearful that they would come home from school to find out that one, if not both, parents had been detained or deported. Children in this environment learn to avoid interaction with authorities by whatever means possible. They also endure extreme psychological stress not completely dissimilar from that which occurs in a war zone. When raids happen, word spreads fast in concentrated Latino communities. Children will hear at school that a raid occurred somewhere in the community and they can spend the remainder of the school day fearing that they have, for all intents and purposes, lost a parent. This situation led one interview subject to prophesize that a majority of the second generation who live in segregated Latino immigrant communities will have some sort of post-traumatic stress disorder when they grow up. She told me about a small girl who panicked at the sight of police lights

passing by. Fearing and loathing police leads to poor community relations, adverse consequences for the socialization of immigrant youth, and an inability of police to get information from people when violent crimes occur.<sup>28</sup>

Segregation also appears to socialize children to accept substandard living and work arrangements. They grow up in an environment that rewards brushing institutional and structural problems under the rug and punishes those who stand up for their rights. Because they live in areas stigmatized as “illegal,” people become socialized to believe that they do not have rights within the system. As one community organizer noted, children “become very disillusioned” and feel as though they are second class citizens, lacking basic rights. Many organizers expressed frustration over their observations that second and third generation Latinos who grow up in segregated and impoverished living conditions are socialized to accept poverty and dilapidated buildings and schools. Often, second and third generation immigrants, many interview subjects noted, know and understand their rights, but their concern for their neighbor’s (and parents) safety can keep them from engaging. In addition, even if they know how the system works, they often lack the organizing skills or the resources to help mobilize their communities. In effect, the decision to try to keep the neighborhood out of the minds of officials, coupled with few applicable skills for community organizing compounds the inability of these neighborhoods to mobilize.

Segregation also seems to exacerbate both the amount of discrimination that

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<sup>28</sup> It is important to note that several interview subjects told me stories about very serious problems with the police. Perhaps the most instructive was about a Latino teenager who had been raped. She reported it to the police and while investigating the crime, police found that her father had immigration issues. As a result of reporting a rape to the police, her father was deported. Many police departments have decided to not investigate immigration status for victims and their families for just this reason, but stories such as this have become urban legends that instruct children to not cooperate with the police even when it is in general the right thing to do.

Latinos face on a daily basis and the fear/distrust of government that immigrants often bring from their home countries. Discussing discrimination in segregated communities, interview subjects noted that it was “a big problem,” “everywhere,” and “just a daily reality.” Being the victims of discrimination seems to aggravate the fear that people feel toward contact with public officials and organizing politically, since Latinos, having experienced significant discrimination, feel sure that whatever they do, they will be taken to jail. Many of my interview participants noted that experiences in home countries exacerbate the fear Latino immigrants feel toward political participation.<sup>29</sup> According to one community activist, “people come from countries where a protest will surely land you in jail and make things even worse. So they have all that stuff, and they are very scared of protesting, very scared of doing things that would [back home] get you killed, get you tortured, put you in jail.” And another said that the distrust of government originates “from their home countries...they think ‘don’t go to the police.’ Just this distrust from the corruption in their home countries is a direct correlation.” One elected official even took me to meet a constituent who lived down the street to find out why she did not call the police when there were problems (she did, however, complain to him, but there was nothing he could do if she never reported it to the police at the time of the trouble). Her response highlighted the community's distrust of the police. When asked what her experiences with the police had been in the past she noted that in her home country “you call and they take days to come, in my town they would have to hitch a ride to get to you, and who knows what you would end up dealing with for having called them?” Of course, her experiences in this country didn’t help matters either. “Here, they always ask for papers and I’m a citizen, but my husband isn’t. I don’t want to deal with

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<sup>29</sup> Peter Burns (2007) found the same reaction from his interview subjects.



that.”

Having a parent or grandparent who distrusts the police and is afraid of contact with government institutions can be overcome when children are exposed to different opinions and witness that the fear and hesitation they see at home is not necessarily widespread in the community. However, when children grow up in segregated environments where these feelings are not only widespread but reinforced by raids, random police searches and other anti-immigrant initiatives, then fear, distrust, and cynicism about government is passed down from one generation to the next and permeates whole communities. One elected official explained to me that his grandmother used to tell him almost every day to “be careful what you do, this is not your country.” But growing up in a largely white middle class suburb, he never took her seriously. However, he thought his own reaction would have been quite different if he had grown up in the segregated barrio that he now represents: “There it would have meant something.”

Segregation appears to dampen both internal and external political efficacy. Latino immigrants and their children in segregated environments, according to many of my interview subjects, appear to neither feel that they have a voice or if they mobilized their community they could achieve change. Of course it is important to note that even some of the community organizers felt similarly. One even noted that impoverished immigrants are right to have low efficacy because, “they’re right, nothing does ever change.” The low political efficacy of these neighborhoods resounded in community meetings. At one meeting I attended a community organization was drafting a master plan for the community and prioritizing community projects so their elected officials

would know which projects were most important to the residents, several members of the group openly expressed that they were wasting their time. The economy had just begun to sink and even the community leaders felt that there was no way that their community would be receiving any funds for projects from the state in the coming years. Thus, there was no point in even submitting requests. Interestingly, I attended a similar meeting in a middle class, predominant white, neighborhood the next week as part of my job. Since the state legislative session was about to commence, this group was undergoing the same discussion, prioritizing projects and laying out their vision for their community. Again, everyone was cognizant of the fiscal climate, but the overarching message communicated by attendees at this meeting was “we better get our requests in first” and that they were just going to have to fight harder to make sure they got what they “deserved.”

The anti-immigrant climate in the United States does not encourage immigrants to return home. Instead, anti-immigrant fervor heightens the fear and anxiety Latino immigrants and their children feel, and increases the likelihood that Latino communities will attempt to control crime from within (or learn to live with it) instead of going to the police. As one elected official noted, “I think it’s [the reluctance to engage authorities] exacerbated by a national climate that’s anti immigrant. The raids, the punitive measures ...you know it’s scary for people. People who risked everything to come here, to give their kids a shot at a better life. Why risk it?” Another explained that the documented and undocumented communities are so connected that anti immigrant legislation sends a message to everyone that they are not welcome.

Everybody who is here legally, there is at least one person guaranteed, I can guarantee you at least one person close to us is not legal. Whether it be an uncle or a cousin...we know somebody. And we may not love them to death, but we aren’t going to say ‘go screw yourself’....[anti-immigrant

initiatives] differentiate between two groups that are very, very close together and for you to say one thing about the other, I mean clearly, that's going to affect everybody.

### **The Socioeconomic Consequences of Segregation**

Levels of segregation for black and Latino students have been steadily increasing since the 1980s (Orfield and Lee 2004). Studies of both African American segregation and concentrated poverty identify socioeconomic mobility as *the* major problem with segregation. Wilson (1996) argues that segregating the poor creates a culture in which children grow up with few employed role models, which cultivates a disorganized social structure unique to the inner city poor. Massey and Denton (1993) likewise posit that racial segregation is the core reason for concentrated poverty and also argue that even wealthy segregated minority communities are worse off than their white counterparts. Both largely attribute the problems of segregation/concentrated poverty to the lack of opportunities for socioeconomic mobility. As Massey and Denton (1993, 153) state:

For blacks, in other words, high incomes do not buy entrée to residential circumstances that can serve as springboards for future socioeconomic mobility; in particular, blacks are unable to achieve a school environment conducive to later academic success. In Philadelphia, children from an affluent black family are likely to attend a public school where the percentage of low-achieving students is three times greater than the percentage in schools attended by affluent white children.

While Wilson attributes the persistent socioeconomic problems to a lack of economic integration and not to race per se, Massey and Denton argue that they cannot be separated. Economic segregation for Blacks, Latinos, and whites is on the rise (Dreier et al. 2001) but the impact of poverty appears to be more detrimental to minority students than their white counterparts, and economic segregation is more extensive for racial minorities than for whites. According to the National Center for Educational Statistics, only four percent of white students were enrolled in a “high poverty” school during the

2005-2006 school year, even in urban and rural areas.<sup>30</sup>

Today, over sixty percent of Hispanics attend a high poverty school and over 77 percent attend a school that is majority-minority (Orfield & Lee, 2005). Even middle class Hispanic students, like their African American counterparts, are likely to attend a school with a greater number of students in poverty and a larger number of second language learners. The state of Latino education in segregated schools is disheartening. Latinos who attend a majority-minority school are more than five times less likely to graduate on time than Latinos in majority white schools (Balfanz & Legters, 2004). Orfield and Lee (2005, 6) find that in 2002, almost a third of majority minority high schools graduated less than half of their students. Among schools that were ninety percent or more white on the other hand, only one school out of the fifty they sampled had a graduation rate that low. They report that two-thirds of the schools in which less than a tenth of the student body was white had dropout rates of over 40 percent.

In addition, poor white children are more likely to attend a school with significantly more middle class students than their minority peers. Attending a higher SES school appears to benefit poor students. For example, Boger (2005) found that poor children attending middle class schools were much more likely to perform at grade level than poor children in high poverty schools. Segregation also creates schools with fewer resources. Schools in segregated poor areas are not only more challenged by social factors (such as parents with low education levels who cannot help with homework, students working full time jobs outside of school, higher malnutrition rates and health problems, more student turnover, and higher concentration of limited English speakers)

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<sup>30</sup> See: <http://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/2008/section4/indicator29.asp> site last visited on March 21, 2009. But the impact of being in a higher or extreme poverty school is clear--higher poverty rates lead to low graduation rates and low overall achievement rates among all students.

but because of the local level funding structure of many school systems, these schools tend to have fewer financial resources. As a result, schools a) are less able to attract and retain highly qualified teachers, b) have more unqualified teachers and c) have more year to year teacher turnover (U.S. Department of Education 2005, also see Darling-Hammond 2001).

The low quality of education that Latino students receive in segregated neighborhoods was a persistent concern expressed by my interview subjects. A general malaise passed over my interview subjects when I broached the topic of how Latino students fare in concentrated Latino schools. Several community organizers and elected officials felt that Latino students are purposefully funneled into low performance, high violence, and low stability schools. They also generally agreed that very few school administrators or teachers feel that Latino students are worth their time and investment. Instead, Latino children, and sometimes whole schools, are written off. Unfortunately, to add insult to injury, Latino immigrant parents lack experience navigating the school system and other institutions. Instead of fighting for their children to be transferred to better schools or demanding reforms, they often withdraw and feel that their children's educations are out of their hands. Schools benefit from active parental involvement, but when parents work two jobs, often have little education themselves and feel that the school system is against them, schools with concentrated immigrant populations appear to have little if any parental involvement. As one community organizer from New York noted:

The task of educating a million students is a huge one, and ELLs [English Language Learners] and their parents are very new to the country, and do not know how to navigate, how to understand the choices that they have, and so they all do not take advantage of what exists that may be really

positive. And ELL's routinely are channeled into the most underfunded, overcrowded, difficult, violent schools, and so they are kind of set up to fail from the beginning. And then there is a kind of historically underfunded base of teachers, so the city does not have enough ESL teachers, English teachers. That has a lot to do with it. If you ask a principal, what is the right way of educating an English language learner, more often than not they are going to say, "They're not going to graduate." I think the expectation of their performance is extremely low. And principals have a lot of work to do even with the ones who are not trying to learn English.

The absence of role models was also a consistent theme. Latino students, who are concentrated in schools where few parents have a high school diploma, lack role models that could set an example of scholarly excellence. According to my interview subjects, low student achievement in concentrated Latino schools is caused by multiple reinforcing factors—parents who are not necessarily pushing children to succeed, teachers who do not believe that their students will succeed, and then student social networks in which no one is thinking about college, or even graduation. As one Latino elected official noted:

The role modeling, the messaging, the looking at education as the primary thing in that child's life, is missing. It's just as important to see her daughter happy, to go to the mall, because she's never seen that herself. She's never had the rigor, and the discipline that has to come if you're going to do well at education. So that self, I mean, in my case, myself and my kids, there was absolutely no doubt that we had to excel in school, there was no option, and it was the first thing that you needed to do, and if you didn't do it, there was all hell to pay. That push does not exist as strongly in the Latino community... [My] county is excellent if you come to it, in the standard model, two college educated parents, middle class, upper-middle class. Yes we have wonderful teachers, wonderful curriculum, you will excel, you will go to Stanford, Harvard, wherever. But if you don't come like that, the model breaks down. We don't know how to teach that kid, and you know, there may be the cure for cancer sitting right there.

Many of my interview subjects advocated new ways of engaging parents in the schools and education programs to help Latino parents access the schools and also to

teach them what their roles are in their children's education. In New York, a Latino-focused community organization recently became a partner with the city to open up a second language learner charter school as an innovative way to deal with this problem. By making the community organization a part of the structure, the school enables the parents of the community who were already active in the organization to have greater access and to take a larger part in the school. The school is making great progress and has all bi-lingual teachers and staff to facilitate parent involvement.

However, even with a focus on teaching second language learners, many of my interview subjects were quite conflicted over the benefits of educating ELL students in concentrated environments, even when the schools are specially designed to meet ELL students' needs. In general, schools with a greater concentration of Latino and second language learners have the potential to cater to their special needs. They can offer services that other schools do not and can specialize in educating ELL children. But, how beneficial is this model? One community organizer in Maryland noted that concentrated Latino schools could provide some level of comfort for Latino students, but given the typically low level of Latino parent involvement, he felt that it was generally better to have more integration. "I mean, there is the possibility that when they're all together as Latinos, they at least have the cultural and linguistic capacity to at least begin to interact and relate. But it doesn't happen in the academic context for Latinos, unfortunately. Parent engagement in the education of their youth is pretty abysmal." A New York activist was extremely conflicted about how much benefit these ESL-specialty schools benefited her community. While she was happy that they had been able to raise the graduation rate from 25 percent to almost 80 percent in just a matter of years, she also

felt that it was a step back for the rights of the ESL population.

We've created all these 'international high schools' [high schools explicitly for ELL students], but it doesn't matter how many international high schools you create, the solution is not to segregate all immigrants to only these schools, although these schools are very successful, and we love ours, but what about if an ELL wants to go to an art school? What about if they want to go to an intramural school? So I think the policies have not been very mindful of the potential, and instead have reproduced a system of real discrimination and segregation of students because they are new in the country and they don't speak English.

Several states have also recently come under fire for school policies that create segregated schools *within* schools in an attempt to better meet the needs of ESL students. At this point, weighing the social costs and benefits of "newcomer schools" whether housed within or outside mainstream K-12 schools is too complicated to decisively condemn either approach. There are both benefits and problems for ESL students when they are removed from mainstream classes and there are social costs to removing Latinos from integrated classrooms where students of all colors would otherwise learn to interact in a multicultural environment. The key question remains, do separated schools help or harm at-risk children by isolating them from the mainstream (Belluck 1995; Stewart 2009)?

Perhaps more disconcerting to many of the elected officials and activists are the vulnerability of students in de facto segregated Latino schools. In particular, gang recruitment in schools compounds the other problems that concentrated Latino schools face. Concentrating underprivileged kids creates situations in which students are ripe for the picking. As one youth organizer noted, "the segregation of Latino students, sort of residentially, but also educationally, makes it completely easier for gangs to recruit, to gain strength, and to really have a strong presence in particular communities."



School desegregation seems to be the fix that most people pointed to, mainly to deplete the power of the gangs, but also to expose the kids to more role models. One Latino youth organizer who works with both integrated and segregated schools in the DC area argued:

If there's only a couple here and a couple there, well, it's easier to reach out to the very few students. But gangs need numbers in order to be strong and in order to claim territory and defend themselves from other gangs. And that missed outpost, you know, in some school way over there that's four people strong is just not going to survive, either in sort of the gang culture or, frankly, because there's going to be so many other influences that those four or five other students are going to be exposed to that are, I think, going to lead them out of that alternative.

Another organizer supported this view, saying, "Gangs target concentrated Latino schools and the kids don't know other options. It's either join a gang or drop out to help support the family.... The kids in integrated schools just have more options. They see their friends succeeding, thinking about college, you know.... I think it helps." The overwhelming agreement appeared to be that the concentration of Latino students either on purpose through the creation of newcomer schools or de facto concentration based on housing patterns made the students more susceptible to "bad apples" as one elected official put it.

The situation was so extreme in many areas that elected officials felt that there was little hope for many of the children they represented. During one of my interviews, we took a walk around a neighborhood and met some of the local school children. One little girl entertained us with a long explanation of what she was learning in school (long division) and what she wanted to be when she grew up (fashion designer, real estate agent, maybe a nurse). When we left, I commented that the girl appeared to be doing

great and that she had a lot of potential. My tour guide, the town mayor, was not as enthusiastic. He had watched several kids like her start their educations with optimism but with such bad schools, they became discouraged and dropped out. Looking back at the playground, he sighed and said "a lot of these [Latino] kids are enthusiastic learners in elementary school. But then they get to high school, and the gangs, the social pressure... It changes." He proceeded to point out all the places in the neighborhood—the bike path, another playground, a grocery store—where, he just learned, kids avoided because of the local gangs.

The other infringement to socioeconomic mobility that segregation negates is the opportunity for employment. In this regard, the economic implications of segregation on Latino immigrants are often not as extreme as they are for African Americans (Wilson 1996, 51-52). Martha Van Haitsma commented that in Chicago, "Mexican immigrants living in Chicago poverty areas may well be residents of crowded and dilapidated buildings, but they are surrounded by small local businesses, many of them owned and operated by persons of Mexican origin, and by Mexican-targeted social service agencies. Poverty-tract blacks are more isolated from jobs and from employed neighbors than are Mexican immigrants" (Van Haitsma as quoted in Wilson 1996, 52). While there is no doubt that segregated and socioeconomically disadvantaged Latinos are much more likely to be surrounded by employed role models than African Americans in similarly segregated areas, the opportunities for socioeconomic advancement are still limited in segregated Latino neighborhoods.

As Suro (1999), and Rumbaut and Portes (2001) note, concentrated Latino social networks often lack connections to opportunities for economic growth. When no one

within a social network works in a higher-paid, higher-status job, it is hard to gain connections for upward mobility (Granovetter 1973; 1983). Concentrated working-class and working-poor social networks are a great benefit to new immigrants who need employment upon arrival but they can be damaging in the long term by isolating Latinos from people with more knowledge of other employment opportunities (Waldinger 2001). Further, while Latino children are surrounded by employed adults (often in multiple jobs), their American socialization teaches them to expect more than the meager salaries and hard working conditions that their parents endure. Thus, the second generation is often reluctant to accept the few employment options available if they have not adequately acquired the education necessary to gain middle class employment (Suro 1999). In addition, economic downturns cut most deeply in the Latino community, often taking their first toll on employment sectors where Latinos are disproportionately represented—construction, service workers, and domestic workers. In a depressed economy, service and domestic workers are the first to go. Nannies, yard workers, day laborers and others are typically employed only when there is excess cash available to the middle class, and thus fall prey to tightening purses in tougher times (Kochhar 2009).

In addition, even if everyone in the neighborhood is employed, most are not employed in ways that inspire the children to stay in school and work toward better futures. Instead, the economic and social prospects for the second generation remain bleak, and the children are often ignorant as to how to escape their current economic situation. As one community organizer put it,

I think it's just harder for them to see alternatives, it is harder for them to see people living another way, people acting another way. And that reinforces a degree of hopelessness in their current condition. I mean, we deal a lot—there's a lot of mental health issues in the community and among adolescents

in particular. We deal with a lot of straight up depression, just you know, a lack of hope and an inability to envision a future worth pursuing.....Segregation only exacerbates it. Because... in more mixed, diverse communities, you've got different things to observe in life. You've got different people to observe and different lifestyles and ways of being that, I think, are positive.

In this way, the schools and the economic prospects of segregated neighborhoods compound the improbability that Latino children will make it out of school and progress up the socioeconomic ladder. So many forces work against concentrated schools that too few children successfully gain the needed skills to make it to college.

Finally, participants also expressed concern over how residential concentration affected socioeconomic mobility in that it led to whole neighborhoods that spoke relatively little English. While several community organizers and elected officials lamented the fact that so few natives spoke a second language, many were adamant that the most difficult barrier for Latino immigrants to overcome is language. The impact of segregation on language skills is felt most in two ways: segregation decreased interaction with proficient English speakers and English classes in immigrant neighborhoods are insufficient to meet demand. Several people pointed out that without English skills, immigrants are stuck in the worst jobs with no ability to report problems or stand up for themselves. In addition, poor English skills leave many Latino immigrants unable to call elected officials, interact with schools and other institutions, or feel comfortable participating in civic activities. One community organizer in New York City lamented how segregation also fed the belief among natives that Latino immigrants do not want to learn English. "The English classes in Manhattan have no one enrolled while ours have waitlists a year long...So the people in the city think that they don't want to learn English,

but you can't put the classes an hour from where people live."

In addition to all of these other ills, residential concentration contributes to the accumulation of symbols of otherness to cue white Americans that Latinos from concentrated neighborhoods are not like them. The ghettoizing of poor Latinos in urban and suburban "barrios" leads to children unfamiliar with mass American culture and fluent only in Spanglish. The combined barriers of skin tone, social context and native language severely limit any prospects of upward mobility and lead to tremendous discrimination. As Alba and Nee (2003, 42) note: "For employers, such cues are a 'market signal' providing a ready rule-of-thumb measure of the individual's cultural capital, especially with respect to the linguistic and social competence needed to perform effectively in the workplace."<sup>31</sup> In short, speaking English poorly rules people out for jobs they would like to attain. The consequence of living in an environment with few English speakers also takes a toll on the second generation. Although English ability is mainly discussed in regard to first generation immigrants, segregation appears to contribute to language barriers being a multi-generational barrier. Historically, immigrant enclaves in the United States consisted of immigrants from many nations which meant that the *only* unifying language was English. Because immigration patterns have drastically changed, many of today's Latino immigrants largely live their lives in places where there are few opportunities to learn English.

Laura Reed, whose high school science classes in the public schools of Montgomery County, Maryland, are made up almost entirely of second generation Latino students, told me of her frustration teaching students grade level science when they spoke

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<sup>31</sup> Waldinger (2004, 8) argues that even without such characteristics, employers decide whom to hire by ranking candidates according to sets of "socially meaningful but arbitrary traits"—primarily racial and ethnic markers. He refers to this ordering as a hiring queue.

and read both English and Spanish at an elementary level. “They aren’t fluent in English or in Spanish—they have basic understanding of both, but that’s it. The minute they walk out of my classroom they are in a world of elementary-level Spanish, since all their friends speak it, there’s no real incentive or even opportunity to perfect their English.” Low levels of parental education and the reality of living most of their lives in Spanish and only part in English, she thought, guarantees that Latino immigrant children will have low language skills. When this situation is coupled with inadequate resources for ESL, and school faculty and administrators overwhelmed with overcrowded classrooms, poor attendance, and other problems, ESL students suffer, particularly in areas of language development. As a result, many children leave school with insufficient language skills to get ahead. Her students, she contended, were easily identifiable as the children of impoverished immigrants, unfit for employment in the modern workforce—not because of their intelligence but because of their dialects and poor communication skills.

### **The Political Consequences of Segregation**

Several studies suggest that residential homogeneity increases civic engagement and facilitates neighborhood social capital because people are more comfortable when they are surrounded by people who share similar life experiences and views (Campbell 2006; Putnam 2007). Studies also find that segregation facilitates political empowerment by guaranteeing that minorities have the electoral strength to elect one of their own (Canon 1999; Gay 2001; 2007; Bobo and Gilliam 1990). Of course, the majority of these studies have investigated the benefits of drawing district lines to facilitate the election of a minority candidate or the benefits of empowerment on the

political participation of different minority groups. Less studied is the effect of residential concentration when the minority group does not have the political power to be a major contender in elections.<sup>32</sup> In the areas in which I did the majority of my interviews, the Latino population is either not large enough to be a critical force in elections (Baltimore and Washington, DC), or houses so many non-citizens that the number of actual voters dampens their potential voice (many areas in New York and the DC suburbs). In almost every case, interview subjects pointed out that politicians ignore their neighborhoods because everyone knows the amount of votes concentrated Latino areas actually deliver. One community organizer noted that, "many people in the neighborhood are immigrants, and they're really not included...in those official structures like the community boards and the civic groups." Two organizers noted that they do not work on the elections in the area, nor mobilize voters, because there are so few actual eligible voters to recruit. As one said, "I don't really pay much attention to the city council elections because we don't have the numbers to really make a difference."

Elected officials and mobilizing institutions have many reasons to ignore Latino neighborhoods. In addition to the number of nonvoters in Latino neighborhoods, concentrated Latino areas are also often located in uncompetitive one-party districts. In one-party areas, the low salience of state and local elections is compounded by the fact that the only real competition is in the primary. In primary elections, candidates typically only mobilize "super voters," voters who have a history of voting in primary elections. One Latino elected official noted that if he only knocked and mailed to super voters, he would only reach out to a few hundred Latinos, even though his district is equal parts

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<sup>32</sup> Nevertheless, frequently when minorities have the numerical strength to elect a co-ethnic, they often remain underrepresented (Hajnal and Trounstein 2005)

white, Latino, and African American. He thought it was worth the effort to reach out to them, but he was just about the only elected official I interviewed who consistently did so. Several others pointed out that they did some organizing beyond super voters, but in general, the resources available did not allow for it. As one elected official who represents a majority Latino town in an increasingly Latino area noted:

In my town, I try to knock on every single door, no matter if they are registered or not. Because it's a small enough town and sooner or later we see and know each other anyway, so, that's at the town level I talk to just about everybody. For the county council race, it was strictly super voters, which there's, according to the records, more than 35,000 registered Democrats in the district, about 5,000 of them are quote-unquote super voters. But of all the voters—of those 35,000 Democrats—less than 200 were Hispanic."

He continued noting that he was not sure if, other than himself, a single Hispanic voter would be considered a "super voter." To complicate matters more, many Latino voters are registered independent, which, in areas dominated by one political party, means they never get to cast a meaningful vote. As one Latino elected official in Maryland noted:

The one thing about the Latino community in [my] county is the very high number of registered independent voters. And we've done a lot of work attempting to educate people that so many of the battles are fought in a primary, and uh, you know, [immigrants] don't really know what a republican or democrat or independent is. If you know [Latin American political parties], then independent sounds like a pretty good thing to be, so part of the challenge here of increasing participation is to have people understand better where the action is. And that may sound somewhat self serving, because we want more Democrats, but we spend a lot of time reaching out to independent voters to educate them, that if you want to be involved in making history, you can't because you've given away your vote, because you are only going to get to vote in the general [election].

The primary political implication of this phenomenon is not that Latinos are registered as independent; to shift the spirit of the word, they simply aren't "registered" at



all. Latinos lack a history of participation and, as a result, they are passively left out. Latinos do not register on the radar of the most important cogs in the political machine—major party primary efforts and interest group mobilization campaigns. In effect, in many locales, the political machine does not appear to know that Latinos exist. The only people who make it onto “the list” for mobilization are strong partisans who have a superlative history of engagement.

Living in a politically competitive area can increase political participation purely because it increases the amount of attention given to otherwise low salience elections (Gimpel et al. 2003; Campbell 2006). Competitive political areas appear to increase voter knowledge about candidates and campaign issues and engage a much broader audience in the political process (Kaufmann, Gimpel, and Pearson-Merkowitz 2006). Single party areas often have lower turnout across the board, but if you couple that with more independent voters clustered in a single area and few resources with which organizations can mobilize their members, the overall impact is likely to be an absence of (1) political socialization for Latino youth and new immigrants and (2) political mobilization of Latino voters. As one Latino elected official noted of the Latino area of her district, "until me, there was nobody who had ever paid any attention or even cared to get people involved, to participate."

The under-participation of Latinos in elections complicates the efficacy of co-ethnic empowerment, since Latino elected officials cannot completely rely on Latino votes to be elected. Instead they have to be very conscious of the policy interests of their non-Hispanic constituents, including those who are vehemently anti-immigrant even in majority Latino areas. One elected official in Maryland noted that:

I mean, one could argue that you know, [segregation] certainly presents opportunities for people to get elected. Although, the district I got elected in, certainly it's the most heavily minority district, but when you look at the actual Latino vote ...it might have been, you know 6 percent, 7 percent of the primary audience, again, I value that, and its important, but it's not dispositive.

Another noted that she has two constituencies, one comprised of voters and the other of Latino residents. To her chagrin, there is almost no overlap. She explained that in her campaign she made the decision to expend resources on Latino non-voters because she wanted to engage the Latino community, despite the fact that they were not signed up to vote: "So we were able to focus and really run two campaigns, one nominally focused on outreach to the Latino community and then the more general one, because you can't get elected just by the Latino community. The numbers aren't there... so you can't get elected without the majority white community also voting for you."

A similar statement was made by another high-ranking official:

The response was excitement. Some had family members who were not yet eligible to vote. They were legal immigrants--they hadn't registered, whatever, but they understood that they could be part of a... a historic shift. And they also understood that there are other ways to participate, so you look at the precincts in [the heavily Latino area], we had a ton of sign coverage and probably when you knock on doors, you usually have a list of prime voters. When I was in [the Latino area] I ended up doing a lot of door knocking that was on a certain level non surgical. That is to say, I was knocking on doors of non-prime voters and potentially in some cases non-eligible voters. But that is because really you look around, and my goal was to get...get people involved in the political process and putting a sign in your yard is a way to get involved in the political process.

The discussion thus far highlights the fact that Latino elected officials play a critical role mobilizing and engaging the Latino community. Despite their scarce resources, they appear to do much more than political parties and interest groups to reach out to low-turnout ethnic enclaves. Ethnic concentration cultivates the development of

Latino leadership and guarantees that they have enough support to achieve elected office. I address these benefits next.

*The Political Benefits of Segregation: Representation and Mobilization*

Achieving descriptive representation is possibly the most substantial benefit of residential segregation for minority communities. Despite the socioeconomic problems generally associated with segregation, segregation often allows minorities to gain political empowerment and incorporation. Browning, Marshall and Tabb (1984) found that, in Northern California, government effectively represented minorities when African Americans and Latinos form active electoral coalitions, and make up at least part of a dominant liberal coalition. These conditions—being descriptively represented on legislative bodies, and having liberals control the legislature—facilitated the appointment of minorities to boards and commissions, increased oversight of police, and increased minority participation in city contracts and municipal jobs. Likewise, Canon (1999) argues that even when minority politicians are not the majority or even a large proportion of the legislature, their presence can serve as an educating force to other elected officials and can dampen anti-minority rhetoric and attacks. In short, segregation enables minorities to elect one of their own and descriptive representation comes with concrete benefits.

As expected, many of my interview participants were adamant that descriptive representation is critical to the Latino community. As one noted, "I think it's important for people to really see themselves represented in the community." Several elected officials explained that they were sure that their presence on the ticket and their campaign activities were at least symbolically important to Latinos. "People were very excited, the

voters were. Those who were voting were very excited, and I'm not sure how many voted, but probably close to all of them did. Lot of excitement; and even here, people are very supportive. I'm second generation Puerto Rican, which is very different from first generation Salvadoran, but still, they consider me somebody who hears them and will fight for them." And these elected officials delivered. One community organizer praised the Latino elected officials for sticking their necks out on issues that were risky even for liberal politicians.

At least our folk have the courage to take on what are essentially among the most controversial issues of our day. I mean, immigration status, the immigration debate on behalf of undocumented people. There's no other politician or group of politicians that are taking on representing the interests of such vilified and marginalized populations. I think there may be a body of African American politicians who represent the interests of former felons. They're pretty much vilified, on some similar level, and the small number of representatives who represent the interests of lesbians and gays, and their rights, are also similarly, I think, vilified. But that's about it, you know. Most every other politician, I think... kind of really focus on the sort of middle-class interests, which you know, are critical, obviously, but it's a very safe space to operate in.... I think that there's a level of courage there that has to be acknowledged among our political representation.

Descriptive representation also appears to be particularly important because Latino issues have not divided the legislature along party lines. While Democrats appear to be more likely to support Latino-interest bills and to vote against anti-immigrant legislation than Republicans, it was by no means clear that Latinos could rely on the Democratic caucus to deliver on their issues. The Democratic elected officials in the areas in which I conducted my interviews are divided on many issues relating to Latinos, particularly Latino immigrants. With anti-immigrant rhetoric flaring, many Democratic legislators are under pressure from the more conservative members of their district to take a stand on immigration. So not only do few non-Latino legislators introduce pro-

Latino bills, but Latino issues are also losing ground with the democratic coalition. As one Latino legislator noted:

Right now, I think [the Democrats] will support [bills that benefit immigrant communities]. I don't think they will necessarily create it and introduce it, though. I think that's why it's been so good to have [other Latino Delegates], I mean [they have] done very targeted legislation and I think it's kind of risky legislation, very up in your face kind of thing with health, and cultural linguistic things... and we've been successful at keeping [state] law what it is, but it's been quite a struggle, I mean I could never sit back and say, this is something I can count on my from democratic group... the partisan issue has helped us so far, but only to the extent that most [Democrats] don't feel that they can lose by going along, but it's a reluctant support and I think a waning support...The Senate just shocked us all... The Republicans added a lawful presence for [a] driver's license bill amendment to a commercial license bill. The vote was 23-24. Eight Democrats went along with that. [A specific Democratic Senator] is feeling the pressure of the anti-immigrant groups.

She continued, explaining that three other Senators who the Latino interest groups used to be able to count on to vote against anti-immigrant bills voted for the driver's license amendment.

In New York, community activists expressed different sentiments. The effect of descriptive representation was of particular importance for symbolic reasons, but the policy implications were less clear. Several community organizers lamented that the Latino elected officials had come "through the party machine" and not from the community organizations and certainly not "from the neighborhood." Thus, the Latino representatives often represented their issues better than more conservative members of the legislature, but not necessarily better than their very liberal white counterparts who won their seats after years of working in community organizations. In fact, many community organizers felt that the community was better represented by a few white elected officials who saw the Latinos in their districts as a critical constituency, than by

Latinos who thought they could count on the few votes that the neighborhood actually delivered. One community activist commented that a local Latino elected official “may look like us, but he’s not *one* of us.”

In Maryland, where there are only a few elected Latinos across the state, the general feeling is that having Latino elected officials is necessary, but is not a panacea. In fact, most people felt that it is more important to have appointed officials involved in policy implementation for the Latino community, particularly given the very few elected positions they have gained. One elected official commented that the number of Latino elected officials in the state legislature was "not there yet, it's the onesies and twosies and unfortunately it's too few, I don't even want to count it." A community organizer said, "here in Maryland we only have three Hispanics representing the community, so people feel represented by them, but they know that's so little. It's just the amount of people who represent them is so small, that they don't see how that's going to work."

A Latino elected official explained that, as a Latino, he knew the issues of his community and in his majority-Latino town he was able to meet their needs. He hired an all bi-lingual staff so that the entire town administration would be accessible to the Spanish-speaking residents. But, if his residents need help that only the state or the county can deliver, there are very few resources. He lamented that no one in the state foreclosure assistance office speaks Spanish. And, when the town had flooded a few years ago because of county neglect, there had been no Spanish speakers to help people recoup their losses. As mayor, the best he could often do was to help his constituents navigate county and state resources, but his role in this, I surmised, was often diminished to translator. As he noted:

So the execution of the policy is huge. For example, you know [the state] regulates banks, lenders, mortgage providers, all of that stuff, of course, there's a lot of targeting of minority communities for bad loans and that sort of thing. We have nobody in our financial regulation investigation unit who is bilingual. So you know there's policy in accessibility and execution of the policy. So we could have the best laws in the world but if the people can't call and talk to somebody, or if they know if they call they won't talk to somebody, then that's a policy that's meaningless to an entire segment.

A similar sentiment was expressed in New York where community organizations noted that even in districts represented by Latinos there are no translation services available at community meetings or in city offices. One community organizer expressed her frustration over language access in districts represented by Latino councilmen by saying:

The fact that you have community board meetings in predominantly Spanish speaking neighborhoods, without any translation services available, what does that tell you about a system? What does that tell you about a governance structure? A city like this, New York City, should know that they are disenfranchising people very deliberately if they aren't providing translation interpretation services. ...When you don't provide language access, you're actually deliberately taking away people's ability to participate.... it's the same question like why in our neighborhoods do we have the shittiest schools? Why are we the ones who don't have the nice parks, but the upper west side they do? Because they don't think we're going to say anything. They don't think we can organize.

By taking away the mechanism through which individuals and communities make change—by participating in neighborhood governance associations—she felt that the city was systematically making sure that only the people they wanted to participate would in fact have the means to participate.

I observed the barrier of language access at several community meetings I attended in Maryland. In Maryland, few community organizers speak Spanish (this may

be a product of the newness of the Latino population). The meetings of the Latino neighborhood organizations that I attended held their meetings primarily in English. Quite often, the lack of resources prevented simultaneous translation. However, the fact that the leadership of the organizations was often not bi-lingual, as the organizers generally came from the ranks of the few white and African American members of the neighborhood, meant that many Latinos who came to the meetings struggled to participate. At best, sometimes there would be a community member present who could translate, but most of the time there was not. There were no state, county, or city-provided resources to make civic associations accessible to Spanish speakers even in places that had elected Latino leadership. The Latino community has few ways to hold their elected officials accountable when they cannot participate in community meetings that provide community feedback to elected officials and who keep tabs on the actions of their elected officials. The only meetings held that were in Spanish were those held by immigrant activist groups. While those meetings were in Spanish, in general, they were only attended by immigrants, and not the rest of the community. In effect, language access produced segregated civic organizations, limiting the potential for building inter-racial, inter-ethnic bonds within the community.

### **The Consequences of Segregation for Community Mobilization**

The most consistent benefit of segregation identified by my interview participants were the effects segregation has on community mobilization. Without fail, community organizers and activists felt that it is critical for Latinos to live together or the task of organizing them would be too great. As one organizer in the Dominican community



noted "If we don't mobilize now when we are all together, how would we ever mobilize them when they are apart?" Another noted that knowing that an entire neighborhood was all Latino immigrants was the only way that an organization like his, with few resources, was able to do so many great things. They can easily identify a majority of the Latinos in the community without advanced statistical tools or door to door identification campaigns because Latinos are relegated to a small area of town. As a result, it is also easy to bring the Latino community together for meetings. No transportation is necessary if the whole community lives in one place. "I don't know how we would operate if they were all over," one noted.

However, while segregation benefits mobilization from Latino and immigrant activist groups, it also means that there is not any cross-mobilization of different racial and ethnic groups. By being segregated, Latinos are mobilized by their groups but not by more traditional mobilizing sources. In addition, because they are able to focus their attention so narrowly on concentrated Latino areas, Latino-focused interest groups do not mobilize non-Latinos who may support their issues. In short, the prospects for cross-cultural mobilization are few.

Several other organizers noted the advantage of both residential concentration and the dense social networks concentration creates. One community organizer in Maryland said, "If I talk to two or three from the community, I find that at least half of the community knows what I said.... So I can get information out as fast as possible. So, you know, usually when they live in one community they pretty much try to stay together and inform each other about one thing or the other. That's one thing about having meetings; they will *meet* each other. So after that it's just friends and neighbors. That makes my

job easier." Another organizer in New York reiterated the point, saying:

When I get ten members of the community in one meeting, I know those ten members...will bring that information that we had at the meeting to the others. And next time I talk to someone who didn't even show up at the meeting, they will know what we talked about and what kind of decisions that we made.... But that's how strong they are, they will bring the information to the others. And then some of them will tell them, 'you know, you have to be in the meetings if you want to give opinions or you want to do something,' to try to push each other to help too.

Another organizer in New York thought Latino immigrants and their children would be less involved in community activity if there was sufficient integration, particularly if they were a small minority. "Our experience is that people seem to get involved when they're with people like themselves."

There was also a feeling that mobilization and descriptive representation went hand in hand but not necessarily always in a positive way. While Baretto (2007) argues that having descriptive representation increases political participation among the Latino community, scholars who study descriptive representation have been troubled by the possibility that minority elected officials elected from super majority-minority districts lack electoral accountability. Famously, Swain (1993, 73) noted one African American Congressman who said that "you can almost get away with raping babies and be forgiven." In short, minority constituencies may turn out in higher numbers when they can vote for a co-ethnic, but they may also become complacent and overly loyal. Several community organizers lamented this problem, although perhaps not to as great of a degree. One noted that their legislator had "tried to turn his back" on his Latino base and "had to do a lot of soul searching." Another noted that their Latino elected officials "just don't seem to get it." But many of these community activists felt that the reason that there was less substantive representation among Latino elected officials was because the

political participation of the Latino community ended after the election. For example, one community organizer in New York noted that,

I think that there are some of them that are representing the interests of the people, and I think getting, for example, predominant Latino communities, getting Latino politicians elected is important, especially if they come from the community, but I think at the same time people need to understand that electing people is not going to change their community. If I was elected tomorrow, and nobody came to me and told me what they wanted, I wouldn't do shit. You know what I mean?...Why would I if I'm not being held accountable by a base?

In short, while segregation is seen as helpful for electing candidates and for mobilization campaigns, even those successes came with costs. Without the skills and resources to hold elected officials accountable and without competitive, highly salient campaigns, the election of co-ethnic candidates appears to have mixed results. In some cases, such as those discussed earlier in this chapter, it produced meaningful policies that helped the community to such an extent that concentration could be seen as beneficial. At other times, the election of co-ethnic representatives was not helpful to the community and did little to change the problems that segregation produced.

#### *Discussion: Weighing the Costs and Benefits of Segregation*

Political mobilization and incorporation is critical for Latinos to gain substantive representation and to become powerful players in the political realm. However, as can be seen from the discussion above, most of my interview subjects also felt that the benefits of segregation are not as great as the drawbacks. After discussing how helpful it was to have everyone in the same place, one community organizer then noted that the problem was that elected officials just ignored the community. Since all Latinos were located in the same precinct, elected officials could just ignore the Latino areas and instead cater to the more affluent and larger voting constituencies located in other precincts. This

sentiment was echoed by another organizer who pointed out that they had to stage a full protest to get a community park. She felt strongly that if the upper west side wanted to reclaim or repair a park, they would be able to secure the funding easily, without the residents taking to the streets. Also, as a result of segregation, mobilization became even more important. Whereas in wealthier neighborhoods a lot of people with busy lives can avoid political activity without any consequences, in Latino neighborhoods, no one could ride for free on the political participation of their neighbors. So few people in concentrated Latino areas understand how and have the means to actively push for the needs of the community that people who would otherwise benefit from the activities of engaged individuals in their community are forced to take an active role if they want to make change.

One final concern of the community organizers, particularly in New York, but also to some extent in Maryland, is important to note. Several times during my interviews, community organizers noted the problem of ethnicity-based organizing. Segregation primarily benefits organizing around shared attributes that distinguish the group as distinct from the rest of the polity. In segregated Latino-immigrant communities, shared language and often shared home countries bring people together. Community organizations that focus on Latino issues are able to harness the bonds within these communities and highlight shared attributes to generate bonding-social capital—a social capital based on “otherness.” The community organizers I spoke to were no less aware of the problems of harnessing bonding-social capital than are political scientists. As Putnam and Feldstein (2003, 3) argue, “the kind of social capital that is most essential for healthy public life [bridging social-capital] in an increasingly diverse society like ours

is just the kind that is hardest to build.” Although it is certainly easier, building community strength by highlighting the difference in communities stands to build walls between groups and prevent the type of coalitions that are necessary to produce meaningful changes in public policy.

As one Latino community organizer noted, “I just don't think identity based organizing is the best kind of organizing you can do. It's not good for immigrant communities, and working class communities. The future of organizing should be that you're deliberately creating a multi-ethnic, multi-religious base. Because that's where your power is.” Another community activist expressed her frustration over the lack of multi-ethnic coalitions and the divisions in the neighborhood that the ethnicity-specific groups created: “I think the fact that there's very little actual work that bridges, that talks about the shared interests of Latinos and African Americans, or Latinos and the Asian community, and I think that's a real problem because the people that have power in the city will use it. So I, for example, in this case of the hate crime in [a specific community], the Ecuadorian organizations want to make this an Ecuadorian issue....They don't want to talk about making cultural relationships more profoundly.” Unfortunately, segregated communities naturally lend themselves to civic and community organizing that capitalizes on the shared characteristics of groups that are distinct from groups in other locales, instead of building bridges between diverse individuals who share common interests and common spaces.

This chapter explored the benefits and drawbacks for Latinos of living in segregated communities. The benefits of segregation are concrete, but so too are the detriments. While segregation appears to help communities organize and achieve

descriptive representation, these benefits are not antidotes for the larger social ills explicitly connected to residential segregation. The interviews I conducted and my experiences in these communities lead me to conclude that integration, while certainly not without its own problems, benefits Latinos more than segregation.

To be clear, segregation certainly has potential positive byproducts. Most importantly, segregation enables minority communities with the ability to gain descriptive representation, to mobilize disenfranchised minorities, and to cater to the needs of unique groups (language access, special schools, etc). As one can see from the discussion above, every benefit that people mentioned about segregation was followed by a “but” that expressed its limitations.

Segregated communities build schools that cater to immigrant populations or those with limited English skills, but further concentrating challenged students into these schools limits their options and may enable gangs to target students more easily. Likewise, community organizations find it easier to mobilize Latinos and build on the strong bonding social capital that Latino neighborhoods possess, but as a result Latinos are largely left out of more traditional mobilization campaigns. Finally, segregation enables Latinos to elect candidates who look like them, but those candidates often are not always responsive to their interests.

This chapter presented the evidence I garnered from interviews with community leaders, elected officials, and activists. Using a triangulation approach (Creswell 2003, 217), in the following chapters, I investigate these same questions using large-n quantitative data. I use the quantitative data in the next chapters to corroborate the findings presented above to show that they hold using national data and not just in the

case studies I explored in depth.

## **Chapter 4: Location, Location, Location: De Facto Segregation and the Keys to Participation**

Real-estate agents know that when it comes to buying a house, only one thing matters: location. Where we live matters (Logan 1978; Logan and Molotch 1987; Massey and Denton 1993; Schneider and Logan 1982). Decisions about where to reside determine access to public transportation, major highways, healthcare, and jobs.<sup>33</sup> Location also affects who our friends and acquaintances are, and the quality of the schools our children attend. Further, where we live determines how much time we spend commuting to work versus how much we spend with our families. Importantly for political science, location also determines our political socialization. As David Campbell (2006) notes, what you do and if you vote depends on where you are.

Moreover, people are constrained by their social location. If social networks are isolated and relatively closed off from other networks, access to information will be more limited and adoption of innovations from outside the social networks is unlikely (Rogers 1979; Rogers and Kincaid 1981). Despite advances in technology, most people's social networks remain geographically constrained. So, where we live makes up "constellations of opportunities" (Pulido 2004, 86) in that it determines our access to a better quality of life as well as to human and social capital. And, as mentioned previously, physical location is potentially more important for the poor than for middle and upper class

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<sup>33</sup> See literature review in Squires and Kubrin (2006).



families whose social networks tend to be more geographically and socially expansive and who have access to better and more efficient transportation.<sup>34</sup>

Over the past decade, increasing numbers of scholars have recognized that place determines life choices and political participation rates are correlated with neighborhood attributes (Widestrom 2008; Tam Cho and Rudolph 2008; Campbell 2006; Gimpel, Lay, and Schuknecht 2003). Individuals participate if the people in their neighborhoods participate. The reasons for this are multi-fold and include the mobilization decisions of parties, candidates, and interest groups, increased rates of political discussion, and the socioeconomic and racial segregation of American cities and suburbs. Tam Cho and Rudolph (2008) find that, “citizens’ participatory behavior is heavily influenced by the participatory behavior of those who live in close proximity to them” (287) above and beyond social networks, socioeconomic status, and other individual-level and neighborhood-level factors. In the last chapter, I showed why community organizers and elected officials feel that segregation impedes socioeconomic mobility and social network diversity for Latino communities. In this chapter, I explore this question using large n-data sets to corroborate my findings.

To review, residential segregation has been increasing for Latinos in the United States. If the rate of increase in Latino-white segregation continues, Latinos will soon surpass African Americans as the most segregated group in the United States (Timberlake and Iceland 2007). Segregation has pernicious effects on minority group social mobility, yet the majority of research overlooks the potentially critical impact residential context

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<sup>34</sup> This statement may be best supported by the literature on job seeking in low income communities. The basic finding of which is that the simple lack of cars in low income communities hampers the geographic expansiveness of job searches (see Blumenberg 2004 for a good review of this literature).

can have on Latino political participation. In addition, the majority of the extant research on the effect of context on participation ignores the critical element of race and ethnicity in the socialization process (Tam Cho and Rudolph 2008; McClain 2003; also see Rushton 2008).

This gap in the literature limits our understanding of the political behavior of the rapidly growing Latino constituency. I argue that segregated environments deny Latinos the information and access to resources they require to be socially mobile. As a result, Latinos in segregated neighborhoods achieve lower levels of education, make less money, and have weaker English proficiency. Immigrant Latinos are also less likely to become citizens. Finally, Latinos in segregated areas have isolated social networks that deny them access to critical information for civic and political participation.

In the analysis that follows, I draw upon quantitative evidence from the Current Population Study 2000, the 2000 U.S. Census, and the Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey 2000. The results of the analysis corroborate the evidence presented in Chapter Three: Latinos in the United States are suffering as a result of segregated housing patterns.

I begin by discussing the current state of Latino segregation in America and offer a theory of why socioeconomic status, citizenship, and English language ability are critical to understanding Latino political participation. Next, I present a description of the data and methods used in the analysis and my findings. I close with a discussion of the future of Latino socioeconomic mobility and social integration if contemporary rates of Latino segregation persist in the United States.

### *Residential Segregation in Latino Communities*

Social and geographic distance between Latinos and other races in the United States is on the rise. For the first time in history, Latinos have become “hypersegregated” in the largest Latino destinations, a categorization previously only applicable to African Americans (Wilkes and Iceland 2004). While Latinos remain nowhere near as segregated as the average African American, the dramatic increase over the last ten years is concerning (Timberlake and Iceland 2007; Wahl, Breckenridge, and Gunkel 2007). According to the 2000 Census, 43 percent of Latinos live in neighborhoods in which Latinos are the majority. This number increased dramatically between 1990 and 2000. In fact, the number of Latinos living in majority-Latino districts increased by 76% between 1990 and 2000 (Pew 2004). Given the current rate of change, Latino/white segregation will surpass Black/white segregation somewhere between 2014 and 2024 (Timberlake and Iceland 2007).

Many Latinos are also linguistically isolated. In 2000, Latinos who spoke only Spanish constituted roughly 28% of the population in majority-Latino census tracts (Pew 2004). Not all non-English speakers are immigrants. Siegel, Martin, and Bruno (2001) found that as of 1990, 52 percent of people five and older who spoke a language other than English in their homes were born in the United States. Over the years, as Latino immigration has continued, it is likely that the number of children in linguistically isolated homes has increased. A recent Migration Policy Institute Report found that one in ten students in US schools is now Limited English Proficient (LEP) and almost three quarters of LEP children enrolled in school are second or third-generation children (Fix et al. 2008). Because of residential housing patterns, these children are clustered into schools overwhelmed by large non-English speaking populations. Over half of LEP

students attend schools where over 30 percent of their classmates also are not native English speakers (Fix et al. 2008, 50).

Racial/ethnic segregation among Latinos, like African Americans, cannot be solely explained by socioeconomic status (Wahl et al. 2007, 1017). Even middle class Latinos have become more isolated. As is evident in Table 3.1, the average Latino lives in a census tract that is almost 45 percent Latino, and contains large percentages of non-citizens and non-English speakers.<sup>35</sup> They are also likely to live in a census tract in which almost half of Latino adults over age 25 lack a high school degree.

Table 4.1. Latino Neighborhood Conditions

	Average Latino in U.S. Census 2000	Social Capital Benchmark Survey 2000
Percent Latino in Census Tract	44%	31%
Percent Non-Citizens in Census Tract	18	15
Percent Speaking Little to No English in Census Tract	24	22
Percent Without a High School Diploma in Census Tract	34	29
Percent of Latino Population without a High School Degree in the Census Tract	49	46
Note: Cells represent the Population Traits for the Average Latino		

As a result, Latinos are becoming concentrated into neighborhoods with low levels of human capital that contain few highly educated role models for children and little access to information held by other communities. Segregation has historically

<sup>35</sup> According to my calculations of the 2000 Census, the average African American lives in a census tract that is 49% African American. This is calculated by using a weighted average of the percent of the tract that is the racial group of interest:  $(\Sigma(L*P))/N$  where L= the number of the Racial Group in the tract, P= the percent of the tract that is that Racial Group and N=the number of the Racial Group in the United States.

resulted in spatial disparities in terms of access to important institutions. Minorities living in segregated communities have less access to everything from banks to healthcare facilities (for a good summary of this literature see Squire and Kubrin 2006). African Americans have historically suffered as a result of residential segregation. Since education and other social service dollars are generally collected on the local level, concentrated poverty—which is typically associated with residential segregation (Massey and Denton 1995)—results in more financially strapped schools and other social institutions than similar social institutions in wealthier and more integrated areas. Recent evidence from the Moving to Opportunity Program (MTO) suggests that there is also a social benefit from living in economically and racially integrated locations.<sup>36</sup> Preliminary evidence suggests that students who relocate to integrated neighborhoods do better in school, engage in less delinquent behavior, have fewer physical and mental health problems, and have more fulfilling family and personal lives (Goering 2005; Goering et al. 2002; Goering and Feins 2003; Kling, Ludwig, and Katz 2005; Rosenbaum et al. 2005; Rubinowitz and Rosenbaum 2002).<sup>37</sup> Further, Crain and Mahard (1978) and Mayer (1991) found that African Americans enrolled in integrated schools were less likely to drop out and scored higher on standardized tests, and that female students were less likely to have a child.

As Latinos become more segregated, they may constitute a new “underclass” or at least encounter more barriers escaping impoverished neighborhoods (Timberlake and

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<sup>36</sup> Moving to Opportunity for Fair Housing (MTO) (commonly called Moving to Opportunity) was a 10-year research based program implemented in the 1990s that combined tenant-based rental assistance with housing counseling to help very low-income families move from poverty-stricken urban areas to low-poverty neighborhoods. For more information see:

<http://www.hud.gov/progdesc/mto.cfm>

<sup>37</sup> The literature review for this section is largely driven by Squire and Kubrin (2006).

Iceland 2007; MacDonald 2004; Portes and Rumbaut 2001; but see Moor and Pinderhughes 1993, and Massey 1993). In short, increasing Latino segregation is thought to have the same effects as segregation has for African Americans: it decreases life choices, educational attainment, earning potential, and spatial mobility.

Residential segregation could have detrimental effects, therefore, on some of the key indices that are critical to the development of political participation, namely citizenship, English language proficiency, socioeconomic status, and friendship diversity. I will now discuss each of these and explain why they are critical to participation.

### **Place, Citizenship and Political Participation**

*“Because of language and recent migration, [Latinos] lack the resources to take part in politics. Because of language and often because of recent migration, they are less often in positions where they are encouraged to take part” (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993, 79).*

Concentrated immigrant communities may decrease the likelihood that residents will become citizens, formally locking Latinos out of the electoral process and limiting their involvement in other participatory acts. Early research on Latino naturalization by Grebler (1966) found that Mexican naturalization rates were constrained by sociodemographic factors as well as contextual factors, including where they lived (see also Pantoja and Gershon 2006). While more recent literature has focused on cultural ties, including family ties to the home country (Garcia 1981), and trans-nationalism (Yang 1994; Jones-Correa 1998; 2001; Pantoja 2005), most of these studies primarily posit that the greater the attachment to the home country, the less likely the immigrant is to naturalize. But they do not investigate the relationship between where they live *now* and their decisions to naturalize. Residential context continues to play an important role

in the decision to naturalize. For example, DeSipio (1996) finds that increased contact with white Americans stimulates naturalization (but see Portes and Curtis 1987).

However, few have investigated the impact of residential context on the decision to naturalize or the connection between segregation and contact with non-Latinos (but see Johnson et al. 1999).

It is likely that Latinos who are surrounded by non-citizens and residentially removed from the U.S. born population will have less incentive to naturalize and/or less information regarding the naturalization process. Social networks possess information and set standards of behavior. If Latinos live in areas where a large portion of the residents are not citizens, then social norms may not enforce naturalization.<sup>38</sup> In addition, areas that have significant immigrant populations may lack the resources to provide sufficient English language and citizenship classes (Fix et al. 2008).

Citizenship is often considered the “single most important obstacle to Latino political empowerment” (Pantoja and Gershon 2006, 1171). Some estimates put naturalization rates of Latinos at approximately half of that for non-Latino immigrants. The low level of naturalization among the eligible population is distressing to many Latino activists and scholars who recognize the critical role citizenship plays in the political life of underrepresented minority groups. Whatever other barriers exist, lacking citizenship bars individuals from the most fundamental form of political participation—voting. The impact of stalled naturalization does not just affect the political power of Latinos as a group, nor the political behavior of the immigrant themselves. Having a non-citizen parent or living among many non-citizens may dampen political participation

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<sup>38</sup> The social norms that social networks create have recently been found to affect everything from educational attainment to the likelihood of obesity (Christakis and Fowler 2007).

even among U.S. born Latinos, because they may grow up in areas without a lively civic and political life. Individuals who grow up in families or neighborhoods that value political participation are likely to retain their commitment to civic engagement even if they move away from the location in which they were socialized (Campbell 2006). Thus, it is reasonable to conjecture that individuals who grow up in households in which their parents are legally barred from voting and in neighborhoods in which the majority of residents cannot legally vote are less likely to develop the sense of civic duty many political scientists identify as critical to maintaining an engaged electorate. In short, living in non-citizen ethnic enclaves may lower political interest, knowledge, and commitment (i.e., feelings of civic duty) among future generations. Thus, understanding why many Latinos fail to naturalize is critical to our understanding of Latino political participation. If segregation deters naturalization, then segregation has a direct and an indirect effect on Latino political power.

*H1: Latinos living in segregated areas are less likely to naturalize than Latinos living in integrated areas.*

#### Place, English Language Ability and Political Participation

As of 2000, there were over 14 million households in the United States that spoke a language other than English as their primary language in the home. Of that, over 3 million can be classified as linguistically isolated (i.e., living in homes where no English is spoken). Over two-thirds of the individuals who live in linguistically isolated homes are U.S. born citizens and 53 percent of adults living in a linguistically isolated home have less than a high school degree.<sup>39</sup>

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<sup>39</sup>See: <http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/hh-fam/AmSpks.html>



It is clear that for many Americans, English language skills are critical to social mobility (Tienda and Niedart 1980; Garcia 1987). English is essential to employment mobility and to understanding the majority of information distributed in the United States. According to the U.S. Census, over 40 percent of Latinos speak English “less than well.”<sup>40</sup> As Figure 4.1 makes clear, U.S. residents who speak a language other than English in the home are geographically clustered. In Arizona, almost 26 percent of the population speaks a language other than English compared to 8 percent in North Carolina. Within states, English language use is further clustered within counties and neighborhoods. As can be seen in Figure 4.1, in some counties almost 25% of the residents do not speak English whereas other counties have very few non-English speakers.


When Latinos are isolated into segregated areas, it is less likely that they will require English skills for daily needs or will have the opportunity to practice English. When signs, stores, and services cater to Spanish language speakers, there is little opportunity for learning English. While Spanish language signs and printed materials are necessary and proper for facilitating access to services by recent immigrants, English language use is essential for Latinos to integrate into American society.<sup>41</sup>

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<sup>40</sup> This information can be found on the census website at: <http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/hh-fam/AmSpks.html>. Cite last visited on April 13, 2009.

<sup>41</sup> This should not be taken to mean that we should not offer second language materials or that businesses should not offer services in another language than English, only that as much as possible, it is important for immigrants and their children to gain sufficient English skills.

Figure 4.1 Second Language Concentration in the United States, by County



Source: U.S. Census, 2000

English language acquisition is critical to socioeconomic mobility. According to a Pew Hispanic Center study, Latinos who are raised in households that speak Spanish only or who themselves speak English “less than well” are more likely to drop out of high school (Fry 2003, 10). Since social networks can facilitate English language acquisition, people who speak Spanish at home but are surrounded by a largely English speaking community will likely acquire English skills faster and more completely than Latinos who live in isolated Spanish-speaking areas. Likewise, if English acquisition is key to educational outcomes, then living in areas that facilitate English skills is also likely to improve educational achievement.

English language ability is critical to socioeconomic mobility but it is also vital to civic engagement and political participation. While the use of Spanish language media by politicians seeking electoral support from the Latino community has increased in recent elections (Ramos 2005), it is still relatively rare in all but a few states housing the most concentrated and established Latino populations. In addition, the investment to translate political materials into Spanish and to produce specific Spanish-language advertisements takes money that most local and state-level politicians simply do not have. Thus, while American politics makes its way into the Spanish-language media every four years with the presidential election cycle, and in some states during a competitive Senate or House race, most Latinos with limited English language skills will be unable to attain the materials necessary to be fluent in even local political affairs. In fact, at many of the community meetings I attended in Latino neighborhoods, local government officials would come to present or to hear from the community but no translators were provided and no one from the government offices who attended the meetings was fluent in Spanish. In light of local government's inability (or unwillingness) to provide translation services, English acquisition is critical for Latino civic and political engagement.

Therefore, if segregation deters English Language acquisition, then segregation should have a direct and an indirect effect on the potential for Latino political interest, knowledge, and engagement.

*H2: Latinos living in segregated communities are less likely to speak English than Latinos living in more integrated areas.*

### *Segregation, Socioeconomic Status and Political Participation*

Socioeconomic status is one of the most powerful determinants of political participation.

SES remains the dominant explanation for the difference in rates of political participation between racial and ethnic groups (Jackson 2003; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Teixeira 1992; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980).

Socioeconomic status is a way to account for latent variables such as the skills and knowledge necessary for meaningful political participation (Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995). Not only are higher SES individuals more likely to overcome the hurdles to participation, they are also more likely to feel obligated to do so. According to Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980, 18), SES, particularly education, captures skills, interest, capacity, and civic duty:

When we classify people by the length of their formal education, we are measuring several different attributes. American schools provide a good deal of explicit instruction and exhortation on citizenship that emphasizes the obligation to vote and thus might be thought to nurture a sense of citizen duty. The better educated are more likely to know social norms. . . . It seems reasonable, then, to think that education increases the moral pressure to vote....Schooling increases one's capacity for understanding and working with complex, abstract, and intangible subjects, that is, subjects like politics.

It is simply more rational for higher SES individuals to participate because the costs of participation for them are lower. Gaining information about the election is not as costly and understanding political cues is easier for higher SES individuals. They are simply more likely to know where, when, and how to participate, and they are more likely to feel obliged to do so. People who feel social pressure to participate are both less likely to incur costs for participating and more likely to feel social and psychological costs if they fail to participate than those without social pressure to participate.

If the majority of the difference between white and Latino participation rates is accounted for by socioeconomic status (Jackson 2003), then understanding the future of Latino political power rests on understanding the impediments to socioeconomic mobility in the Latino community. Segregation has the potential to deny Latinos opportunities for socioeconomic mobility. Douglas Massey and Nancy Denton (1993) argue that segregation among African Americans was the key component in the making of the “underclass.” Segregation created “barriers to spatial mobility” and these barriers created obstacles to social mobility because “where one lives determines a variety of latent factors that affect individual well-being: the quality of schooling, the value of housing, exposure to crime, the quality of public services, and the character of children's peers” (150). For African Americans, they argue, segregation has isolated them into bad schools, where children are likely to receive lower quality educations and be exposed to fewer and more constrained life choices. This in turn decreases their chances of achieving economic success. For adults, segregation limits the accessibility of jobs and services and dampens support among whites for programs that would help alleviate the poverty and rampant joblessness common in segregated minority communities (Massey and Denton 1993; Sugrue 1996; Wilson 1996). Moreover, concentrated poverty, a common side effect of racial segregation, appears to lead to social disorder and as a result impedes the development of vibrant civic institutions (Wilson 1996).

It is clear from a plethora of literature on the black experience, as well as the extensive research on the consequences of housing and local policy, that segregation among African Americans concentrates poverty and people with similarly bleak life experiences into neighborhoods away from whites and from those with moderate to

higher incomes. This in turn creates lower levels of education and job skills, less access to quality and stable employment, and increased mental and physical health problems (Cutler and Glaeser 1997; LaVeist et al. 2008; Massey and Denton 1993; Popkin et al. 2004; Squires and Kubrin 2006; Wilson 1990; Wilson 1996). The experience of Latinos is unlikely to be significantly different. The majority of Latino immigrants enter the United States with less than a high school education and U.S. born Latinos have lower educational achievement rates than any other racial or ethnic group (Pew 2008). U.S. born Latinos are likely achieving at lower rates as a product of the schools they attend (Orfield and Lee 2005). Schools in segregated areas face barriers to educating children that are far beyond what any school can take on in a given year. High mobility rates, the inability of parents to tutor or mentor their children, unsafe streets, and poor nutrition all add to the barriers schools face with regard to educating minority children in concentrated neighborhoods (Carr and Kutty 2008).

There is, of course, the potential that residential segregation is a *product of* socioeconomic inequalities between whites and Latinos. The research on immigrants and residential segregation, does in fact indicate that immigrants of lower socioeconomic status are more likely to settle in concentrated immigrant (and impoverished) areas (Iceland and Scopilliti 2008), and economic segregation in the United States is at an all time high (Dreier et al. 2002), limiting the choices of the poor in their search for housing. However, while adult immigrants may have their context determined by their economic situations, their children are a product of the locations in which they live. Thus, while housing availability certainly constrains Latino choices, the contexts in which people

live—even if done by choice—have grave implications for their future socioeconomic trajectories.

It is also likely that Latinos are more segregated than their economic situations should predict. Recent evidence suggests that Latinos are considerably more likely than whites to face housing discrimination by private agents. Recent studies found that Latinos face discrimination in 4 out of 5 visits to a rental agent (National Fair Housing Alliance 2003), and that Latinos are more than twice as likely as whites to be offered only high cost, subprime loans (see Squires and Kubrin 2006; Carr and Kutty 2008) and more than one in six Latino homebuyers is treated unfavorably compared to equally qualified whites (Turner et al. 2002).

Even if where people live is determined by their ability to meet housing costs, their future life choices and the choices available to their children are determined by the opportunities available. The lessons from the African American experience with segregation discussed above are likely to be shared by Latinos living in segregated communities. Latino economic fortunes are held down by residential concentration (Waldinger 2001; Santiago and Wilder 1991) and there is good reason to believe that Latinos have lower educational outcomes in residentially segregated environments for similar reasons to those found for African Americans (Carr and Kutty 2008). Schools that are attended by a largely second language student population face greater challenges getting children up to speed than schools trying to overcome class factors without additional language barriers. As mentioned above, Latinos are less likely than any other group to graduate high school or go to college. Thus, as Latinos are concentrated into

segregated residences, schools will need to battle both language barriers as well as impediments associated with parental education.

The research to date indicates that Latino concentration hinders the socialization of Latino children. Zhou (2003) finds that Latino children in concentrated areas with high levels of Latinos, immigrants, and high poverty rates, suffer:

These disadvantaged communities have a profound impact on children, who find themselves (1) socially isolated from mainstream American society, (2) culturally exposed directly to ghetto cultures and to a materialistic mainstream culture through television, (3) devastated by poor living conditions, unsafe streets, and economic distress, and (4) handicapped by inadequate and turbulent schools (overcrowding, a high dropout rate, a high rate of below-grade level enrollment, and a problem with English) (Zhou 2003, 219).

These are not the socialization criteria often associated with a civically and politically engaged electorate.

*H3: Latinos living in more segregated communities have lower socioeconomic mobility than Latinos living in more integrated areas.*

### **Race, Place, Social Networks, and Political Participation**

The old idiom “birds of a feather flock together” remains true, although in a limited sense. There are barriers and facilitators of social network homophily. People must interact with the other people available to them in their geographic and social context.<sup>42</sup> “Perhaps the most basic source of homophily is space: We are more likely to have contact with those who are closer to us in geographic location than those who are distant” (McPherson, Smith-Lovin and Cook 2001, 429). Thus, living in an integrated

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<sup>42</sup> While social networking websites have enabled similar individuals to find each other despite extreme geographic distance, the relative impact of this relatively limited and constrained to those with the most access to computers. Given that computer access continues to be highly unequal across racial and economic groups (Fairlie 2004)/



setting is likely to increase meaningful interaction between people of different backgrounds (Marsden 1987, pp. 128–29).

The confines of social networks limit access to information and have powerful consequences for the attitudes network participants form, as well as the interactions they experience (McPherson, Smith-Lovin and Cook 2001).<sup>43</sup> In effect, concentrated Latino neighborhoods are likely to house large populations of non-English speakers and non-citizens, who have little experience with or information about American politics or democratic institutions, limiting the likelihood of political discussion and political action.

Through social networks, individuals gain access to political information and are encouraged and recruited to participate in civic and political activities (McClurg 2003; McKenzie 2004; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). Research on social networks suggests that political information gained through casual conversations can enrich knowledge and understanding of otherwise complicated political information, such as the effects of public policies, candidate qualities, election news, etc. (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995; Huckfeldt 2001; Mutz 2006; Parker, Parker, and McCann 2008; Walsh 2004). As Coleman (1990) notes, people can “free ride” off of their more attentive peers. “[A] person who is not deeply interested in current events but who is interested in being informed about important developments can save the time required to read a newspaper if he can get the information he wants from a friend who pays attention to such matters” (Coleman 1990, 310).

Given that Latinos are less likely to discuss politics and be active in political affairs, isolated Latino social networks are not likely to cultivate civic and political

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<sup>43</sup> Djupe and McClurg (2000) find that even when holding media information and socioeconomic status constant, individual political agendas are affected by local social context.

participation. Latinos, more than any other group, may rely on “weak ties” (or ties to networks of people with a longer history in the United States) to inspire civic and political activity. There is little political socialization from within Latino social networks, largely due to the fact that so many Latinos in this country are first or second-generation immigrants who do not have a tradition of participation in the United States or knowledge of how the system works (Krasner and Pierre-Louis 2006). Also, concentrated immigrant neighborhoods will likely have a significant proportion of their population that is legally barred from voting and participating in politics through institutionalized means and may fear participation or feel they are not allowed to participate in other matters that involve government institutions (i.e., writing elected officials, protesting, etc.). This inability to participate should decrease political discussion, political knowledge and the potential for mobilization. In fact, recent studies of Latino participation show that Latinos often report little political discussion and/or interest among their peers (Garcia-Bedolla 2005; Gimpel, Lay, and Schuknecht 2003; Hardy-Fanta 1993; Lopez 2003). Thus, diverse social networks may be critical to Latino political socialization and participation.

*H4: Latinos living in segregated communities will have less diverse social networks than Latinos living in more integrated areas.*

#### Data and Methods

The data for this chapter comes from three sources: the Current Population Survey 2000 (CPS), the 2000 U.S. Census, and the Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey (SCBS). Quantitative analysis on citizenship attainment, English language ability, and socioeconomic status are conducted using the Current Population Survey

linked with contextual data from the U.S. Census. The CPS is a monthly survey of about 50,000 households conducted by the Bureau of the Census for the Bureau of Labor Statistics. In 2000 the CPS included a supplement to include voting and registration of the respondents in the data set. The CPS voter supplement includes over 7,000 Latino respondents. This data set is unique for its large sample of both U.S. born Latinos *and* Latino immigrants. It includes over 4,000 Latino immigrants and over 3,000 U.S. born Latinos.

Unfortunately, the CPS does not include any questions regarding the social networks of respondents; therefore, quantitative analysis on social network diversity is drawn from restricted data from the Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey 2000 (SCBS). The Saguaro Seminar of the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University compiled this data in 2000. It includes a national survey of 3,000 people and an additional 42,000 respondents in 42 communities inside the United States. The data set includes over 2,000 Latinos. The restricted data includes geographic codes enabling the researcher to link the individual respondents to the characteristics of their neighborhood as provided by the U.S. Census.

### Measurement of Variables

#### **Residential Context**

The smallest geographic unit of analysis included in the Current Population Survey is the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA). Although MSAs are large and encompass much more than an individual's neighborhood or even residential context, they allow for analysis of housing markets. As described by Steinmetz and Iceland (2003, 1), "Residential housing patterns (often referred to as "residential segregation" in

the technical literature) usually describe the distribution of different groups across units within a larger area. To examine the residential housing patterns of racial and ethnic groups, an appropriate area and its component parts or units of analysis must be chosen.” MSAs are the most common area used to measure the housing patterns of racial groups. Iceland, Weinberg, and Steinmetz (2002), in conjunction with the U.S. Census, calculated racial segregation measures for Latinos in 2000 using 19 isolation/segregation measures found in the housing literature. Each of these measures fit into one of 5 main categories: evenness, exposure, concentration, centralization, or clustering. For the purposes of this paper, I use the exposure/isolation measure recommended by Iceland, Weinberg, and Steinmetz (2002) because "exposure measures the degree of potential contact, or possibility of interaction, between minority and majority group members" (Massey and Denton, p. 287). The two measures of exposure, isolation and interaction, are highly correlated.<sup>44</sup> This variable is referred to in the text as “Latino Isolation.”<sup>45</sup>

The SCBS allows for a more in-depth approach to neighborhood context because it includes census tracts. Thus, for analyses drawing from the SCBS, the “Latino Isolation” measure is based on a factor score of three tract level variables: percent Latino living in the census tract, percent of the Latino population in that tract that speaks *no* English, and the percent of the tract that is not a citizen (alpha .7).<sup>46</sup> This factor score captures not only the extent to which the individual lives in a largely Latino area but the extent to which they are isolated among Spanish speakers and non-citizens (factors that

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<sup>44</sup> For a full discussion of the various segregation measures, see:

[http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/housing\\_patterns/app\\_b.html](http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/housing_patterns/app_b.html)

<sup>45</sup> Unfortunately, these MSA level segregation variables do not allow for analysis of Latino isolation with regard to anything beyond isolation based on ethnic identification.

<sup>46</sup> These variables were originally run separately and had separate expectations, however, they are highly correlated and overly increase the multicollinearity of the model and wipe out the statistical effects of each variable.

should decrease the extent to which outside institutions attempt to mobilize the neighborhood). *Latino Isolation* was created using principal components analysis (.pcf in STATA).<sup>47</sup>

### **Dependent Variables**

*Citizenship and Immigration status.* The CPS includes variables indicating whether the respondent is an *immigrant*, a *naturalized immigrant*, or if they were born in the United States (*U.S. born*). Unfortunately, the SCBS does not include this detailed information. The SCBS only includes if the respondent is a citizen or not, but does not include information on whether they are an immigrant.

*English Language Ability.* The CPS only includes data on whether the person lives in a home in which Spanish is the only language spoken by adults. Since the data include only adults, this should mean that, at least in the home, the respondent speaks only Spanish. Since it is certainly the case that many respondents may be fluent English speakers but choose to speak only Spanish at home, this is not a perfect measure. Speaking English *only* in the home should be an adequate measure and should correlate highly with English ability. The SCBS includes a variable indicating whether the person chose to take the survey in English or Spanish. Since it is likely that respondents will choose to take the survey in the language in which they feel most comfortable, this variable is used to measure English language proficiency.

*Socioeconomic Status.* Education and income are included as indicators of socioeconomic status. Education is measured by the number of years of schooling

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<sup>47</sup> Eigenvalues 2.03, factor loadings: percent Latinos speaking no English in tract: .66; percent non-citizens: .91, percent Latino .89. Unfortunately, the SCBS does not include many important relevant variables available in the CPS. For this reason, I replicated all of the models using both data sets when possible for validation purposes. The replications were consistently the same and did not produce any divergent results.

completed by the respondent. Income is measured as the total household income in dollars.

*Network Diversity.* Social network diversity is measured 1 if the respondent indicated that they have at least one personal friend that is not Latino. This variable is only included in the SCBS.

### **Independent Variables**

*Age.* Age is the age of the person at the time of the interview. Only those over the age of 18 are included.

*Year of immigration.* Immigrants who have been in the United States longer should be more likely to become citizens, and to have learned English. Thus, the year that the respondent immigrated is included in the analysis. This variable is only available in the CPS and is measured as the number of years the immigrant has been in the United States relative to her age.

*Country of Origin.* A great amount of diversity exists in the Latino community. Puerto Ricans come to the United States as citizens and thus never face citizenship barriers. Cubans have higher SES in general than other Latino immigrant groups and many came to the United States as political refugees. Mexicans are the largest immigrant group and generally come to the United States with very low education rates and for economic reasons (Massey, Durand, and Malone 2003). Finally, South American immigrants such as Brazilians and Chileans often immigrate to the United States with high levels of education and move to more integrated locations. Thus, in these models, I control for differences in country of origin. Dummy variables are included for Mexican, Puerto Rican, Central American, and “other Spanish” language country. Cubans are excluded and serve as the comparison group.

*Church Attendance, Gender, and Married* are all dichotomous variables. Church attendees, women, and married respondents are each coded as one.

The distribution of all included variables is included in Appendix B. In the following pages, I first present the results of my logistic and regression equations. I then discuss the substantive implications of these findings. Finally, I conclude with a discussion of the implications of this research.

## Results

### **Residential Context and Citizenship Attainment and English Language Ability**

Does residential segregation decrease naturalization rates and English skills? To test these two questions, I run logistic regression models. Because immigrants largely attain their education in their home country, and more educated immigrants are more likely to have the skills necessary for citizenship attainment in the model for naturalization, I include a control for education. Controls are also included for language use, age, and year of immigration because English speakers, older immigrants, and those who have been in the country longer are also more likely to become citizens. Being married has also been found to increase naturalization rates. Finally, I include dummy variables for the country of origin of the immigrant, using Cubans as the comparison group. Puerto Ricans are excluded from the analysis because they are citizens. Since Latino immigrants may move to more segregated areas as a result of social network recruitment and because it helps them get established when they first arrive, I run analyses separately for U.S. born Latinos and Latino immigrants. For the model for English use, I control for age, gender, year of immigration (for the immigrant model), marriage, and country of origin. Education is not included in the model for U.S. born Latinos because the directionality of

this variable is unclear. While higher levels of education should increase English language ability, having better English skills is also critical to achieving an education in the United States. For U.S. born citizens, English skills are a common determinant of educational attainment.<sup>48</sup>

Table 4.2 presents the results of the models for citizenship and English language ability. For each of the logistic models, I present both the logit coefficients and the change in predicted probability for a one-unit increase in the independent variable. Model A presents the results for naturalization rates among Latino immigrants. Controlling for all other factors, immigrants who live in residentially segregated metropolitan areas are less likely to naturalize. For each one-unit increase in residential segregation of the immigrant's metropolitan area, the likelihood of naturalizing decreases by 6 percentage points. This evidence supports hypothesis one—Latino immigrants in residential areas are less likely to naturalize.

Model B in Table 4.2 tests hypothesis two (English ability) for Latino immigrants. Again, a logistic regression model is used and predicted probabilities for a one-unit change in the independent variable are presented. Even controlling for education, income and a host of other variables, segregation decreases the likelihood of speaking English for Latino immigrants. For a one-unit increase in segregation, the likelihood that a Latino immigrant will speak English decreases by 22 percent.

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<sup>48</sup> I also ran the model controlling for education and it did not change the results.



Table 4.2. The Effect of Residential Isolation on Latino Citizenship and English Language Proficiency

	Citizenship	Change in predicted Probability (0->1)	Spanish Speaker	Change in predicted Probability (0->1)	Spanish Speaker	Change in predicted Probability (0->1)
	Model A ( <i>Immigrants Only</i> )		Model B ( <i>Immigrants only</i> )		Model C ( <i>U.S. Born only</i> )	
Latino	-.41*		.98*	.22	1.02*	0.05
Isolation	(0.20)	-.06	(.15)		(0.35)	
Education	.17*	.02	-.37*	-.09		
	(.03)		(.03)			
Age	.01*	.001	.01*	.002	-.01*	-.001
	(.003)		(.003)		(.01)	
Spanish Speaker	-.45*	-.07				
	(.09)					
Gender	.17*	.03	-.10	-.02	-.08	.00
	(.08)		(.06)		(.15)	
Year of Immigration	-.28*	-.05	.13*	.02		
	(.01)		(.01)			
Married	.23*	.04	-.06	-.02	-.67*	-.03
	(.09)		(.07)		(.17)	
Mexican	-1.40*	-.23	-.30*	-.07	-.70*	-.04
	(.15)		(.14)		(.32)	
Central American	-.86*	-.12	-.53*	-.12	-.47	-.02
	(.15)		(.14)		(.39)	
Puerto Rican			-1.01*	-.20	-.24	-.01
			(.18)		(.35)	
Other	-.40	-.05	-.44*	-.10	-1.34*	-.05
	(.22)		(.19)		(.44)	
Constant	1.79*		-1.48*		-1.94*	
	(.32)		(.26)		(.41)	
N	4192		4771		3232	
Pseudo R2	.27		.09		.04	
Prob>Chi2	.00		.00		.00	

Source: Current Population Survey

Notes: Sample includes all Latino over the age of 18.

Cubans are the comparison group for nation of origin.

Cells are Logit coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.

\*p<.05

As mentioned previously, many Latinos who do not have sufficient English skills were born in the United States. Model C in Table 4.2 tests hypothesis two (English ability) on U.S. born Latinos. U.S. born Latinos who live in segregated areas are less likely to speak English than their integrated counterparts. For a one-unit increase in MSA segregation, the likelihood of speaking Spanish goes up by 5 percent. It appears that when Latinos are isolated from English speaking communities, they are less likely to learn English or to have opportunities to practice their English skills.

### **Residential Segregation and Socioeconomic Mobility**

Table 4.3 presents the results for a test of hypothesis three (socioeconomic mobility). I test this hypothesis using three dependent variables—the likelihood of being a high school drop out, overall educational achievement, and income. Model D presents the effect of residential segregation and control variables on the likelihood of being a high school dropout. This model is only run with U.S. born Latinos.

Latinos who live in residentially segregated cities are more likely to drop out of high school. For a one-unit increase in residential segregation, the likelihood of not completing high school goes up by 6 percentage points. Segregated Latinos are also more likely to end their educational career earlier on a continuous scale. For a one-unit increase in segregation, Latino educational attainment decreases by .22.<sup>49</sup>

Model F shows the affect of segregation on income. Even controlling for education and other relevant variables, Latinos living in residentially isolated locations make less money than their more integrated counterparts. A one-unit increase in

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<sup>49</sup> The affect of segregation remains significant if I only include those ages 17-25 in the model. I ran this test to check that the effect was not a product of people with low levels of education living together after they received their education.

segregation results in over a full unit decrease in income. Immigrant Latinos (Model G) appear to suffer slightly less than their U.S. born counterparts as a result of segregation. However, they too make less in segregated environments. The smaller coefficient is likely a product of the more constrained incomes of immigrant Latinos (Waldinger 2001).

So far, the evidence suggests that segregated housing patterns are having a detrimental effect on Latino individual outcomes. The evidence indicates that if residential segregation continues on its current trajectory, Latinos may in fact become a new “underclass.” However, part of the critical development of the underclass for African Americans was their social distance from whites. Since whites and African Americans did not interact, whites viewed African Americans as unworthy “others” and African Americans lacked the access to critical information held only in white communities (such as job opportunities, etc) (Wilson 1996; Massey and Denton 1995; Carr & Kutty 2008).<sup>50</sup> Social integration is critical to Latinos for the same reasons.

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<sup>50</sup> Of course this does raise a question of directionality. Did whites not interact with African Americans because they viewed them negatively or did negative views drive whites to fear interaction with African Americans? In my view it is most likely reciprocal. While whites may not interact with minorities due to stereotypes, those stereotypes are exacerbated by a lack of interaction with minorities.

Table 4.3 The Effect of Residential Isolation on Educational Attainment

	<b>High School Drop Out</b> (U.S.- born only)	<b>Change in predicted Probability (0-&gt;1)</b>	<b>Overall Educational Attainment</b> (U.S. -born only)	<b>Income</b> (U.S.-born only)	<b>Income</b> (Immigrants only)
	Model D		Model E	Model F	Model G
Education	--		--	.98*	.71*
	--		--	(.04)	(.04)
Spanish	.34*		-.77*	-1.18*	-1.19*
Speaker	(.09)	.05	(.07)	(.22)	(.11)
Latino	.41*		-.22*	-1.27*	-.62*
Isolation	(.16)	.06	(.11)	(.32)	(.25)
Gender	-.08		.07	-.44*	-.53*
	(.07)	-.01	(.05)	(.12)	(.10)
Mexican	.01		-.64*	-.45	-.11
	(.23)	.002	(.17)	(.42)	(.21)
Central	-.20		-.25	-.82	.31
American	(.26)	-.03	(.20)	(.49)	(.22)
Puerto Rican	.27		-.58*	-1.76*	-1.5*
	(.23)	.04	(.18)	(.44)	(.28)
Other	-.59*		-.22	-.67	-.65*
	(.26)	-.07	(.19)	(.45)	(.32)
Age	.04*		.01*	-.02*	-.001
	(.00)	.003	(.001)	(.004)	(.003)
Constant	-2.59*		2.81*	8.82*	7.74*
	(.24)		(.19)	(.50)	(.33)
N	6387		3651	3191	4099
R-Square/Pseudo					
R-Square	.09		.04	.18	.14
F Prob>Chi2	.00		.00	.00	.00

Source: Current Population Survey

Notes: Sample includes all Latinos born in the United States over the age of 18.

Cubans are the comparison group for nation of origin.

Cells are Logit coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses for High School Drop out model and OLS coefficients for Overall Education model.

\*p&lt;.05

### **Residential Segregation and Social Network Diversity**

Table 4.4 presents a test of Hypothesis four—social network diversity. For this model, I turn to the Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey 2000. In this model I include a control for church attendance because church attendance has been shown to constrain social networks for some immigrant groups (Foley and Hoge 2007). The results show that Latinos of higher socioeconomic status, citizens, and English speakers are all more likely to have diverse social networks that include non-Latinos. Controlling for all of these factors, living in a residentially segregated area greatly decreases the chances of having a diverse social network. This model supports my theory that Latinos who live in residential isolation will have limited access to information that is not contained within their all-Latino social networks. In addition, this model supports the thesis that residential segregation increases geographic and social distance between groups.

### **Substantive Implications**

In order to investigate the substantive impact of segregation on the different variables of interest, I calculated predicted outcomes for each dependent variable. The results are presented in Table 4.5. For these calculations, I use Hanmer's (2007) method for calculating predicted outcomes for each individual, setting all other variables at their actual values. Following this method, I present the average predicted outcome for the sample, setting the segregation at three different values: low-segregation (minimum observed segregation value), mid segregation (half way point), and high segregation (maximum observed segregation value).

Table 4.4 The Effect of Residential Isolation on Friendship Diversity

	<i>Friendship Diversity</i>	<b>Change in Probability</b>
Isolation	-.89* (.30)	-.17
English Speaker	.87* (.14)	.17
Church Attendee	-.28* (.12)	-.05
Education	.19* (.04)	.04
Income	.19* (.04)	.04
Age (logged)	.19 (.17)	.04
Citizen	.54* (.14)	.10
Mexican	.12 (.41)	.02
Puerto Rican	-.44 (.43)	-.09
Other	.19 (.42)	.03
Constant	-.88 (.75)	
N	1831	
Pseudo-Rsquare	.15	

Source: Social Capital Benchmark Survey

Notes: Sample includes all Latinos born in the United States over the age of 18.

Cubans are the comparison group for nation of origin.

Cells are Logit coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses for High School Drop out model and OLS coefficients for Overall Education model.

\*p<.05

Table 4.5 presents these results. The first row presents how residential segregation affects the probability of becoming a U.S. citizen for Latino immigrants. The average Latino in the data set has a 14% likelihood of naturalizing in a low segregation area. However, as segregation increases, that rate declines significantly, dropping to below 10 percent in a high segregation area, a decrease of five percentage points. While this may not seem like a large decrease in naturalization rates, we must consider the quantity of people a change of this magnitude would affect. According to the U.S. Census, today there are 21 million non-citizen immigrants currently residing in the United States, and the vast majority of non-citizen immigrants are Latino. Given this number, a decrease of five percent is quite meaningful. So, even small changes in the relative probability of naturalization have large consequences in terms of actual people.

The second and third rows present the likelihood of speaking only Spanish at home. The predicted probability that an average native-born Latino will speak only Spanish in a low segregation area is only 2 percent, whereas in a high segregation area it increases to 7 percent. Again, considering the large population of Latinos born in the United States each year, even this low probability is significant. Further, this measure only captures speaking only Spanish, so it does not capture the degree to which segregation may increase the probability of U.S. Born Latinos being a limited English speaker.

Not surprisingly, the effect of segregation on immigrants is much stronger. Latino immigrants have an average predicted probability of speaking only Spanish in low segregation areas of 27 percent, whereas in high segregation areas, the probability

increases to 50 percent. In short, Latino immigrants are almost twice as likely to speak only Spanish if they live in a highly segregated area as if they live in a highly integrated area.

Table 4.5 Average Predicted Outcomes

	Low- Segregation	Mid- Segregation	High- Segregation
Naturalization (immigrants only)	14%	11%	9%
Speaking Spanish Only (Immigrants only)	27%	38%	50%
Speaking Spanish Only (U.S. Born only)	2%	5%	7%
Dropping out	18%	21%	25%
Income (U.S. Born)	\$30,000 - \$34,999	\$25,000 - \$29,999	\$20,000 - \$24,999
Income (Immigrants)	\$20,000 - \$24,999	\$20,000 - \$24,999	\$15,000 - \$19,999
Friendship Diversity	82%	75%	60%
Civic Engagement	29%	22%	16%

The consequences of segregation on education and income are quite striking. In general, the table shows that Latinos have relatively high drop out rates and low incomes across the board, but this situation is exacerbated by segregation. In highly integrated areas, Latinos have just under a one in five chance of not completing high school. In highly segregated areas, this ratio drops to a one in four chance of dropping out—a seven percentage point increase in the likelihood of dropping out. In short, living in integrated areas does seem to increase the chances of at least making it out of high school.

The predicted U.S born Latino family income in a highly segregated area is between \$20-24,000, whereas in integrated areas, the average is almost \$10,000 more.



The average predicted income for an immigrant family in an integrated area is \$20-24,000 but in a segregated area that figure decreases to \$15-19,000. In effect, segregation appears to lead to Latino families being much more likely to live below the poverty line.

The implications of segregation on the friendship diversity and civic engagement of Latinos is strikingly large. Latinos have an 82 percent chance of having at least one friend who is not Latino in low segregation areas. In highly segregated areas, that number decreases to 60 percent. While still greater than a fifty-fifty chance of having a non-Latino friend, segregation obviously impedes social network diversity for Latinos.

### Discussion

Previous research has shown that residential segregation constrains the socioeconomic mobility of African Americans (Massey and Denton 1993; Wilson 1995). As a result of socioeconomic inequality and segregation, African Americans and whites had little meaningful interaction, resulting in social distance and unequal opportunity. Historically, other minorities in the United States, including Latinos and Asians, have been far less segregated than African Americans, but times have changed. As of 2000, Latinos were on their way to becoming the most segregated minority in the United States (Timberlake and Iceland 2007).

As a result of an increase in Latino immigration, Latinos have become the largest minority in the United States. As their numbers have grown, they have become more similar to African Americans with regard to their political status in the United States. Politicians have made Latino immigration a major element to their campaigns, framing the immigration debate in “us versus them” terms and using language that defines Latinos as “invaders” of the United States (Massey, Durand, and Malone 2003) who will depress

wages and take jobs from American citizens (Morris 1993). Latinos now experience housing discrimination at a rate similar to African Americans (National Fair Housing Alliance 2003; Bocian, Ernst, and Li 2006). As a result of many factors, Latinos now live in more concentrated environments than ever before and if the current trend continues, Latinos will surpass African Americans as the most segregated minority group in the United States within the next decade (Timberlake and Iceland 2007).

The evidence presented in this chapter suggests that increased segregation of the Latino American community is taking its toll. Latinos immigrants who live in isolated areas are less likely to naturalize and both Latino immigrants *and* the U.S. born are less likely to learn English as a result of segregation. By not becoming citizens, Latino immigrants are not able to take advantage of many basic rights U.S. citizens take for granted (Massey, Durand, and Malone 2003). In addition, they are unable to qualify for basic social services or receive compensation for lost wages, even when they pay income taxes (Massey, Durand, and Malone 2003). Importantly, beyond a few locales that have allowed immigrants to participate in local elections, non-citizens are formally locked out of the most fundamental elements of democracy—most importantly, voting. Elected officials respond to active constituencies (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1993). When residential areas lack participatory groups, elected officials can more easily ignore the needs of Latino residents and divert resources to more demanding communities.

This chapter has also shown that Latino socioeconomic mobility is being constrained by segregation. Latinos living in segregated communities are more likely to drop out of high school, end their educational careers earlier, and make less money. Unfortunately, these are the very tools that contribute to the making of the underclass.

As Waldinger and Feliciano (2004, 395) ask, “if less skilled immigrants make up a working poor, locked into low wage jobs, and therefore confined to inner cities and their failing school systems, can we expect that their U.S.-born-and-raised children will find progress?”

Without policies that integrate schools, if not neighborhoods, segregated Latino children will be confined to schools without resources and with more challenged students. Impoverished segregated schools not only have to educate children but also confront the symptoms of poverty—lack of health care, nutrition, high mobility rates, and frequent absence. School segregation not only denies these children resources but also the access to “social networks that can help them escape poverty by linking to the world of economic and social success” (McKoy and Vincent 2008, 129). Diverse economic and racial social networks bring role models, information, and social capital not available in other isolated schools (Briggs 1998; Cattell 2001).

The final finding of this paper is pessimistic as to the future of integrated social networks. Latinos living in isolated areas are much less likely to report having a non-Latino friend. Segregation constrains social connections and social connections continue to have meaningful implications for information distribution (McPherson, Smith-Lovin and Cook 2001). As segregation increases in the United States, people’s knowledge about other groups will decline because they will lack quality interaction with people unlike themselves. Unfortunately, social distance often accompanies misunderstanding and the escalation of negative stereotypes (Welch et al. 1999). Moreover, without access to information held by non-Latinos, Latino political participation may continue to lag

behind other racial groups. In order to increase participation, interaction with groups that advocate participation may be critical to their political future.

This chapter also contributes to the literature on contextual effects and racial segregation. Since the publication of Massey and Denton's *American Apartheid* (1993), segregation has primarily been considered a problem only for African Americans. As Massey and Denton note, "No other group in the contemporary United States comes close to this level of isolation within urban society." The process of Latino socioeconomic integration is often considered to mirror the integration and assimilation process of European immigrants. Scholars have begun to question the applicability of the classic assimilation model instead proposing models of "segmented assimilation" (South et al. 2005) or "downward assimilation" (Portes and Rumbaut 2001). These alternative models portray the children of Latino immigrants as declining from the modest starting position of their parents into a "new rainbow underclass...at the bottom of society" (Portes and Rumbaut, 2001: 45). While no model of immigrant acculturation is sufficient, understanding how context constrains the choices and opportunities available to immigrants and their children is critical to our understanding of the future of the Latino population.


Finally, the experience of segregation and isolation among African Americans proves not to be unique. Latinos also suffer when they are separated from the majority group. If Latinos are less likely to participate when they are residentially removed from society, than whole areas of the country will be made up of residents who lack political voice. Moreover as the population of non-voters in the United States proliferates, democracy will be at risk.

Using the findings presented above, in the next chapter, I investigate how segregation affects political participation both directly and indirectly through socioeconomic mobility and social networks.

## Chapter 5: Latino Segregation and Political Participation

Citizens express their political preferences by voting in local, state and national elections, and engaging in numerous other political acts, like emailing or calling their elected officials, working for candidates who inspire them, and going to meetings to discuss community issues. It is through activities such as these that elected officials gauge the preferences of their constituents and are alerted to community problems in need of redress. Representational inequality festers when different groups express their political voices at different rates and at different decibels. As can be seen in Figure 5.1, almost 60 percent of Latinos reported participating in no political activities in 2000 (non-voting) compared to about 40 percent of whites and African Americans and far fewer Latinos register to vote or actually turn out to the polls once they are registered than other groups. As a result, Latino political voices remain relatively muted. They participate in all political activities at levels far below that of either African Americans or whites and as a result, despite recent gains, Latinos remain under-represented in government institutions (Hajnal and Trounstein 2005; NALEO 2007).

Figure 5.1 Political Participation by Race and Ethnicity



Source: Citizen Participation Survey 2000 and the Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey

Representation can translate into real benefits for minority populations, whether through the allocation of civil service jobs, city contracts, or the psychological, representational, and educational benefits that come from descriptive representation (Browning, Marshall and Tabb 1986; Banducci, Donovan, and Karp 2004; Gay 2002; Leal, Martinez-Ebers, and Meier 2004; Mansbridge 1999). For these reasons the historical participation gap between Latinos and other Americans has important implications for all levels of the policy making process as well as the social mobility of the Latino population. Previous studies have investigated various reasons for Latino non-

participation, including their aggregate lower socioeconomic status (Buehler 1977; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980); cultural characteristics, including English-language acquisition, recent immigration, and continuing attachment to homelands (Calvo and Rosenstone 1989; Jones-Correa 2006; Lien 1994; MacManus and Cassel 1988; Uhlaner, Cain, and Kiewiet 1989); and finally their social institutions and factors associated with mobilization (Shaw, de la Garza, and Lee 2000; Skerry 1993; Wong 2006), but none that I know of have attempted to create a causal path that takes into account the relationship between each of these variables and the location in which Latinos live.

Building on the findings of the previous two chapters, in this chapter, I explore the direct and indirect effects of Latino residential context and political participation. I argue that residential segregation inhibits political participation because it constrains socioeconomic mobility and isolates Latinos from diverse discussion networks and civically active communities. Thus, residential segregation indirectly decreases participation by constraining socioeconomic mobility and social integration. This thesis directly challenges previous research positing that segregation benefits the development of political participation (see esp., Campbell 2006; Putnam 2007) (but also see, Alesina and La Ferrara 2000; Costa and Kahn 2003; Hero 2003; Hill and Leighley 1999)—research that downplays the importance of socioeconomic mobility and social integration and relies on the supposition that all homogenous contexts foster political and civic participation as a social norm.

Here, I present a theoretical model of the role of residential segregation in Latino civic engagement, interest in political affairs, and political participation. My findings indicate that Latino segregation directly decreases civic engagement and indirectly



decreases political participation by constraining socioeconomic mobility, social network diversity, civic engagement, and political interest. These are the channels through which residential segregation decreases civic and political participation in the Latino community. By constraining life choices, social networks, and the development of civic engagement, Latinos are denied political information and do not develop the interest in politics that is necessary to stimulate meaningful political participation.


As I showed in the last two chapters, Latinos in segregated neighborhoods have fewer opportunities to attain the skills necessary for civic and political participation, such as those gained through socioeconomic mobility, and through diverse friendship networks. Latino immigrants, more than any other group, may rely on “weak ties” (or ties to networks of people with a longer history in the United States) such as those attained through religious, voluntary, and employment related civic institutions. Also, as discussed in Chapter Three, a significant proportion of the population in concentrated immigrant neighborhoods is legally barred from voting and participating in politics through institutionalized means and may fear participation or feel they are not allowed to participate in other matters which involve government institutions (i.e., writing elected officials, protesting, etc.). This perceived inability to participate should further decrease political discussion, political knowledge and the potential for mobilization.

In this chapter I investigate civic engagement as well as political engagement because, civic institutions are helpful for increasing political knowledge, interest, and the motivation to participate in political affairs. Civic activities cultivate the discussion of community relevant issues and how they are affected by political decisions and government policies. Being in these settings makes the connection between the actions

of politicians and government agencies and community outcomes easier to understand. In short, civic activity, while not political per se, should increase political knowledge and interest and therefore participation. Moreover, civic activities increase both of the key factors associated with political participation: motivation and capacity (Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1993, 3). Since political activity is voluntary in the U.S., all citizens must want to participate (i.e., motivation) and have the skills necessary to participate (i.e., capacity).

Figure 5.2 shows the theoretical path and makes clear that the majority of the effect of residential segregation on political participation should work indirectly via socioeconomic factors, social networks, political knowledge and interest, and civic engagement. The first few stages in the model were shown in the previous two chapters. Latinos in segregated contexts are more likely to have lower SES and more constrained social networks. Here I look at the final stages in the model: civic engagement, political interest, and finally political participation and incorporate a structural equation model.

Figure 5.2 Conceptual Model of the Residential Segregation –Political Participation Connection



### Data, Methods, and Measurement

The data for this chapter are derived from two sources. First and foremost, I employ restricted data from the Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey 2000 (SCBS). The Saguaro Seminar of the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University compiled this data set in 2000. It includes a national survey of 3,000 people and an additional 42,000 respondents in 42 “communities” inside the United States. The data set includes over 2,000 Latinos. The restricted data includes geographic codes

enabling the researcher to link the individual respondents to the characteristics of their neighborhood as provided by the U.S. Census. For this chapter, because it is possible to do so, I maximize this information and use information generated from census tracts. While not a perfect indicator of neighborhoods, census tracts are usually a relatively good proxy for neighborhoods because they normally follow visible features, and often governmental unit boundaries and other non-visible features.

Following methodology used by Walker (2008), Brehm and Rahn (1997), Scheufele, et al. (2006), Asher (1988) and others, a structural equation model (SEM) using the statistical program EQS (Byrne 2006) was developed to test a theoretical model of Latino political participation. Structural equation modeling was chosen because it allows the researcher to see both direct and indirect effects of variables of interest. The heavy reliance on single equation, unidirectional OLS and MLE regression techniques have obscured the relative importance of context and other variables whose effects are masked by the inclusion of such potent indicators as political interest and civic engagement. By using a SEM approach, I am able to parcel out how residential context restrains the development of these key mediating factors and thereby indirectly affect the likelihood of participation.

The relationships of the variables are portrayed graphically in Figure 5.2. Each arrow in Figure 5.2 represents an empirically tested hypothesis. As depicted the model contains eight endogenous variables—socioeconomic status, citizenship, English language ability, church attendance, friendship diversity, civic engagement, political interest, and finally political participation. The dichotomous nature of some of the dependent variables violates the assumptions of MLE and OLS regression used in many

SEMs. EQS allows the analyst to notify the program as to which variables are categorical and take into account the non-linear distribution, which could otherwise produce biased estimates (Finney and DiStefano 2006, but also see Byrne 2006, Chapter 5).

### **Measurement and Coding of Variables**

#### *Residential Context*

Generated from the census, I include a “*Latino Isolation*” measure to estimate the extent to which Latinos are isolated into segregated neighborhoods and lack exposure to other communities. The measure is a factor score of three tract-level variables: percent Latino living in the census tract, percent of the Latino population in that tract that speaks *no* English, and the percent of the tract that is not a citizen (alpha .7), as was employed in the previous chapter.<sup>51</sup> This factor captures not only the extent to which the individual lives in a largely Latino area but the extent to which they are isolated among Spanish speakers and non-citizens (factors that should decrease the extent to which outside institutions attempt to mobilize the neighborhood). *Latino Isolation* was created using principal components analysis (.pcf in STATA).<sup>52</sup> I also include a dummy variable for if the neighborhood is located in the southern United States defined as the states of the confederacy.

#### *Individual variables and Socioeconomic Status*

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<sup>51</sup> Each of these variables were included in the model separately, however, they are highly correlated and measure one theoretical concept.

<sup>52</sup> Eigenvalues 2.03, factor loadings: percent Latinos speaking no English in tract: .66; percent non-citizens: .91, percent Latino .89.

I include five individual measures: citizenship status, English language ability, income, and education and age.<sup>53</sup> Unfortunately the SCBS 2000 does not include any variable indicating if the Latino respondent is an immigrant. Thus, I can only control for if the respondent is a citizen. Citizen is coded 1 if the individual is a United States citizen. English language ability is measured by if they took the survey in Spanish or in English. This variable is coded 1 if they took the survey in English. While this measure is not a perfect indicator of how well the individual understands and is capable of speaking English, it at least should capture which language they feel more comfortable speaking. In any case, both the citizenship and the language variables used in this chapter should be seen as conservative tests of the theory given both should have increased measurement error, which should decrease the size of the coefficient and the potential for statistical significance. Originally, nation of origin was included in the models. The SCBS only has indicators for Puerto Rican, Mexican, Cuban, and “other.” However, when they were included in the model, they were consistently insignificant, and given the limitations of the categories, they were dropped from the model.

Socioeconomic status is a factor score of two variables: education and income. It was generated using principal components analysis.<sup>54</sup>

### *Social Network Diversity and Civic Engagement*

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<sup>53</sup> Because the Latino population in the United States is younger than the total population, it has a skewed distribution. To account for this, I employ the natural log of the age variable.

<sup>54</sup> Education is measured as the number of years of formal education the respondent received. It ranges from less than a high school education to graduate degree. Income is measured as the respondent’s answer to their household income and ranges from under \$20,000 to over \$100,000. Eigenvalue: 1.42, factor loadings: income: .84; education: .84.

To account for the potential effects of social network diversity, I include a variable that is measured 1 if the respondent indicated that they have at least one personal friend that is not Latino. Church attendance is measured as 1 if the individual attends church and 0 otherwise. The variable to measure civic engagement is a composite score of the number of non-political groups and events the person participated in.

### *Political Interest and Participation*

Political Interest is measured as the respondents answer to the question: “How interested are you in politics and national affairs? Are you very interested, somewhat interested, only slightly interested, or not at all interested?”

Political Participation is measured in three ways: voter registration, voting, and non-voting political activity. Voter Registration is coded as 1 if the individual indicated they were registered to vote. Models using this variable are run only on individuals who also indicated that they were citizens. Voting is coded 1 if the individual indicated that they voted in the 1996 presidential election. Models using this variable are only run on individuals who are citizens and registered to vote. Finally, political participation is measured as an index to 7 questions regarding non-electoral political activity including signing a petition, attending political meetings or rallies, joining in any demonstrations, protests, boycotts, or marches, involvement in local reform efforts, membership in political groups, ethnic, nationality, or civil rights groups, or labor unions.<sup>55</sup> A full explanation of each variable is available in the appendix.

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
<sup>55</sup> This variable is the “Protest” variable provided in the Social Capital Benchmark Survey 2000.

## **Methodology**

Figure 5.3 illustrates the nature of the SEM to be estimated. Following past efforts at developing causal models of participation, I separate my variables into six “causal stages.” In the first stage are the residential characteristics of the neighborhood, as measured by the Latino isolation factor and the southern state dummy variable. Age is also included in the first stage as a control variable. In the second stage are sociodemographic characteristics that are exogenous to social network diversity and civic and political participation. This includes socioeconomic status as well as citizenship and English language ability. The next two stages posit a causal ordering between various types of social and civic integration. Occupying the third stage is church attendance. The fourth stage is social network diversity. The fifth stage contains non-political civic engagement. The sixth stage is interest in political affairs and the seventh stage, or outcome, is political participation.



Figure 5.3 Causal Stages in the Model of Latino Political Participation



Although the figure includes causal arrows only from one stage to the stage immediately following it, I allow the variables in each causal stage to have direct and indirect effects on the variables in all of the subsequent stages, as in Figure 4.2. Based on

these estimates, I compute the direct, indirect, and total effects of the various indicators on political participation and display those effects in Tables 5.1-5.3.

### Results

What drives Latino participation? Table 5.1 presents the direct effects of all the variables included in the SEM. By looking at this model we can see that Latinos who are citizens, have higher SES, are civically engaged, and who are interested in politics are more likely to participate in political affairs. Also, Latinos living in the South and older Latinos are much less likely to participate. As expected, the largest effects on participation are derived from civic engagement and political awareness. Like other racial groups, Latinos are most likely to be recruited to participate in political activities and to develop an interest in politics when they are active in non-political civic activities (Walker 2008). The effect of this variable is considerable. For a one-unit increase in civic activity, Latino political participation increases by .283, when holding all other variables at their means. Likewise, Latinos who have an interest in politics are much more likely to participate. A one-unit increase in political interest results in a .218 increase in political activity, holding all other variables constant. Given the large direct impact of these two factors on political participation, how Latinos gain political interest and become involved in civic activities is critical to understand.

However, by including all variables in a single model without specifying the structural nature of the variables, this model overlooks the potential impact that contextual and individual characteristics have via their affect on the factors that appear the most relevant—SES, civic engagement, and political interest. By relying solely on

the direct effects, we can not investigate the relationship between the contextual variables and the dependent variables of interest and how segregation constrains the causes of participation. Thus, the model is misspecified. The theory in this paper lies out that the variables included in Table 5.1 are related in a causal path. Thus, all the indicators in the model should affect participation indirectly.

Table 5.1 Direct Effects of All Variables on Political Participation

	Coefficient	Standard Error
Political Interest	.218**	.023
Civic Engagement	.283**	.012
Friendship Diversity	-.028	.043
Church Attendance	.045	.046
SES	.078**	.031
Citizenship	.091	.051
English	.088	.050
South	-.274**	.051
Age (logged)	-.170**	.062
Residential Isolation	.002	.014
N	1903	
Note: Cell entries represent AGLS estimates in EQS. The entries are unstandardized coefficients and standard errors.		
Models were also run using MLE with Robust Standard Errors, but the results were not substantively different.		
**Significant $p < .05$		
Source: Social Capital Benchmark Survey 2000		

Table 5.2 presents the structural equation model for political participation. The models are presented in the order in which they appear in the specified path. First isolation, south, and age are used to predict, SES, citizenship, and English language ability. Next, each of these variables is included in a model predicting church attendance, then church attendance is added to the model to predict friendship diversity and so forth

until all the variables are included in the model for participation. The variables in each model include their direct, indirect, and total effects for the endogenous variable.

How does residential segregation affect the political participation rates of Latinos in the United States? In order to understand this question, we must understand the affect of residential segregation on the critical factors associated with participation.

As shown in the previous chapter, residential isolation drastically decreases Latino socioeconomic status, citizenship, and English language acquisition. Controlling for age and southern residency, a one unit increase in residential isolation, results in a .03 decrease in socioeconomic status, a decrease of .8 in the likelihood of knowing English, and a .07 decrease in the likelihood of becoming a citizen. Looking at church attendance, the model shows that Latinos living in isolated neighborhoods are more likely to attend church, although the impact of segregation on church attendance is largely indirect via the negative affect segregation has on individual socioeconomic status, citizenship, and English ability. As Model 4 shows, higher socioeconomic status Latinos are less likely to attend church, as are citizens and those who speak English well. Since residential segregation decreases these factors, it has a robustly positive *indirect* effect on church attendance.

Table 5.2 Structural Equation Model of Latino Political Participation

	Model 1 SES Direct	Model 2 Citizenship Direct	Model 3 English Direct	Model 4 Church Attendance Direct Indirect Total			Model 5 Friendship Diversity Direct Indirect Total		
Church Attendance							-.04 (.02)		-.035
SES				-.09** (.01)		-.090**	.09** (.01)	.003	.090**
Citizenship				-.13** (.02)		-.132**	.09** (.03)	.005	.092**
English				-.10** (.03)		-.102**	.18** (.03)	.004	.187**
South	.03 (.06)	-.13** (.03)	-.16** (.03)	-.06** (.03)	.031	-.090**	-.01 (.03)	.036**	-.045
Age (logged)	.07 (.06)	.14** (.03)	-.01 (.03)	-.11** (.03)	-.023**	-.131**	.03 (.03)	.020	.047
Residential Isolation	-.03** (.06)	-.07** (.01)	-.08** (.01)	.004 (.007)	.030**	.034**	-.02** (.007)	-.034**	-.050**
N	1907								

Note: Cell entries represent AGLS estimates in EQS. The entries are unstandardized coefficients and standard errors. Models were also run using MLE with Robust Standard Errors, but the results were not substantively different.

\*\*Significant  $p < .05$

Source: Social Capital Benchmark Survey 2000

Table 5.2b Structural Equation Model of Latino Political Participation (Continued)

	Model 6 Civic Engagement			Model 7 Political Interest			Model 8 Political Participation		
	Direct	Indirect	Total	Direct	Indirect	Total	Direct	Indirect	Total
Political Interest							.22** (.02)		.218**
Civic Engagement				.07** (.009)		.074**	.28** (.01)	.016**	.299**
Friendship Diversity	.57** (.20)		.568**	.19** (.03)	.042**	.230**	-.03 (.04)	.210**	.183**
Church Attendance	-1.03** (.12)	-.020	-1.05**	-.16** (.05)	-.085**	-.239**	.05 (.05)	-.348**	-.303
SES	.69** (.08)	.144**	.834**	.22** (.027)	.093**	.312**	.08** (.03)	.297**	.375**
Citizenship	.32** (.14)	.188**	.504**	.10 (.05)	.075**	.174**	.09 (.05)	.172**	.263**
English	.48** (.14)	.212**	.688**	.03 (.06)	.102**	.133**	.08 (.05)	.213**	.301**
South	.03 (.14)	-.088	-.058	.03 (.06)	-.019	.007	-.27** (.05)	.038	-.312**
Age (logged)	.30 (.16)	.245**	.544**	.29** (.06)	.097**	.384**	-.17** (.05)	.247**	.077**
Residential Isolation	-.08** (.04)	-.213**	-.294**	.02 (.015)	-.075**	-.056**	.002 (.014)	-.116**	-.114**
N	1907								
Note: Cell entries represent AGLS estimates in EQS. The entries are unstandardized coefficients and standard errors. Models were also run using MLE with Robust Standard Errors, but the results were not substantively different.									
**Significant p<.05									
Source: Social Capital Benchmark Survey 2000									

As hypothesized, and as shown in the previous chapter, despite technological innovations and the relative ease of modern transportation, Latinos living in isolated neighborhoods are also less likely to have diverse friendship networks (Model 5). In addition to the direct effect of isolation on social network diversity, residential isolation also indirectly constrains friendship diversity because higher SES individuals, citizens and English speakers are all more likely to have diverse social networks.

Model 6 in Table 5.2b shows the impact of residential segregation on civic engagement. Civic engagement is critical to the vitality of neighborhoods. When citizens are involved in non-political community activities, social capital grows and neighborhoods are safer. Further, individuals within engaged neighborhoods are healthier, happier, and less at risk for economic hardship (Putnam 2000). These data suggest that residential isolation will have a negative effect on the vitality of Latino neighborhoods. Residential isolation directly decreases civic engagement. Controlling for all other factors, a Latino living in an isolated neighborhood is less likely to participate in civic affairs. The indirect affect of isolation is extremely large. By constraining socioeconomic mobility, citizenship, English language acquisition and friendship diversity, segregation further decreases civic engagement. The total effect of a one-unit increase in segregation is a decrease of .294 in civic activity.

Being interested in politics is the foundation for political participation. Individuals who are interested in politics tend to follow the news more and discuss politics more, which increases both their knowledge about political affairs and their ability to use heuristics and to understand political information (Neuman 1986; Nicholson, Pantoja, and Segura 2006). The effect of residential segregation is entirely

indirect. Latinos living in isolated neighborhoods *are* less likely to be interested in politics, but it is because they have low levels of friendship diversity, SES, citizenship, and English proficiency—all of which are lower in segregated neighborhoods. Friendship diversity appears to be very important to the development of political interest. Latinos who have diverse social networks are much more likely to be interested in political affairs. This gives support to the idea that isolated Latino social networks lack access to political information. Latinos with access to bridging social ties—social contacts that “bridge” to social networks otherwise inaccessible—are able to access political information that their social networks otherwise lack. Civic engagement is also critical to the development of political interest. Latinos involved in civic activities are more likely to be involved in conversations about political affairs and to gain an understanding of the link between community concerns and politics (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995).

Model 8 presents the direct, indirect, and total effects of each variable in the SEM model on political participation. The direct effects are identical to those presented in Table 5.1. When socioeconomic status, political interest, and civic engagement increase, so too does political participation. Latinos who are engaged in non-political civic activities are likely to be recruited to participate in political affairs (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Wong 2006). The effect of friendship diversity is also critical, but its effect is indirect. Since Latinos with more diverse social networks are more likely to be engaged in civic activities and to be interested in politics, they are more likely to participate in politics. The same is true for residential isolation. While segregation does not directly decrease political participation, by constraining the factors that are critical to



participation, segregation severely curtails the potential for participation in Latino neighborhoods. Residential segregation denies Latinos the ability to learn about politics and to come into contact with politically active social networks. Thus, instead of residential homogeneity increasing the civic norms associated with high levels of political participation (i.e., Putnam 2007; Campbell 2006); it denies them the ability to become active participants in the democratic process.

Table 5.3 presents a summary view of how residential isolation affects all of the critical indicators in the path to participation. Either indirectly or directly, segregation negatively affects socioeconomic mobility, and social and political incorporation.

Table 5.3 Effects of Isolation on Political Participation

<i>Direct effects of Isolation</i>			<i>Indirect Effects of Isolation</i>		<i>Total Effects of Isolation</i>	
SES	-.135 (.013)	**			-.135	**
English Ability	-.079 (.007)	**			-.079	**
Citizenship	-.071 (.007)	**			-.071	**
Church Attendance	.004 (.007)		.030	**	.034	**
Friendship Diversity	-.016 (.007)	**	-.034	**	-.05	**
Civic Engagement	-.078 (.038)	**	-.216	**	-.294	**
Political Interest	.019 (.015)		-.075	**	-.056	**
Political Participation	.002 (.014)		-.116	**	-.114	**

Note: Cell entries represent AGLS estimates in EQS. The entries are unstandardized coefficients and standard errors.

Models were also run using MLE with Robust Standard Errors, but the results were not substantively different.

\*\*Significant  $p < .05$

Source: Social Capital Benchmark Survey 2000

Table 5.4. Structural Equation Model of Latino Voter Registration and Voting						
	Model 10 Registration			Model 11 Voted		
	Direct	Indirect	Total	Direct	Indirect	Total
Political Interest	.07** (.01)		.072**	.07** (.01)		.074**
Civic Engagement	.005 (.004)	.005**	.010**	.01** (.005)	.004**	.015**
Friendship Diversity	.001 (.03)	.021**	.023	.07 (.04)	.019**	.084**
Church Attendance	-.05** (.02)	-.022**	-.074**	-.04 (.03)	-.026**	-.068**
SES	.05** (.01)	.030**	.080**	.06** (.02)	.040**	.101**
English	.12** (.03)	.029**	.144**	.21** (.04)	.034**	.242**
South	.02 (.03)	.005	.026	-.006 (.04)	-.005	.011
Age (logged)	.21** (.03)	.034**	.245**	.42** (.04)	.007	.423**
Residential Isolation	-.005 (.008)	-.016**	-.021**	-.01 (.01)	-.027**	-.038**
N	1277			902		
Fit						
Note: Cell entries represent MLE estimates in EQS with Robust Standard Errors. The entries are unstandardized coefficients.						
**Significant p<.05						
Source: Social Capital Benchmark Survey 2000						

Table 5.4 presents the direct, indirect, and total effects of the SEM on voter registration and voting. In model 9, the dependent variable is voter registration. This model includes only Latinos who are citizens. The dependent variable in model 10 is voting in the 1996 election. This model includes only Latino citizens who are registered to vote. The effects of residential segregation are consistent in these models as well and largely replicate the findings of Model 8. Although largely indirectly, Latinos living in isolated areas are less likely to register to vote and to vote once they are registered. Voting is the most equal and accessible political act (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady

1995), thus voting is critical to the future of the Latino political voice. Neighborhoods with high voter turnout receive more attention from elected officials and parties (Gershtenson 2003), as such there is a reciprocal relationship—neighborhoods that participate receive more attention, which increases their participation in the future. Local and state elected officials, particularly in one party areas, bend at the will of “super voters.” These elected officials hold the purse strings for critical public services important to the Latino community. Without their ear, Latinos are unlikely to see funding for the policies they need most.

### Discussion

Briefly, it is important to consider why the factors that residential segregation constrains are important for political participation. Doing so paints a picture of the conditions of the Latino population in the United States. As discussed in-depth in the previous chapter and as replicated here, immigrant Latinos in isolated areas are less likely to become citizens. Citizenship’s effect on Latino participation is significant, but also only indirectly. Citizens are more likely to have non-Latino friends, and to be involved in civic activities. Citizenship also has an additional indirect effect on civic engagement, channeled primarily through social network diversity. Since citizens are more likely to have diverse social networks, they are recruited more frequently into civic activities. Although there is no direct effect on political interest, citizenship does indirectly increase political interest via both network diversity and civic engagement.

The consequences of English language proficiency are also important and almost identical to that of citizenship. Latinos with proficient English skills are more likely to have non-Latino friends and to be involved in civic activities. English skills also have a

critical indirect effect on civic activities. Channeled through these factors, English increases the likelihood of being interested in politics and participating. The fact that there is no direct effect of English skills on political interest indicates that Latinos, who do not have full access to English language news and discussion, do still develop an interest in politics. This may be a result of the new investment in Spanish language media advertising (Ramos 2005), the extensive political coverage in the Spanish language news (television, radio, and print media) and the recent attacks on immigrants, which has shown to increase political awareness even among recent immigrants (Pantoja, Ramirez, and Segura 2001).

Socioeconomic status remains critical to the development of all factors associated with political participation. The total impact of low SES is large and significant for every indicator of social and political involvement. Latinos with low SES are less likely to have non-Latino friends, to be active in civic activities, and to develop political interest. They are also less likely to participate in politics. This finding presents a pessimistic vision of the future of Latino communities. Socioeconomic segregation in the United States is rampant. The rich and poor are almost as unlikely to live together as individuals of different races. Local land ordinances, once designed to prevent racial minorities from purchasing or renting homes in towns, counties, and suburbs, left a legacy of class segregation that is unlikely to disappear in the future (Dreier, Mollenkopf, and Swanstrom 2001). However, many lower SES white communities participate far more than their socioeconomic status would indicate. Particularly rural towns with large amounts of political agreement appear to have a dedication to civic engagement and as a result political activity (Campbell 2006).

The situation for low SES Latino communities does not appear to be as bright. Latino communities with aggregately low SES are likely to experience a fair amount of poverty. Latinos suffer from poverty rates similar to that of African Americans. According to the 2005 supplement to the Current Population Survey, about 22% of Latinos were living in poverty as of 2005, compared to 25% of African Americans and 8.3% for non-Hispanic whites. These numbers are likely to increase with the recent downturn in the economy. Latinos are more likely to be employed in the construction industry than any other racial group (Kochhar 2006). As new home construction has plummeted and home improvements have slowed due to a fluctuating economy, many Latinos have lost their employment or have become underemployed, working only incrementally. Thus, low SES Latinos are likely to live among many impoverished people as it is and are likely to see increases in neighborhood poverty if the economy continues to flat line (or to further decline). Given the effect of SES on civic engagement poor Latino neighborhoods may begin to mirror the social disorganization historically seen in African American neighborhoods with concentrated poverty (Massey and Denton 1993; Wilson 1990; Wilson 1996). Gang activity and crime thrive in poverty-ridden, densely-populated areas. If neighborhoods are unable to bond together and fight off these threats and provide help and assistance to each other, collectively each individual is likely to suffer.

Friendship diversity is also critical for cross-cultural understanding. Diverse social networks not only provide for the spread of information, but also help groups understand each other and feel less threatened by the presence of “others” (Dixon and Rosenbaum 2004; Mutz 2006). So, on the one hand, segregation decreases access to

information about job advancements, innovations, and other information not present in Latino communities, it also leads to the development of misunderstandings and stereotypes held by the white community.

The evidence presented in this paper regarding Latino church attendance is troubling. Churches have long been an incubator of community and political activity. The role of religion and the church in American politics is critical to understanding American political behavior. But while the church has been an active mobilizing force for African American communities, the research presented herein suggests that the churches Latinos attend further isolate them from the broader community—fostering strong bonding (within group) ties, but prohibiting bridging (between group) ties. When Latinos are active in church communities, they appear to be simply less likely to participate in non-church political activities and to come into contact with diverse social networks (Foley and Hoge 2007).

### Conclusion

The total effects of segregation on the cumulative elements presented in this chapter—socioeconomic mobility, friendship diversity, civic engagement, and political interest—present a pessimistic view of the future vitality of Latino political participation. The statistical analysis presented in this paper is based on data from eight years ago. Since that time, segregation has been on the rise (Timberlake and Iceland 2008), and the poverty level within Latino communities has increased due to higher unemployment and a souring economy (Torrens 2008). This chapter has shown that the more isolated

Latinos are from non-Latinos, the less likely they are to be civically engaged, to be interested in political affairs, and to participate in politics.

This disinterest and non-participation has the potential to have further negative effects on Latino communities as federal, state, and local elected officials write them off as unnecessary electoral constituencies. Unfortunately, as poverty in Latino communities increases, Latino neighborhoods will need significant investment from policy makers if they are to escape the social unrest that typifies so many high poverty neighborhoods.

Latino neighborhoods will require significant investment in their schools and social services if they are to escape poverty. This support is likely to be dampened the more isolated they are from the rest of the community. Since local and state governments operate under significant financial constraints, communities and groups compete for services and money for pet projects (Kaufmann 2004; Judd and Swanstrom 2005). In these competitions, the loudest voices tend to win (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). Environmentally hazardous chemical plants are placed in minority communities, particularly immigrant communities (Hunter 2000), because of NIMBY rejections by politically engaged white neighborhoods (Hamilton 1995). New schools and community facilities are built in already advantaged neighborhoods because they were organized and are rewarded for their support of local officials who wish to avoid political backlash by placing coveted new projects in neighborhoods without a critical electoral constituency.<sup>56</sup>

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<sup>56</sup> In one interview that I conducted, a community activist noted that even though the community had finally elected a Latino county councilman that the Latino area of town would not get the new health center that was planned for the district. Instead, she argued it would be placed in the African American side of town because that was where all the voters were, despite where the most sensible place would be to place it given the population the center would serve.



Latinos living in isolated conditions are also likely to become disaffected with government and lack reasons to participate. As Melissa Michelson (2003a; 2003b) finds, the longer Latinos live in the United States, the far more cynical and disaffected they become. If they are isolated into poor, Spanish speaking communities, this effect is likely to be far greater. As Latinos suffer from neglect from government institutions, they may be even less likely to participate because they feel that the government is not representative of them, does not care about them, and will not respond to their needs.

The increase in anti-immigrant/anti-Latino ordinances at the local level is also troubling for the future of the Latino community. Ordinances that target, Latino (or potential Latino) homeowners such as maximum occupancy legislation—particularly outlawing extended families from living within the same house—and the Latino public, such as, English only laws, and attempts to deputize local government officials—and sometimes local residents themselves—to become immigration enforcement agents, only serve to isolate the Latino community further. Moreover, recent evidence suggests that Latinos are considerably more likely to face housing discrimination by private agents. Recent statistics suggest that Latinos face discrimination in 4 out of 5 visits to a rental agent (National Fair Housing Alliance 2003), and that Latinos are more than twice as likely as whites to be given a subprime, high cost loan—making Latinos more likely to face foreclosure and to lose what may be their only investment.

As segregation increases in the Latino community, it is likely that any relative increase in the socioeconomic status of second and third generation Latinos will be inhibited and as a result the potential voice of the Latino community will be muted. Without significant investments in enforcement of the Fair Housing Act, increased

coverage and funding of the Community Reinvestment Act, and state and local policies that increase opportunities for minorities to live in diverse environments, the future of Latino politics is bleak.

## Chapter 6: If They Won't Do It, We Will: Punitive State Responses to Latino Immigration

The previous chapters show that Latinos in the United States, both foreign and U.S. born, face arduous hurdles to civic and political participation in U.S. political institutions. Political participation is fundamental to representation in the United States, since it is through participation that the polis elects representatives who understand community needs and concerns. The under-representation of minorities and the poor is likely to be far greater in state and local elections (see Hajnal 2005; Herring and Forbes 1994; Vanderleeuw and Engstrom 1987; Vanderleeuw and Liu 2002; Vanderleeuw and Sowers 2007).<sup>57</sup> Minorities have higher rates of voter roll-off—a situation that Vanderleeuw and Engstrom (1987) argue makes African Americans and Latinos “doubly underrepresented.” “Not only may the potential voters within such a group turn out to vote at a lower rate than those in other groups, but those who do turn out may also participate in many of the different elections at a lesser rate” (Vanderleew and Engstrom 1987, 1091). Further, given the low media coverage and salience of state and local elections, skills that lower the costs of participation are even more important for down-ballot elections (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1993).

The implications of voter under-representation and unequal “political voice” at the state level are ever more critical in an era of state legislative activism. State

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<sup>57</sup> While descriptive representation has been shown to increase co-ethnic turnout in Mayoral races (Bobo and Gilliam 1990; Barretto 2007; Gay 2001), no research that I know of has investigated if mobilization is affected by co-ethnic candidates for state legislature. Given the low-salience of these races, however, it is unlikely that it would have as great an impact as mayoral empowerment does, but certainly this is a worthy area of study.

legislatures are increasingly taking an active role in areas previously considered to be solely under federal jurisdiction, including immigration policy.

When Congress failed to pass immigration reform in 2006, the number of states introducing anti-immigrant legislation rapidly expanded (NCSL 2007). As I will explain, many of these measures threaten to increase racial profiling, especially against Latinos, and could be pernicious to the socioeconomic and physical mobility of the Latino community. In this chapter, I build on the findings of the previous chapters—that Latinos face great hurdles to political participation as a result of both low socioeconomic status and residential concentration—and examine the policy consequences of muted political voice at the state legislative level. Here, I investigate the relationship between demographic and political factors and the introduction and passage of immigration bills that increase discrimination against Latinos in employment and law enforcement—what I call “punitive” immigration bills.

About two-thirds of U.S. states introduced punitive immigration bills in 2007 but only a few states implemented their legislation. Studying the punitive immigration reform movement in the American states may provide a glimpse of (1) what legislation we should see in states over the next few years if Congress continues to delay immigration reform; (2) what accounts for differences in state responses to immigration; and (3) the importance of Latino political participation in state politics. In this chapter I ask: what are the political and demographic correlates of punitive immigration reform?

In the following pages, I give a brief history of federal immigration policy and summarize state and local responses to congressional inaction on immigration reform. To explain the politics of immigration at the state level, I introduce four competing

theories to explain the different approaches to immigration: the *group threat* approach, the *fiscal stress* perspective, the *ideological polarization* model, and the *ethnic empowerment* framework. Finally, I present preliminary findings using data on bill introduction and passage in 2007 and discuss the implications of the results for the utility of these models, then conclude by examining some promising directions for future research.

The preliminary data suggest that states that introduce and pass punitive immigration bills are, on several measures, significantly different from states that do not. Most significantly, introduction and passage states have much higher Latino immigration rates than states that do not enact legislation. Further, states without bill introductions spend more on health and education than those who pursue a punitive agenda. The preliminary evidence provides substantial support for a group threat model.

#### *Federal Responses to Immigration and the Changing Demographics of the U.S.*

The federal government has shirked its responsibility to adequately legislate immigration matters. Since the 1990s, it has become clear that the immigration system is broken. According to the Immigration and Naturalization Service (now the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services), the size of the undocumented population grew by over 350,000 people a year in the early 1990s.<sup>58</sup> Congress reacted to this wave of undocumented immigration by reforming immigration law in 1996. However, the reforms failed to produce any meaningful decrease in the rate of undocumented entrances

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<sup>58</sup> Calculating the undocumented population is quite difficult. The most respected way to calculate this population appears to be Warrant and Passel's so-called "residential" method, which has been used for several decades. For a discussion of how these numbers are calculated see Passell (2002).

to the U.S. and may have actually boosted it by failing to address the demand for immigrant labor (Massey, Durant, and Malone 2003). From 1996 to 1999, the undocumented population grew on average by about 500,000 people per year, consisting primarily of immigrants from Mexico, El Salvador, Guatemala, Colombia, and Honduras (Migration Policy Institute 2003). The impact of this growth was felt in both traditional immigrant gateways and in places unequipped to deal with such a sizeable increase. Arkansas, Tennessee, and South Carolina, each of which had an undocumented population under 10,000 in 1990, experienced an explosion in their undocumented immigration rates. These states each had immigration rates of over 400 percent in the late 1990s (Migration Policy Institute 2003).<sup>59</sup> By 2006, over 12 percent of the United States population was foreign born (the highest percentage since 1930) and new cities and towns across the nation became “emerging immigrant gateways” (Singer, Hardwick, Brettell and Cisneros 2008).<sup>60</sup>

In response, Congress again took up immigration reform in 2006. A bipartisan bill introduced by Senators Edward M. Kennedy (D-MA) and John McCain (R-AZ) sought to create pathways to citizenship for the undocumented population, overhaul the immigration system, and create an “impact aid” program that would provide grants to states to compensate for the costs of providing health care and education to new

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<sup>59</sup> Immigration rate is the multiplier of the number of foreign-born residents between two time periods. In effect, it is the rate of growth for the immigrant population. See Migration Policy Institute (2003).

<sup>60</sup> Cornelius (1995) posits that the increased expenditures on border patrol have done nothing to decrease border crossings but instead have limited the return of Mexican and other Latino immigrants who had planned on only staying for a limited period (also see Massey et al. 2002). In addition, he notes, the continued need for low cost labor perpetuates the demand for illegal immigrants, where US National policy only addresses the supply (Cornelius 2005, 777). In effect, he argues, our immigration policies are symbolic, not substantive (789).

immigrants. However, the bill failed and as a result, state and local governments have begun to take matters into their own hands (NCSL 2007).<sup>61</sup>

### **States and Locales Respond**

State governments have a history of legislating immigration. Throughout the 18<sup>th</sup> and early 19<sup>th</sup> centuries, immigration policy was primarily determined by individual states until the Supreme Court ruled that immigration policy should be uniform and under federal jurisdiction (Hutchinson 1981; Tichenor 2002). Even though the courts consider immigration policy to be the exclusive territory of the federal government, states and locales must provide services to immigrants and their families that help them survive in the United States. The “most careful and objective studies of [immigration] conclude that, while immigrants (illegal and legal) represent a net fiscal gain to the federal government, they are often a net burden to affected states and a definite fiscal negative to local governments” (Skerry 1995, 77). In fact, state and local governments bear the greatest fiscal responsibility in regards to immigration (particularly low-income immigrants), primarily through the cost of educating children and providing services in a second language (Fix and Passel 1994; Furuseth and Smith 2007, 13).<sup>62</sup> Whether or not immigrants, including the undocumented, generate an economic stimulus or drain on

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<sup>61</sup> In its report “Federal Gridlock on Immigration Reform Leads States to Action” (NCSL 2007), NCSL pinpoints federal inaction on immigration as the sole reason for the vast activity of states in this policy arena.

<sup>62</sup> As of 2000, there were about 1.6 million undocumented immigrant children in the United States. Another 3 million children with undocumented parents are U.S. citizens because they were born here (Passel, Capps, and Fix 2004). These children are primarily concentrated, like their parents, in ten states: California, Texas, Florida, New York, Illinois, New Jersey, Arizona, Georgia and North Carolina.

resources for local governments is still a matter of debate.<sup>63</sup> However, immigration opponents have emphasized the fiscal stress produced by immigration, particularly the undocumented variety, and in recent years this argument has carried more weight than claims that immigrants produce a net fiscal benefit.

Nevertheless, state responses have been mixed, perhaps because it remains unclear whether immigrants help or hurt state economies. In some areas, new immigrants are met with open arms, as they bring life and economic stimulus to towns that were declining and losing out to places with larger low-wage labor forces (Grey and Woodrick 2005). Some states pass legislation to make life without papers easier. In other places, where immigrants are not so welcome, communities attempt to keep new immigrant groups out by passing local ordinances that make life for non-English speakers (and the often poor) more difficult. For example, in reaction to the increasing presence of Latino immigrants, in 2006, the Cherokee County, Georgia Board of Commissioners unanimously passed a local law that penalizes property owners for renting housing to undocumented immigrants and requires all business transactions to take place in English.<sup>64</sup> Likewise, other suburban counties in Georgia facing high rates of immigration implemented local housing ordinances setting caps on how many people can occupy a single family home, and increasing the amount of “sleeping space per person” required (Odem 2008, 124-127). There has been significant local policy activity around immigration which appears to be filtering up to state legislatures in a manner consistent

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<sup>63</sup> One can easily produce a list of cites from scholarly journals that attributes economic stagnation or declining wages to immigration, just as one can produce a list of cites debunking such statistics (For example see, Borjas 2001; Simon 1999; Edmonston and Smith 1998).

<sup>64</sup> In 1999 a single Georgia township passed a similar ordinance including an English-only provision. In a strange twist of fate, the first person prosecuted under this law was a Spanish-language Christian minister who posted signs in Spanish for the services at his Spanish language congregation (Olivias 2007).



with what we know about policy diffusion (see for example the review of this literature included in Berry and Berry 1994).<sup>65</sup>

By the time the 2006 mid-term elections were held, state and local governments had passed over 70 separate pieces of legislation targeting undocumented immigrants (Newton 2008, 174). In 2006, almost 600 immigration related bills were introduced in state legislatures and 84 enacted. In 2007, that number had nearly tripled, to 1,562 bills introduced and 240 laws enacted (NCSL 2008). Much of this legislation reflected policy tools debated in Congress in the 1990s and again in the 2000s, such as employer penalties, expansion of police powers to states and local police, and denying social services and education to the children of undocumented workers, regardless of whether the children themselves are citizens.<sup>66</sup> Law enforcement (187 bills in 27 states) and employment (364 bills in 46 states) legislation were by far the most common forms of immigration-related legislation introduced in 2007, followed by education and healthcare.<sup>67</sup> Table 1 in Appendix C provides an exhaustive list of the types of policies—some negative, others positive—relating to immigration introduced in the U.S. states in 2007.

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<sup>65</sup> For more discussion of local anti-immigrant policies and their causes, see Singer, Wilson and DeRenzis 2009).

<sup>66</sup> That said, much of the legislation introduced in state governments pertained to integrating immigrants or to clarifying how to judge immigrant employment credentials.

<sup>67</sup> Many of these bills expanded the rights of immigrants and combat discrimination against immigrants. One hundred and seventy eight bills were introduced that created some sort of penalty for businesses who employ undocumented workers. These bills increased civil penalties or revoked business licenses (32 states), established criminal penalties (13 states) or denied state contracts (35 states) for businesses found to have employed undocumented immigrants. Only three states introduced bills to create, fund or extend adult English language education, despite the common complaint that new immigrants are not learning English fast enough. Finally, several states introduced other anti-immigrant bills such as denying medical coverage or education to undocumented immigrants and their children, and disallowing the use of adult education funds for educating immigrants, to name a few.

While most of the immigration legislation introduced in 2007 pertained solely to foreign-born immigrants, some of the legislation had potentially negative consequences for U.S.-born Latinos as well. That said, the anti-immigrant movement has been so obviously directed toward Latino immigrants that some scholars consider anti-immigrant rhetoric to be “code for anti-Latino” (Smith and Furuseth 2006, 13; also see Newton 2008; Short and Magana 2002). From Operation Wetback in the 1950s to modern raids targeting illegal immigrants for deportation, police and immigration enforcement officers have rounded up, harassed, demoralized, and interrogated U.S. and foreign-born Latinos alike, on the basis of distinguishing features such as brown skin and Spanish-accented English (Garcia 1980; Romero 2006; Newton 2008). Immigration officials and others justify stereotypes and racial profiling procedures because illegal immigrants are just that—illegal (see Aguirre 2004 for a good review of how police officers have justified racial profiling of Latinos in court). As Short and Magaña (2002, 703) note: “this is the Mexican American dilemma: Sharing a phenotype (Latino) with a stigmatized other (illegal Mexican immigrants) renders one susceptible to prejudice and discrimination.”

Use of racial profiling and its harmful effects has been well catalogued in legal and police studies and has been highlighted in news coverage (see Aguirre 2004; Romero 2000; 2006; Romero and Serag 2004; Johnson 2001). Two sources of state anti-immigrant policy that are particularly likely to have negative consequences for Latinos more broadly are laws that punish employers for hiring undocumented workers and those that instruct law enforcement officers to act as immigration officials.

First, if employers hold negative stereotypes of Latinos as illegal immigrants, and state governments increase the costs associated with employing undocumented workers,

Latinos of all immigration statuses may struggle to find employment or face discrimination in the hiring process (Bansak 2005).<sup>68</sup> Second, if states direct law enforcement to act as immigration officers, Latinos may be more likely to experience racial profiling and as a result be subject to more traffic stops and interrogative policing that disrupts their daily lives and decreases congeniality between Latino communities and their local government institutions (see Romero 2006; Aguirre Jr. 2004). Latinos already are stopped and searched at higher rates than whites (Aguirre Jr. 2004, 929; Schafer et al. 2006).<sup>69</sup> Adding immigration enforcement to the list of duties assigned to local law enforcement can only serve to add to this problem and increase the rate at which Latinos are punished more harshly than whites merely for their ethnicity (Wiseman, Headen, and Parker 2009; Romero 2006).

To summarize, the conundrum of legislating immigration from the statehouse is that many policy tools available to state lawmakers to dissuade illegal immigration stand to increase discrimination against Latinos regardless of where they were born or how they arrived on U.S. soil. I categorize these bills as “punitive immigration laws” because they increase the penalties for individuals who are stereotyped as illegal immigrants—mainly Latinos.


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<sup>68</sup> Scholars have noted that employer sanctions imposed by the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act resulted in lower wages for Latino non-agricultural workers (Bansak and Raphael 1998; Bansak 2005). (IRCA sanctions were not imposed at that time for agricultural workers). And, in fact, this concern was figured prominently in the 1986 immigration debates in Congress. Lisa Newton found that one of the recurring themes in the congressional debate regarding the introduction of employer sanctions was the victimization of non-white groups that would result. Members expressed grave concerns that employer sanctions would unduly affect Latino job seekers (see discussion in Newton 2008, 80-85), and recent research suggests that they were not incorrect in their arguments.

<sup>69</sup> Recent studies suggest that the over-representation of Latinos in the U.S. prison system is a result of racial profiling of Latinos (NCLR 2004).

Despite the fact that the introduction of immigration related bills was widespread, not all states introduced the same type of legislation. Figure 6.1 shows the distribution of states that introduced and passed *punitive* immigration related law enforcement and employment laws in 2007. It demonstrates that while the introduction of these bills is widespread, not all states had punitive immigration bills introduced and fairly few actually passed punitive bills into law.

Figure 6.1 Introduction and Passage of Punitive Immigration Bills in the U.S. States, 2007.



\*neither Alaska nor Hawaii had bill introductions

Most of the literature pertaining to immigration reform in the U.S. states has focused on the legality of these laws, if they are preemptive, and whether the states have constitutional authority over immigration (see for example, Olivas 2007; Skerry 1995; Speasmaker ND; Booth 2006; McKanders 2007; Manheim 1995), but there has been little

effort to understand why state legislatures pursue anti-immigrant agendas. Having established that these specific bills are of interest to the Latino population and explained how they became popular policy tools, I now review the different theoretical approaches that have been used to explain immigration attitudes and federal immigration policies in the past and, based on this review, develop a theoretical approach to understanding state immigration policies.

*Explaining State Approaches to Immigration: Economic Drain, Group Threat, Empowerment, or Ideological Division?*

**Group Threat**

Several scholars argue that immigration reform debates in Congress during the 1980s and 1990s were reactionary in nature and focused on unwanted types of immigrants and their impact on American culture and the economy. Massey, Durand, and Malone (2003) argue that congressional and state leaders use Latino immigrants in particular as scapegoats for economic problems and portray them as negative influences on U.S. culture for political gain, while at the same time attempting to maintain a steady flow of cheap labor available for the agricultural sector. Likewise, Lisa Newton's (2008) study of immigration reform found that Congressmen quite often made verbal attacks on Latino immigrants during debates over immigration reform. These scholars posit that punitive immigration reform often is driven by a perceived threat from the increasing presence of Latinos in American society—an argument that largely mirrors group threat theories based on the punitive policies that came about as a reaction to the presence of, and increases within, local black populations.

Group threat theories hold that sizable minority populations increase white hostility (Allport 1954; Williams 1947; Blalock 1967). Summarizing the research on the causal chain of reactions to local minority populations, Taylor (1998, 513) finds three primary arguments for how the minority population influences intergroup relations: “(1) minority visibility worsens white attitudes; (2) these negative attitudes fuel discrimination; and (3) discrimination aggravates intergroup inequality.” Two factors have largely been used to explain these findings: racism and economic and/or social competition. While not completely distinct, these factors lead to two different ways of interpreting group threat hypotheses.

In the first, racism leads whites in particular to punish, diminish, or subjugate populations with darker skin—historically, African Americans. Alternatively, social order theories suggest that minorities will be tolerated to an extent as long as they do not appear to pose a threat to the white population. Blalock (1958) and Burr et al. (1991) argue that hostility arises when a minority group poses an economic threat, while others assert that threat responses develop when minorities challenge the existing political or status hierarchy (Giles and Evans 1986; Giles and Hertz 1994; Glaser 1994). Group threat has been used extensively to explain state English-only initiatives (Tatalovich 1995; Branton et al. 2007; Hood III and Morris 1997; Hood III and Morris 1998; Hood III, Morris, and Shirkey 1997; Hood III and Morris 2000; Morris 1993; Tolbert and Hero 1996; Tolbert and Hero 2001; Tolbert and Hero 2003; Pantoja and Segura 2003; Valenty and Sylvia 2004).<sup>70</sup> This research suggests that punitive immigration policies may be

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<sup>70</sup> On the federal level investigations of immigration control have focused on ideology (Gimpel and Edwards 1998) and target populations (Trichenor 2002; Newton 2008).

particularly likely in states that have large, growing, or politically active Latino populations.<sup>71</sup>

Drawing on both the group threat and Congressional immigration reform literature, one could surmise that state legislatures and state institutions respond to an increasing presence of Latinos in a negative fashion (also see Key 1949, Giles and Buckner 1993; Longoria 1996; Glaser 1994; Hajnal 2001; and Kaufmann 2002). Just as the industrialized north of the 1940s and 1950s reacted to African American migration from the South by instituting racial covenants and undertaking widespread programs to isolate and subjugate African Americans (Sugrue 1995), states and locales today are reacting to the growing presence of Latino immigrants by introducing and passing punitive bills aimed at curbing Latino immigration. This leads to the first set of hypotheses:

*H1: Latino Threat Hypothesis: As the size of the Latino population increases the chances of introduction and passage of punitive immigration bills will increase.*

*H2: Latino Immigration Threat Hypothesis: As the Latino immigration rate increases the chances of introduction and passage of punitive immigration bills will increase.*

However, group threat does not require the presence of a Latino, or even dark-skinned population. In the early 1900s nativism erupted over threat from German, Polish, Asian and Jewish migration, as well as migration from Southern Europe (Tatalovich 1995; Tichenor 2002).<sup>72</sup> Thus, threat response could be a reaction to immigrants and

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<sup>71</sup> Interestingly, Hood and Morris (1997) speculate that the large group size *and* segregation of Latinos lead whites to view Latinos negatively.

<sup>72</sup> Of course, it is important to note that many of these European immigrants at the time were considered “Black” for all intents and purposes.

rapid immigration rates in general, not just to Latino immigrants.<sup>73</sup> And thus I offer two additional threat hypotheses:

*H3: Immigration Threat Hypothesis: Regardless of nationality, as the immigration rate increases the chances of introduction and passage of punitive immigration bills will increase.*

*H4: Immigrant Threat Hypothesis: Regardless of nationality, as the size of the foreign-born population increases the chances of introduction and passage of punitive immigration bills will increase.*

### **Economic Drain**

Group threat may be symbolic or it may be a product of the perceived economic threat posed by a new or growing minority population. Immigrants may instigate a threat response in tough economic times in particular. If the local population is having a hard time securing work, then newcomers who also need jobs are unlikely to be met with open arms. Immigrants often are blamed for “taking jobs from Americans.” Common to the federal-level debate over immigration reform is the mantra that immigrants, particularly undocumented immigrants, undermine wages in certain sectors and take jobs that otherwise would go to native-born Americans (Newton 2008), and public opinion toward immigration has been found to reflect concerns about the national economy and about taxes (Citrin, Green, Muste, and Wong 1997; Wilson 2001; Burns and Gimpel 2000; Oliver and Mendelberg 2001; Lee and Ottati 2002; Lee Ottati and Hussain 2001). When unemployment is high, immigration may be more salient and may be seen as having negative consequences for native-born workers. Thus, when competition for jobs

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<sup>73</sup> Unfortunately, I cannot separate out too many groups. There is ample evidence to suggest that Asian immigration may in fact decrease anti-immigrant sentiment. However, the distribution of Asians in the United States does not vary enough from state to state to enable a test of this hypothesis across states. For more research on the subject of Asians and their effect on white attitudes toward immigration, I would point readers to the various works by Hood III and Morris (1997; 1998) and Taylor (1998).



intensifies, state legislatures should be more likely to react by trying to increase immigration control and particularly to increase penalties for hiring illegal immigrants over U.S. citizens.

*H5: Job Scarcity Hypothesis: As unemployment rates increase, introduction and passage of punitive immigration bills will increase.*

Immigrants, particularly those with lower incomes, come with other financial costs to communities. As noted earlier, perhaps the most common complaint generated from state and local governments is that immigrants are a drain on often scarce resources such as education, health, and other social services. While few whites may see immigrants as a threat to their jobs, they still may see them as a threat to the quality of the services they enjoy, and government officials are left with the politically unpleasant job of finding the money to pay for public goods. Thus, it may be that anti-immigrant legislation is more likely in states experiencing an imbalance between tax revenue and expenditures on social services. That said, states with large minority populations have historically spent less on social services than homogeneously white states (Preuhs 2007, Hero and Preuhs 2007; Schram, Soss and Fording 2003), thus what constitutes a “burden” to places with a history of minimally funding social services may be drastically different than in places that devote more resources to these programs.

*H6: Fiscal Stress Hypothesis: As the proportion of tax dollars spent on public services increases, introduction and passage of punitive immigration reform bills will increase.*

### **Ideological Divisions**

Immigration may not be solely a racial or economic issue. James Gimpel and James Edwards (1998) argue that the immigration debate in Congress in the 1990s

centered on ideological divisions over redistribution, and that as partisanship has become stronger and more reflective of ideology, attitudes toward immigration likewise have become more partisan in nature.

To the extent that immigration is seen as a partisan issue, liberal states also may be less likely to introduce or pass punitive immigration legislation because, quite often, such bills are seen as constraining civil rights, which may be less palatable to politicians courting minority voters. Democratic coalitions are often made up of minority groups who may be less tolerant of legislation that could increase discrimination or racial profiling. Finally, Latinos are an emerging sector of the Democratic Party coalition; Democrats may therefore be mindful of the potential backlash for attacking Latino immigrants.<sup>74</sup> Two more hypotheses address the impact of political factors on immigration legislation.

*H7: Party Control Hypothesis: As the percentage of the legislature that is Democratic increases, introduction and passage of punitive immigration bills will decrease.*

*H8: Ideology Hypothesis: As the percentage of the state that is liberal increases, introduction and passage of punitive immigration bills will decrease.*

### **Empowerment**

Empowerment through descriptive representation can be critical to minority groups. For example, several scholars have noted that African Americans, women, and Latinos have different policy interests than their white male counterparts (Whitby 1989; Hutchings 1998; Whitby and Krause 2001; Saint-Germain 1990; Thomas 1991; Branton 2002). Although substantive representation is not dependent upon having elected officials who “look like” the minority population, having a legislature that mirrors the

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<sup>74</sup> For example, Donovan (2007, 274) argues that there was a “blowback” against the Republican Party in California after the passage of Proposition 187.

characteristics of the population is considered beneficial on many fronts (see Haynie 1999; Cannon 1999; Swers 2002; Rouse 2008; Branton 2006; Fraga 2006).

The presence of Latino legislators could offset the introduction and passage of anti-immigrant legislation. Even if Latinos do not hold enough seats to make up a sizeable voting bloc, the presence of a few Latino legislators may play an educating or socializing role for the other legislators, decreasing the support in the chamber for legislation unpalatable to the Latino delegation. However, consistent with power theory, group threat is triggered when the social order is challenged in one of three ways: economically, socially, *or politically*. Accordingly, when groups begin to challenge the social order by gaining political power, the majority group will react in a threatened manner and attempt to subjugate the challenging group (Giles and Hertz 1994), thereby leading to a “backlash” of policies aimed at the minority community. Unfortunately, if the introduction of these bills is a reaction purely to the size of the Latino population, as the threat hypothesis would suggest, then Latino presence in the state legislature will not only fail to offset the introduction of these bills, it will appear to increase the likelihood of introduction because of the high correlation between Latino population size and Latino empowerment (see for example Haider-Markel 2007).<sup>75</sup>

H8: Legislative Empowerment Hypothesis: As the Latino proportion of the legislature increases, introduction and passage of punitive immigration reform will decrease.

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<sup>75</sup> A correctly specified model of empowerment would take into account the two-stage (or causal) nature of the data. When population size results in empowerment, the direct effect of population on bill introduction may be positive while the indirect effect of population through empowerment on introduction may be negative. Unfortunately, I cannot sort this out with the data available at this time.

## Data and Methods

### **Selecting State Legislation**

The data for this paper are derived from the Migration Policy Institute's 2007, "State Responses to Immigration: A Database of All State Legislation." The data set includes all immigration related bills and resolutions introduced in state legislatures. It was completed as a joint project of the Migration Policy Institute and New York University's School of Law.<sup>76</sup>

For the purposes of this project, I limited my search to bills pertaining to employment and law enforcement, which produced a list of 551 bills—364 regarded employment, 187 regarded law enforcement.<sup>77</sup> I then went through each bill to check that it was correctly coded. Bills were scrutinized to make sure that they did in fact have the potential to increase racial profiling or discrimination of Latinos in either the employment or law enforcement sector by extending police powers, by increasing or establishing penalties for employing illegal immigrants, or by requiring enrollment in an employment eligibility verification program.<sup>78</sup> After checking every bill, a total of 216 bills were

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<sup>76</sup> Information about the methodology used to find and evaluate each piece of legislation is available at: <http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/2007methodology.pdf>.

<sup>77</sup> While certain other laws could have been included, such as those requirements of proof of citizenship for public services, education, and voting, none were so clear cut in their likelihood of increasing discrimination to the entire Latino community as the two that I choose to evaluate. However, it would be interesting to extend this study to at least include bills that restrict public services to citizens, since it could mean that individuals suspected of being immigrants would receive cooler treatment by government agencies.

<sup>78</sup> I did not include bills that established a state law against human trafficking. Although these laws have been used to prosecute legal relatives and friends driving vehicles with undocumented immigrants in their cars (Aguirre Jr. 2008, 934-935), they are also policy tools used to create state violations for those involved in human trafficking for the sex trade, forced labor, and other illegal activities. Thus, they are not always aimed at deterring illegal immigration or particularly bad for Latinos. In addition, I did not include laws that denied bail to defendants who were illegal immigrants. E-verify bills were included because the system has known to produce many more false rejections for Latinos and African Americans than for Anglos. In addition, The Department

included in the data set. Of those, 146 pertained to employment and 70 to law enforcement. Ten separate bills were enacted into law. The remaining bills were voted down, expired, or had no legislative action.<sup>79</sup> As seen in Table 6.1, seven employment bills and 4 law enforcement bills passed that met my requirements. One bill covered both employment and law enforcement. In this case, the bill was counted individually for the separate totals for employment and law enforcement but only once for the total count.

The majority of the bills regarding employment punished (in some way) employers for hiring undocumented workers, or required employers to enroll in the Federal Work Authorization Program (e-verify) or other verification program. Each of these categories was included because they could potentially increase the barriers to employment for a person who the employer *suspects* of being an illegal immigrant.

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of Homeland Security has testified that increasing the use of e-verify will create enormous backlogs and that minorities are more likely to be flagged as “nonconfirmations” and require more information. If employers cannot wait for verification they might decide to hire people who do not fit an immigrant stereotype. (See the testimony before Congress of Inspector General of the Department of Justice, available at:

<http://waysandmeans.house.gov/hearings.asp?formmode=detail&hearing=564>)

<sup>79</sup> Expired legislation was categorized as failed. Pending legislation was categorized as failed legislation because after 2 years time the legislation never received a vote. While it is possible that these bills could come up for a vote sometime in the future, to this date they have not passed.

Table 6.1 Punitive Immigration Legislation by State, 2007

	Employment Introduced	Employment Passed	Legal Introduced	Legal Passed	Total Introduced	Total Passed		Employment Introduced	Employment Passed	Legal Introduced	Legal Passed	Total Introduced	Total Passed
Alabama	8	0	0	0	8	0	Montana	2	0	1	0	3	0
Alaska	0	0	0	0	0	0	Nebraska	0	0	0	0	0	0
Arizona	6	1	4	1	10	2	Nevada	2	1	0	0	2	1
Arkansas	1	1	0	0	1	1	New Hampshire	1	0	0	0	1	0
California	4	0	1	0	5	0	New Jersey	0	0	0	0	0	0
Colorado	3	1	1	0	4	1	New Mexico	2	0	0	0	2	0
Connecticut	2	0	0	0	2	0	New York	3	0	3	0	6	0
Delaware	1	0	0	0	1	0	North Carolina	7	0	6	0	13	0
Florida	3	0	4	0	7	0	North Dakota	1	0	0	0	1	0
Georgia	0	0	1	0	1	0	Ohio	1	0	1	0	2	0
Hawaii	0	0	0	0	0	0	Oklahoma	12	1	6	1	14	1
Idaho	0	0	0	0	0	0	Oregon	4	0	4	0	8	0
Illinois	4	0	0	0	4	0	Pennsylvania	4	0	1	0	5	0
Indiana	3	0	2	0	5	0	Rhode Island	8	0	1	0	9	0
Iowa	4	0	0	0	4	0	South Carolina	8	0	6	0	10	0
Kansas	3	0	0	0	3	0	South Dakota	2	0	0	0	2	0
Kentucky	5	0	1	0	6	0	Tennessee	19	1	10	1	26	2
Louisiana	0	0	0	0	0	0	Texas	5	1	10	1	15	2
Maine	0	0	0	0	0	0	Utah	3	0	1	0	4	0
Maryland	0	0	0	0	0	0	Vermont	0	0	0	0	0	0
Massachusetts	4	0	0	0	4	0	Virginia	6	0	6	0	12	0
Michigan	2	0	1	0	3	0	Washington	0	0	0	0	0	0
Minnesota	0	0	0	0	0	0	West Virginia	6	2	0	0	6	1
Mississippi	6	0	3	0	9	0	Wisconsin	1	0	0	0	1	0
Missouri	6	0	3	0	9	0	Wyoming	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>								<b>146</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>205</b>	<b>10</b>

Source: State Responses to Immigration: A Database of All State Legislation, 2007. Migration Policy Institute

The majority of the law enforcement related bills included in the data set directed state police and attorneys general and allowed local law enforcement to enter into an

agreement with the ICE under the 287(g) program of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRAIRA).<sup>80</sup> Other legislation was included that directed law enforcement to inquire into the citizenship of an individual if they *suspected* the individual was in violation of immigration law. For example, an Oregon bill called for law enforcement agencies to “apprehend a person...based upon probable cause that the person is in violation of federal immigration laws.”<sup>81</sup>

Figure 6.2 shows the number of bills introduced and passed for each state.

Tennessee had by far the most introductions with a total of 26 bills introduced in 2007.



Twelve states did not introduce any of this legislation and only 8 states passed legislation into law.

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<sup>80</sup> ICE runs a program called “ICE ACCESS” which “provides local law enforcement agencies an opportunity to team with ICE” on immigration enforcement (see: [http://www.ice.gov/partners/287g/Section287\\_g.htm](http://www.ice.gov/partners/287g/Section287_g.htm)). The “agreements” that local and state law enforcement enter into with ICE fall under the 287g program of the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRAIRA). According to ICE’s website, there are currently 63 state and county law enforcement agencies with existing agreements and over 840 law enforcement officers have been trained and certified under the 287(g) program to act as immigration officials.

<sup>81</sup> <http://landru.leg.state.or.us/07reg/measures/hb3500.dir/hb3553.intro.html>

Figure 6.2. Legislation Introduced and Passed By State Ordered by Most Introductions



Source: State Responses to Immigration: A Database of All State Legislation, 2007.  
Migration Policy Institute



### **Dependent Variables**

Institutional variation between state legislatures, such as professionalism, length of the legislative session, and introduction caps, may influence the number of immigration bills introduced and passed in each state.<sup>82</sup> Thus, I chose not to treat the dependent variable as a count variable (number of bills introduced). Instead, I present analyses using two different dependent variables. For the first analysis, the dependent variables for both introduction and passage are dichotomous variables. Introduction is coded as one if the state introduced at least one punitive immigration bill and passage is coded as one if the state passed at least one of these bills. The passage model only includes states that had at least one introduction.

The third dependent variable is the proportion of all bills that were punitive immigration bills. This variable is computed by dividing the total number of punitive immigration bills by the total number of bills introduced for each state. This should control for interstate institutional variation by eliminating the differences between states that have lower bill introduction rates across the board because of institutional constraints and states with very large bill introduction rates. The last dependent variable uses the proportion of all bills passed that were punitive immigration bills.

### **Explanatory Variables**

As independent variables, I include several state level variables including the percent foreign-born, the immigration rate, the percent of the population that is Latino,

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<sup>82</sup> While normally, one would control for these factors, the data are not up to the task. The small number of states make it impossible to control for each of these factors. In addition, the ideal model would probably be a Heckman selection model, or another model equipped to deal with data of this nature, but the small *n* prohibits this type of analysis.

the Latino immigration rate, and an alternative Latino immigration measure—Latino population increase—which captures the increase in the share of the population made up of Latinos between 2000 and 2007.

A number of economic and political variables are also relevant. My economic measures include the unemployment rate, and two variables to measure the strain on state and local services. The first (Fiscal Strain) is the proportion of the per capita tax rate that is spent on education and healthcare. The second (Education and Health) is the per capita expenditures on education and healthcare.<sup>83</sup> Political characteristics include the percent of the legislature that is Democratic, the percent of the population that is liberal, and the percent of the legislature that is Latino.

Finally, I also include a variable to measure the percentage of the state that is cropland because farmers often rely on migrant workers and have historically lobbied the government for more relaxed immigration laws and procedures (Massey and Durant 2002; Newton 2008).<sup>84</sup> A full explanation of each variable, including the source of the variable, and each variable's mean, range, and standard deviation are included in Appendix B.

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<sup>83</sup> I chose not to use the traditional measure of economic strain—either tax capacity or fiscal need (see Berry and Fording 1997; Rogers, Jr. and Tedin 2006; Tannenwald 1999) because I wanted to focus on the policy areas in which critics claim that immigrants are using the most resources. Later versions of this paper will need to address tax capacity, fiscal need, as well as fiscal comfort (Tannenwald 1999).

<sup>84</sup> In immigration debates in congress, farmers were often quite adamant in their opposition to immigration reform that would punish employers or increase the difficulty of hiring workers in times when crops needed to be picked immediately (Newton 2008). In addition, recent evidence has suggested that farm communities may be more accepting of immigration (Gimpel and Lay 2008). I also looked at the percentage of the state employed in agriculture, but it was also not significant.

## **Methods**


I employ several methodological techniques to sort through the correlates of punitive immigration policy. I first present the differences between states in which at least one bill was introduced and states with no introductions, then states in which at least one bill was implemented compared to states with introductions but no enactments. Because these variables are binary, logistic or probit analysis would be the most logical technique to use. Unfortunately, these modeling techniques are inappropriate for sample sizes under 100 (Long 1997, 53-4). Because this chapter's data is preliminary and is limited to a single year, the sample sizes are only 50 (for introduction analysis) and 38 (for passage analysis). Thus, it is not possible to produce reliable statistics when controlling for multiple variables. Instead, I present comparison of means tests for introduction and non-introduction states (and passage and non-passage states). Using this form of analysis helps to begin the process of understanding the dynamics at work in states in which punitive immigration legislation is introduced and passed. By beginning this process, I hope to set up some testable hypotheses for future research.

In the next section, the dependent variable measures the proportion of all bills that were punitive immigration bills. Because this measure is linear, I am able to present multivariate analysis, albeit limited given the small number of observations. I first present correlation coefficients for the independent variables to find which variables correspond with introduction and passage. Then, using these findings, I present OLS regression results.

## Results

Table 6.2 presents t-test comparison of means for the political and demographic variables between states with at least one bill introduced (Column 1) and states with no introductions and states that had at least one bill enacted compared to states in which none of these bills were signed into law (Column 2). Figure 6.3 shows this information graphically for easy reference.

Figure 6.3 Comparison of Means for Bill Introduction



\*t-test comparison of means significant at .1 or lower

Table 6.2 Difference of Means for States With and Without Bill Introductions and Bill Implementation, 2007

Dependent Variable	No Introduction States	Introduction States	Difference	Significant	No Passage States	Passage States	Difference	Significant
Foreign Born	8.2	8.35	-0.14		8.1	9.28	-1.17	
Immigration Rate	20.63	29.73	-9.1	**	27.84	36.80	-8.95	**
Latino Population	0.06	0.1	-0.04		0.09	0.16	-0.07	*
Latino Immigration Rate	1.34	1.38	-0.03		1.38	1.39	-0.007	
Latino Population Increase	.015	.02	.005	*	.02	.03	-.01	**
Unemployment Rate	4.01	4.52	-0.51	*	4.51	4.58	-0.08	
Fiscal Stress	.26	.24	.02	*	.24	.23	.004	
Health and Education	2816.18	2385.75	430.42	**	2458.10	2114.44	343.66	**
Liberalism	21.49	18.39	3.1	**	18.46	18.16	0.297	
Proportion Democrat	.56	.53	.03		.52	.56	.03	
% Latino Legislators	0.01	0.03	-0.02	*	0.03	0.05	0.02	
Crop Land	0.19	0.43	-0.24		0.47	0.24	0.22	
N	12	38			30	8		

Note: Cells are group means.

Source: Data compiled by author from multiple sources.

\*\*p&lt;.05 \*p&lt;.1

## **The Correlates of Bill Introduction**

### *Demographic and Political Factors*

Are demographics different in states that introduce punitive immigration bills? States with rapid growth in their foreign-born populations are more likely to have punitive immigration bills introduced. States with bill introductions have significantly higher immigration rates than those that do not, but the actual size of the foreign born population is not different. There is a 9-point difference in immigration rates between the average immigration rate of states that have introductions and those that do not. States that introduce punitive measures have a mean immigration rate of 29.73 compared with 20.63 in non-introduction states. This supports an immigration threat hypothesis. While it appears that the current size of the foreign-born population is irrelevant, the data suggest that when there is a rapid increase in immigration, legislators seek to control the flow.<sup>85</sup>

There appears to be no difference in the size of the Latino population or the rate of Latino immigration between introduction and non-introduction states. While states that have introductions do have larger Latino populations and higher Latino immigration rates, the differences are not statistically significant. It is likely that the relationship between these two variables is either a) conditional or b) non-linear.

To test for this conjecture, I investigate the relationship between the change in the share of the population that is Latino and the likelihood of bill introduction. Immigration rates often are very large because the state has very few Latinos at time point 1. So if the

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<sup>85</sup> A larger analysis able to employ multiple regression models would be more appropriate to analyze the relationship between these two variables.

number of Latinos doubles, the immigration rate of Latinos from time 1 to time 2 will be 100 even though the actual increase in the number of Latinos may be relatively small. Latino Population Increase captures both the immigration rate and the size of the Latino population. States that had punitive immigration bills introduced had larger growth in the share of the population that was Latino. States with bill introductions had a mean change in the Latino share of the population of 2 percentage points and states that did not saw an average increase of 1.5 percentage points. (For example, a state that had a 2 percent increase in the population would be a state that went from 5 percent Latino to 7 percent Latino). Thus, while the immigration rate of Latinos was not different for introduction and non-introduction states, when that rate translated into a substantially larger presence of Latinos in the population, the state was more likely to have at least one bill introduced.

The percentage of the legislature that is Latino is significantly *larger* in bill-introduction states. This relationship is could be spurious due to the large correlation between Latino population size and Latino empowerment or could be reflective of an ideological divergence between the Latino electorate and Latino elected officials. To sort out the relationship between population, representation, and bill introduction/passage would require a two-stage or multi-level model. Unfortunately, this preliminary data analysis is not a large enough sample to allow us to model this relationship using a multi-level method

The proportion of the legislature that is Democratic is not statistically significant; however, the proportion of the population that is liberal is negatively correlated with introduction. It appears that more liberal populations are less interested in this type of legislation.

### *Economic Factors*

States with bill introductions have significantly higher unemployment rates, indicating that punitive immigration legislation could be a reaction to a perceived economic threat from a new population. If states have high unemployment *and* new populations, legislators may feel the need to attempt to limit the number of jobs that are farmed out to non-U.S. workers within U.S. borders. However, the fiscal stress hypothesis receives little support. In fact, introduction states spent less on education and health care per person and had less of their per capita tax rate devoted to social services than states that had no introductions. While these numbers may appear counterintuitive, in fact, they are not. States that have a history of devoting fewer resources to social spending may perceive increased demand for services as more threatening than states that have historically devoted significant resources to providing social services.<sup>86</sup> A consumer-voter approach would suggest that state legislators have an incentive to keep their tax rates low in order to attract high income migrants to their state and to limit redistributive spending (see Dye 1990; Peterson 1981; Preuhs 1999). And in fact, states with introductions did have significantly lower per capita tax rates than non-introduction states (not shown). However, this finding is consistent with Preuhs (2007) and Hero and Pruehs (2007) who find that state investment in social spending negatively correlates with Latino population size. So, although arguments against immigration often center on the

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<sup>86</sup> Data from the Mexican Migration Project indicates that undocumented immigrants rarely use public services. Massey (2005) finds that while three-quarters of undocumented Mexicans paid U.S. taxes, only ten percent used public schools and five per cent or less reported using AFDC, unemployment benefits, food stamps or other government benefits. Further, the cost to local governments of educating and aiding new immigrants is more costly in areas such as the rust belt where new immigrant populations are coupled with native population decline. Whereas immigrants in the south, where the majority of these bills were introduced and passed, were accompanied with a steady stream of in-migration from native-born migrants (Furuseh and Smith 2006, 13) which increase the tax base.



amount of social services immigrants consume (particularly undocumented immigrants),<sup>87</sup> it seems more important to legislators if these immigrants are competing for jobs.<sup>88</sup>

### **The Correlates of Punitive Immigration Bill Passage**

The second analysis in Table 2 presents differences of means for states that passed punitive immigration bills compared to states in which a bill was introduced but not enacted. Passage states have higher immigration rates, larger Latino populations and larger increases in the size of their Latino population. There is no difference between the unemployment rates, or the proportion of the tax rate consumed by health and education expenditures, in states that implemented their bills and those that did not. Again, states that did not pass this type of legislation actually spent more on social services than states that implemented their legislation. States that did not implement their punitive bills spent over 300 dollars more per capita on education and health care than states that implemented these bills. There are no other statistically significant differences between states that passed the legislation and those that did not. State legislatures that have the political will to move these bills from introduction to vote and to garner enough votes to pass them into law appear to be responding to the influx of new minorities into their communities. If a punitive bill is introduced, Latinos appear to find few friends in the legislature even within the Democratic Party, or among their co-ethnic representatives. I will investigate this relationship further in the next chapter.

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<sup>87</sup> For example Proposition 187 in California and Proposition 200 and 300 in Arizona.

<sup>88</sup> Now, it may be that when Latinos take up more social services the type of legislation legislators pursue is different. For example, as was shown in Table 1, several states introduced bills banning education and health care access for undocumented immigrants and their children. I expect to look at this relationship in the future.

States with larger Latino populations, higher immigration rates, and larger increases in the percentage of the state that is Latino appear to be more likely to move their bills from introduction to passage. These findings give significant support to group threat perspective.

### **The Correlates of Legislative Attention to Punitive Immigration Reform**

Since lone legislators may introduce a piece of punitive immigration legislation, the dependent variable of interest for the next section is the proportion of all the bills introduced in the 2007 legislative session that were punitive employment or law enforcement immigration legislation. Table 6.3 shows the correlation between the independent variables and the proportion of the legislative agenda devoted to punitive immigration proposals. I find that the rate of bill introduction is positively correlated with the overall immigration rate, the Latino immigration rate<sup>89</sup> and, again, negatively correlated with expenditures on education and health care and the proportion of Democrats in the state legislature.

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<sup>89</sup> Immigration rate and Latino immigration rate are statistically correlated at .32.

Table 6.3 Correlations and Regression Analysis for the Proportion of a State Legislative Agenda Dedicated to Punitive Immigration Bills

	Proportion of Bills Introduced-- Correlations	Proportion of Bills Passed-- Correlations	Proportion of Bills Introduced— Regression^	Proportion of Bills Passed— Regression^
Foreign Born	-.17	.12		
Immigration Rate	<b>.40**</b>	<b>.27*</b>	.004 (.002)	.001 (.002)
Latino Population	-.01	<b>.26*</b>		.012 (.44)
Latino Population Increase (2000- 2007)	.15	<b>.14**</b>		<b>6.13*</b> <b>(3.91)</b>
Latino Immigration Rate	<b>.25*</b>	-.08	.224 (.197)	
Unemployment Rate	.10	-.01		
Fiscal Stress	-.13	-.25		
Health and Education	<b>-.52**</b>	<b>-.35**</b>	<b>-.0002**</b> <b>(.00008)</b>	-.00009 (.00007)
Proportion Democrat	<b>-.27**</b>	.19	-.158 (.332)	
Liberal Population	<b>-.32**</b>	.12	-.001 (.006)	
% Latino Legislators	-.07	.06		
Crop Land	.16	-.16		
Constant			.613 (.457)	.131 (.222)
R-Square			.34	.27
N			50	38

Note: Cells are correlation coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.

Source: Data compiled by author from multiple sources.

^Variable scaled 0 to 1 to ease presentation.

\*p<.1 \*\*p<.05

The results of the regression analysis indicate that only spending on health and education is significant when controlling for the Latino population, but again, the relationship is in the wrong direction for a fiscal stress hypothesis. The more the state spends on social services, the less of the legislative agenda is devoted to punitive immigration bills. These results indicate that the historical and present ideological

disposition of the state may matter more than the difference captured by either the ideology or party measures. In general more liberal states tend to spend more of their tax dollars on education and social services. Thus, ideology may be working indirectly through social spending.<sup>90</sup> This argument would be consistent with Gimpel and Edwards (1999, 297) who posit that, “immigration has been translated into a redistribution issue.” If state-level legislative partisanship is not as strong as in Congress, a better measure as to the ideological leanings of the state government may in fact be their expenditures on social services. States with fewer members predisposed to spend significant sums on social services may also be more likely to feel a negative impact from increased demand for those services.

The second column of Table 6.3 shows the correlations for the proportion of all bills passed that were punitive immigration bills and the explanatory variables. If a state sees a punitive immigration bill introduced, the party make-up of the legislature is not correlated to passage rates. The sole correlates of passage for states in which at least one bill was introduced are the immigration rate, the size of the Latino population, the extent to which the share of the population that is Latino has increased, and the amount of money spent on social services. The correlations give substantial support to the Latino threat hypothesis. The correlations suggest that states with larger Latino populations and states in which the Latino population is rapidly increasing are more likely to both introduce and pass more punitive immigration legislation that has the potential to increase racial profiling and discrimination of Latinos—citizens or not.

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<sup>90</sup> In fact, simple correlation coefficients suggest this is the case. Spending on health and education is highly correlated with both ideology (.39) and the percentage of the legislature that is Democratic (.36).

The results of the regression analysis suggests that, controlling for other factors, when the Latino population begins to take up a larger share of the population, substantially more punitive bills are enacted. Health and education spending, immigration rate, and Latino population size do not reach statistical significance.

### *Discussion*

State legislatures are responding to the failure of Congress to produce immigration reform. I began this chapter with one simple research question: What demographic and political factors increase the chances of states introducing and passing punitive immigration legislation? I offered several testable hypotheses to explain variation between states including group threat, (social, economic, or political), economic strain, Latino political empowerment, and ideology.

I find evidence that demographic factors increase the chances of punitive immigration bills being introduced and passed into law, supporting a group threat approach to understanding the politics of immigration at the state level. It appears that legislatures are more likely to introduce and pass punitive immigration reforms when the Latino population, in specific, is growing. I also find evidence of ideological influences—more liberal states are less likely to pursue such legislation even though ideology does not appear to constrain passage rates.

The preliminary evidence provides only partial support for an economic threat hypothesis. States with introductions did have higher unemployment than those without, but the unemployment rate was unrelated to passage and the fiscal stress measure was higher in states with no introductions, as was the actual level of social spending per

person. The largest and most consistent correlate to introduction and passage was the rate at which the Latino population was increasing.

In the end, very few states passed these bills. The low passage rate of these bills can be explained by any number of reasons. These punitive immigration bills often walk a fine line between attempting to police immigration and deter future immigrants, and infringement on human and constitutional rights. Many legislators are also aware of the potential this type of legislation poses for increasing racial profiling and racism in employment and police inquiries. Finally, immigration regulations have long faced problems surmounting objections from powerful lobbies such as strong business lobbies that fear their members will be fined for unknowingly employing an undocumented worker, and the agricultural industry that has claimed that checking worker eligibility will lead to wasted crops and income losses (Newton 2008).

The evidence also suggests that punitive immigration legislation is primarily a symbolic gesture meant to send a message to immigrants and anti-immigrant constituencies and possibly also to Congress. Legislators can grandstand on the problems of immigration from “undesirable” countries even though they recognize that state government has little power to regulate most of the incentives for illegal immigration. States lack the ability to give undocumented workers a path to citizenship, to effectively police immigration, or to change the process or procedures regulating immigration. They are left with few policy tools to deter immigration at their disposal; and even fewer that do not increase the potential for constitutional violation or discrimination in housing, employment and law enforcement.

Policy entrepreneurs in the states also face the need to define immigrants and immigrant employers as negative target populations while not offending important voting blocks. Legislators have many tools at their disposal for defining immigrants as undeserving criminals, but other target groups, particularly employers, are defined as good, deserving, and already overburdened by government regulation. As Lisa Newton notes, without a negative social construction of the target population, “it is difficult for legislators, even policy implementers, to defend policing, fines, jail time, and other coercive policy tools associated with curbing criminal behavior. Even when they operate in overt violation of established laws, employers do not bear the stigma of criminality that marks the illegal immigrant” (Newton 166).

Increasing employment penalties and expanding police powers seem to be particularly popular bills to introduce but these policies often face strong opposition that block their progress through the legislative system. Attacking businesses (a positively associated target population) and increasing the duties of already overworked and underpaid police (another positive target population) may present barriers to passing legislation aimed at restricting and punishing immigrants (a negative target population). Apparently, in only a few states are the opposition weak enough and the anti-immigrant sentiment strong enough for this legislation to succeed.<sup>91</sup> But anti-immigrant/anti-Latino sentiment does appear to be highest in states with rapidly increasing Latino populations.

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<sup>91</sup> But it is also important to note that when workplace ICE raids take place, many people in the community can become quite upset, particularly if they do not blame immigrants for immigration problems. After a particularly large raid of an Iowa meat packing plant in early 2008 that arrested hundreds of undocumented workers, there was a community outcry that the ICE was targeting the wrong subjects—workers and not employers. There was also concern because of the effect on the workers children, many of who were left behind when their parents were detained. One newspaper article noted that, “Half of the school system's 600 students were absent Tuesday [the day following the raid], including 90 percent of Hispanic children, because their parents were

Further, in regard to expanding police powers to include immigration duties, while many locales and a few states have signed up to be part of the INS's 287(g) program, state legislators may be hesitant to increase the potential for lawsuits to their police departments, or they may believe that it is up to the local jurisdiction or the local police department to decide if this type of training is warranted in their community instead of mandating it from above or charging state police with immigration powers.<sup>92</sup> That said, dozens of 287(g) agreements are in the process of approval (Archibold 2009).

States are finding ways to legislate immigration and immigrants within their borders. If Congress does not tackle comprehensive immigration reform soon, in the end, we may see a race to the bottom in state-sponsored immigration regulation. As some states pass punitive immigration laws, other states will have additional incentive to pass similar restrictions—if state legislators believe that by not passing these castigatory measures they will be a “magnet” for undocumented workers. There is some evidence that this is already happening. One Latino elected official from Maryland commented to me that their undocumented Latino population boomed after Virginia counties passed strict anti-immigrant laws and started working with the INS to identify and deport illegal immigrants. As a result, he felt a push to deter more immigrants from his district as well,

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arrested or in hiding.” The school administrator then complained, “They don't go after employers. They don't put CEOs in jail” (Hsu 2008).

<sup>92</sup> The ACLU and the Immigration and Human Rights Policy Clinic recently released a report cataloguing the human rights and civil liberties abuses of police officers trained under the 287(g) program. Most notably racial profiling, discrimination, and a disregard for equal protection were among the most outstanding issues with the implementation. In addition, they note, “Wrongful immigration determination is yet another legal concern that arises from the implementation of § 287(g) MOAs. Because immigration law is a complicated, ever-evolving, and specialized area of law and law enforcement, state and local officers often lack the necessary expertise notwithstanding the § 287(g) training that they undergo. Consequently, American citizens and lawful permanent residents as well as undocumented immigrants who have legal claims to lawful status become vulnerable to wrongful detention and even wrongful deportation. Proven, documented cases of both have already occurred” (Weissman, Headen, and Parker 2009; 6-8).



despite his ties to the immigrant community. Research on the diffusion of these policies over time (in terms of passage) will be an important future research endeavor.

On the other hand, the proliferation of sanctuary cities—cities that have an official “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy toward the citizenship status of their residents—and even sanctuary states, indicates that many locales view their immigrant populations, even their undocumented immigrant populations, as a net benefit to their economies and their culture. As reported in a recent article on Salon.com, “A comprehensive list of sanctuary cities would have to include a huge swath of urban America. It would include the four biggest cities in the United States, [and] the majority of the 25 biggest cities” (Koppelman 2007). According to a Congressional Research Service Report, there are currently 2 states with sanctuary laws in place and over 30 cities and counties with sanctuary policies (Seghetti, Vina and Ester 2006).<sup>93</sup> Ten states introduced bills to prohibit sanctuary cities in 2007 (AZ, IN, KS, KY, MI, MS, NY, OK, TX, and VA), but by the end of 2007 only one, Oklahoma, had passed the legislation and that was part of an omnibus immigration bill.

Most of these urban locations are the places receiving the most Latino immigrants. Perhaps exposure to immigrants and associated minority groups (e.g., Latinos and Asians) increases awareness, understanding, and compassion among the non-

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<sup>93</sup> Alaska and Oregon, both of which are overwhelmingly white and neither state’s immigrant population is primarily Latino, but Oregon’s does allow local police to help INS officials gather information on individuals arrested for criminal offenses. Both of which are overwhelmingly white and neither state’s immigrant population is primarily Latino. Cities and counties with sanctuary policies include Anchorage, AK, Fairbanks, AK, Chandler, AZ, Fresno, CA, Los Angeles, CA, San Diego, CA, San Francisco, CA, Sonoma County, CA, Evanston, IL, Cicero, IL, Cambridge, MA, Orleans, MA, Portland, ME, Baltimore, MD, Takoma Park, MD, Ann Arbor, MI, Detroit, MI, Minneapolis, MN, Durham, NC, Albuquerque, NM, Aztec, NM, Rio Arriba, County, NM, Santa Fe, NM, New York, NY, Ashland, OR, Gaston, OR, Marion County, OR, Austin, TX, Houston, TX, Katy, TX, Seattle, WA, and Madison, WI.

immigrant population and policy elites. The “contact hypothesis” would suggest as much (see McClain et al. 2006).<sup>94</sup> Thus, if cities with more immigrants are more likely to pass or enforce sanctuary policies, then it is likely that greater contact and integration should increase tolerance for Latinos. However, it is important to note that contact with illegal immigrants has consistently been shown to decrease support for immigration and undermine positive views of immigrants and Latinos, including among Latino citizens, in several studies (de la Garza et al. 1991; Hood et al. 1997; Burns and Gimpel 2000).<sup>95</sup>

Finally, this chapter calls into question the effect of state legislative empowerment in circumventing legislation that has the potential to increase ethnicity based profiling and discrimination against Latinos in the workforce. I found no evidence that Latino empowerment decreases the chances of introduction or passage of these bills. Because the data available are so limited and the correlation of Latino empowerment to Latino population is so high, I investigate this relationship further in the next chapter, where I look at the voting behavior of legislators on punitive immigration bills. I expect to extend this analysis to also include other punitive immigration bills such as those denying health care and education to undocumented immigrants, and those outlawing sanctuary policies.

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<sup>94</sup> Gimpel and Lay (2008) also find evidence that rural youth who have increased contact with Latino immigrants have much more positive views toward immigration and diversity, although limited.

<sup>95</sup> Of course, one cannot escape the fact that urban locations tend to be much more liberal than suburban and rural locations. Thus, the difference between places designating themselves as immigrant “sanctuaries” and those enacting anti-immigrant policies may be more a product of ideology than this analysis can unearth.

## Conclusion

The rate of introduction and passage of punitive immigration bills calls to attention the need for higher participation rates among Latinos—particularly those that will be harmed the most by the discriminatory nature of the legislation. Unfortunately, right now the lowest participation rates are among those who would be the most harmed by these bills—Latinos who live in segregated barrios and who work in low-paid occupations. Expanded sanctions against employers are likely to decrease the wages of Latino workers as employers pass the buck for expected fines and may also lead to increased discrimination in employment when employers fear losing government contracts and other penalties (Bansak 2005; Brownell 2006). Increasing local and state police powers to conduct raids and enforce immigration policy also will only serve to isolate already segregated Latino communities further. Raids and police enforcement that use the Latino phenotype as an indicator of unlawfulness decreases trust in Latino communities for the law and, in the words of Mary Romero, “results in deterring political participation, identifying urban space racially, classifying immigrants as deserving and undeserving by nationalities, and serves to drive a wedge dividing Latino neighborhoods on the basis of citizenship status” (Romero 2006, 447-448). A greater understanding of both the causes and consequences of punitive immigration bills is needed.

## Chapter 7: The Meaning of Empowerment: Descriptive Versus Substantive Representation on Punitive Immigration Legislation

Residential segregation has made the political empowerment of Latinos and African Americans easier to achieve (Massey and Denton 1993) and these political victories have been critical to the political incorporation of both groups (Browning, Marshall, and Tabb 1986). However, the substantive impact of political empowerment is less clear. Studies of the legislative behavior of Latino elected officials have certainly shown an increased propensity to introduce and vote for legislation that benefits the Latino community, particularly in areas such as education, poverty, and anti-discrimination measures (Bratton 2006). This chapter extends the study of Latino legislative empowerment to investigate the behavior of Latino legislators on immigration bills that could lead to discrimination in the Latino community—legislation that could harm Latinos. The previous chapter showed that punitive immigration policy was more common in states with large Latino populations *and* states in which Latinos held a larger proportion of the seats in the statehouse, but the correlation between population and representation is too high to draw conclusions about the distinct impact of empowerment on the passage of this legislation. Thus, in this chapter, I explore the relationship in more depth by looking specifically at support and opposition for punitive immigration bills among Hispanic and non-Hispanic members of state general assemblies.

Immigration policy is clearly one of the most hotly debated political issues in the United States. While social scientists of various academic disciplines have certainly paid a great deal of attention to immigration and to the lives of American immigrants, surprisingly little research exists that investigates the nexus between ethnic empowerment

and immigration policy. The dearth of research in this area is especially stark in state and local politics research. Champions of the normative value of majority-minority districts (see for example Guineir 1994; McDonald 1992; Yatrakis 1981) would argue that when Latinos are represented in legislative bodies punitive immigration policies that increase the potential for discrimination should receive less support. On the other hand, the isolation of Latinos into overwhelmingly majority Latino districts could prove to dilute their influence in the surrounding districts (Lublin 1999; Cameron, Epstein and Halloran 1996; Cannon 1999) and their political incorporation and power could provoke a backlash from non-Latino legislators (Haider-Markel 2007; Lublin and Voss 2000; Yoder 1991). Given the prominence of such opposing theories, a lack of empirical investigation into this question at various units of analysis highlights the importance of this study. Likewise, the lack of federal action on immigration policy has forced state and local governments to take on immigration with increasing regularity and to respond to the passionate minority of Americans that demand legislation to combat illegal immigration by any means necessary. An important piece of this puzzle that I address in this chapter is whether descriptive Latino representation provides an effective counterweight to the anti-immigrant forces at work in many American state capitals and where underrepresented Latinos can find substantive representation when Latino delegates are not present or sufficient.

One would expect immigration policy to be an area of consensus between Latino legislators and the Latino population, given the salience of the issue to Latinos in the U.S. Latinos care more about immigration than whites or African Americans, are more sympathetic towards immigrants, and disapprove of many prominent public policies used

to decrease legal and illegal immigration (Lopez 2008). While education and economic concerns often take center stage, immigration is by far a more important and salient political topic to non-Puerto Rican Hispanics than it is to other groups (see Bratton 2006; Leal 2000). Over two thirds of Latinos living in the United States today are either foreign born or have at least one parent who is (Suro and Passel 2003)—a far greater connection to immigrants than any other U.S. ethnic group. Thus, the impact of immigration laws is experienced most intensely by the Latino community. While a body of literature exists on Latino public opinion toward immigration (de la Garza 1991; Hood, et al. 1997; Rouse, Wilkinson, and Garand 2006; Kehrberg and Butz 2006) and federal immigration reform (Gimpel and Edwards 1999; Newton 2008), little work has been done on immigration legislation on the state level outside of California where immigration has taken center stage in several state ballot initiatives (but see Skerry 1995; Tatalovich 1995). This is probably due to the relative silence of state legislatures on the immigration issue until the last few years, but the recent upsurge in state sponsored immigration legislation (NCSL 2008) opens the opportunity to evaluate the degree to which Latino state legislators are reflective of the Latino population in their voting on immigration issues.<sup>96</sup>

In this chapter, I examine anti-illegal immigrant legislation that has the potential to increase discrimination against Latinos in the areas of law enforcement and employment. Primarily, my evidence bears on the following research questions: (1) how

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<sup>96</sup> Another reason for the lack of scholarship is the difficulty of conducting research at the state level because of the barriers in identifying appropriate state legislation, the cumbersome nature of finding legislative votes on state laws, and the lack of available data on individual state legislators and their districts. According to a PEW Hispanic Center Report, “Between 1989 and 1995 the number of Immigration and Naturalization Service agents assigned to enforcement of employer sanctions dropped by half as did the number of fines issued.” States may therefore feel some pressure to provide this disincentive at the state level. (Lowell and Suro 2002, 4)

controversial are punitive immigration bills? (2) What individual and demographic factors correlate with the voting behavior of legislators on these bills? (3) How do Latino legislators vote on punitive immigration bills? And, (4) when Latinos lack descriptive representation, in whom do they find substantive representation on anti-immigration issues? In the first part of the analysis, I catalogue the votes of state legislatures and in particular, Latino legislators, on punitive immigration bills in the years 2006-2008. Following a discussion of general observations from the distribution of votes on these bills, I focus on votes taken in four states: Arizona, and Texas, which have large Latino delegations, and Montana and Georgia, both of which have very few Latino legislators. Using data on both the individual characteristics of the state legislators and characteristics of their districts, I find that opposition to these bills varies greatly by state. In general, I find that non-Hispanic Democrats in states with smaller and newer Latino populations do a better job representing the interests of newer Latino immigrants than Latino representatives in Border States where immigration is a salient political issue.

Latino empowerment does not appear to help stem the tide of anti-immigrant policy because many Latino elected officials appear to be divided on the benefits and consequences of these policy tools. Consequentially, while most scholars view empowerment as one of the few saving graces of residential segregation, I argue that limited Latino representation is not the panacea for punitive immigration bills that one might expect. Since descriptive representation is only effective when policy opinions are homogenous within the minority population, when elected officials and those they represent have shared life experiences, and finally, when the minority is proportionally represented in the legislature (Mansbridge 1999), divisions within the Latino population

on immigration policy complicate the link between descriptive and substantive representation in matters of immigration.

The implications of my findings highlight the importance of political participation among Latinos—particularly first generation immigrants and their children. Despite their large numbers in many states, Latinos remain far underrepresented in state legislatures. If Latinos were more politically active and adequately mobilized, they would have a better chance of combating punitive legislation.

### *Political Representation of Underrepresented Minorities*

While the pernicious effects of residential segregation on socioeconomic mobility and interracial relations are well documented, segregation also enables minority groups to achieve political representation. Descriptive representation of African Americans, Latinos, and women is seen as beneficial because female and minority elected officials pursue policy agendas that disproportionately benefit members of their minority group (Whitby 1989; Saint-Germain 1990; Hutchings 1998; Haynie 1999; Swers 2002; Bratton 2006), enable intra-ethnic/racial coalition building (Canon 1999), and increase trust and participation in elections among minority voters (Gay 2002; 2001; Bobo and Gilliam 1990; Barretto 2007). However the extent to which descriptive representation should translate into meaningful policy successes for the Latino community is debatable. While Latino school board empowerment has been shown to translate into increased representation of Latinos among school administrators and teachers, to have positive benefits for the educational achievement of Latino school children (Meier and Stewart 1991; Meier, Stewart, and England 1989), and to result in increased funding for bilingual education (Leal and Hess 2000), it is unclear whether Latino representation in state



legislatures benefits Latinos in the electorate beyond agenda setting on pro-Latino issues (Branton 2006; Rouse 2008).

Jane Mansbridge (1999) argues that descriptive representation is critical to minority groups when the minority group is marked by four criteria: (1) mistrust of governing institutions; (2) uncrystallized interests; (3) historical subordination; and, (4) as a result, the institution suffers from low de facto legitimacy within the minority population. In these situations, descriptive representation can increase: (1) communication both “vertically” (legislator to voters of the minority group) and “horizontally” (between legislators of the majority group and legislators representing the minority group); (2) substantive representation of the minority group; (3) attachment of the minority to the polity as a whole; and (4) the social meaning of democracy and the legitimacy of the governing institution among minorities.

Each of the factors Mansbridge identifies for justifying descriptive representation is relevant to Latinos. Despite recent gains, Latinos remain decidedly underrepresented at all levels of government. Historically, Latinos have been treated by many governments as second-class citizens—denied voting rights and locked into segregated housing and schools (Massey, Durant, and Malone 2002). Moreover, many of the issues most important to Latinos do not neatly align with the two-party dichotomy (Rouse 2008; Branton 2006). Thus, given the historical subordination and underrepresentation of Latinos in state government and the low levels of trust and belief in governing institutions among Latino voters (Schildkraut 2005), representation may be particularly important for translating Latino voter interests into substantive policy outcomes (Branton 2006).<sup>97</sup>

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<sup>97</sup> While several scholars have found that Latinos have higher than average trust in the political system, recent evidence, such as that by Schildkraut (2005) and Michelson (2003) find that

However, the link between descriptive and substantive representation is not automatic. For example, legislators and the minority group must have “shared experiences” that lead to shared preferences on political issues (Mansbridge 1999, 629). Monolithic preferences ease the translation of descriptive representation into substantive representation. Thus, it seems that to substantively represent all issue positions held by groups marked by diverse or internally conflicting opinions, a greater number of representatives and more ideologically diverse (and ideologically reflective) representation is required (i.e., if a group is marked by, for example, economic heterogeneity, representation from elite members only is insufficient to provide substantive representation, even if they “look like” the population they appear to represent).

This qualification increases the complexity of Latino descriptive representation and expands the number of issue areas usually regarded as pertinent to Latinos. To date scholars largely have judged the success of Latino representation in state government by evaluating bill introduction, agenda-setting, and legislative success on issues considered to be of “Latino interest” (Branton 2006; Fraga et al. 2006; Rouse 2008). However, this research has focused primarily on issues that can be considered *pro*-Latino. For example, Branton (2006, 1137) argues that Latino interests include “such policies as education, healthcare, welfare, as well as policies that are explicitly designed to aid an immigrant or Latino population,” in addition to policies that “decrease discrimination against Latinos or alleviate the effects of discrimination” (1142). The decision to focus on these issues is

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assimilation is corrosive of political trust. The longer Latino immigrants have lived in the U.S. the more likely they are to lack trust and feel disaffected from governing institutions. In addition, second and third generation Latinos are much less trusting than Latino immigrants.

certainly justified, as all these issues are incredibly important both socially and politically to a majority of the Latino community (see Martinez-Ebers et al. 2000; Leal 2000).<sup>98</sup>

Scholars investigating the benefits of Latino representation have looked for connections between empowerment and policies that benefit the Latino community in these issue areas (Leal and Hess 2000; Meier, Stewart, and England 1991; Bratton 2006; Rouse 2008; Fraga et al. 2006).<sup>99</sup> However, I have found no work to date that focuses on Latino legislators' voting on issues that are potentially *harmful* to Latinos within those areas of interest. To what extent are Latino legislators both relevant for advancing policies beneficial to the Latino community *and* effective at defeating or mitigating proposals that harm the Latino community? To fully understand the extent to which Latino descriptive representation translates into substantive representation and meets the criteria necessary for effective descriptive representation laid out by Mansbridge, we must understand this side of the coin as well.<sup>100</sup>

Immigration is an issue that is more important to Latinos than any other group but no political party has taken ownership of the issue. This general trend is particularly pronounced at the state level, where government responses to immigration are relatively new on the political agenda and is an area where one might expect the link between substantive and descriptive representation to be robust.

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<sup>98</sup> A National Association of Latino Elected Officials 2008 survey found that the four most important issues to the Latino electorate were the economy, the war, health care, and immigration (NALEO 2008, 4).

<sup>99</sup> In these studies, empowerment has been measured either as the percentage of the legislative body made up of Latinos, Latino membership on key legislative committees, and the number of Latinos in leadership positions within the legislature.

<sup>100</sup> For example, Donald Haider-Markel (2007) finds that descriptive representation is a two-sided coin. Descriptive representation both increases the number of beneficial bills and punitive bills that target the minority group.

## Immigration Attitudes among Latinos

Many initiatives that try to reduce illegal immigration in a particular state, to decrease the number of current illegal immigrants, or to dissuade immigrants from choosing the state as a potential destination, may lead to discrimination against native born and legal immigrant Latinos as well as the undocumented immigrants they are supposed to target.<sup>101</sup> As a result, punitive immigration policies can be considered *anti-Latino* in nature.<sup>102</sup> Thus, looking at Latino legislator voting behavior on punitive immigration bills begins the discussion of whether descriptive representation is effective for countering anti-Latino initiatives.

Immigration regulation is one particularly relevant issue area to Latinos, but one where the Latino electorate and the Latino elite may not be of one mind. In many ways Latinos are not a cohesive group. Nationality, class, racial, and generational cleavages divide the Latino community and increase barriers to the development of group consciousness (Kaufmann 2003; DeGenova and Ramos-Zaya 2003; Stokes 2003; Marquez 2006). For example, the first wave of Cubans came to the United States primarily through legal means and came with high education levels and sufficient financial resources, although, they were followed by "The Marielitos" who were not as welcome or as mobile (Suro 1999). Regardless, once on American soil Cubans are considered legal refugees and are provided with resources to ease their integration (Portes and Rumbaut 2001). Puerto Ricans are citizens by birth, whereas Mexicans and other Central Americans face long lines and a long wait to be eligible for citizenship.

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<sup>101</sup> I discuss this at length in Chapter 5.

<sup>102</sup> That said, many scholars argue that all anti-immigrant initiatives are in fact anti-Latino (see Smith and Furuseth 2007, 13)

Dominicans and other Caribbean Latinos also primarily enter the U.S. through legal means but often face hardships due to their darker skin tone (Massey and Denton 1993). As a result, “Latino interests” are difficult to define and may, in fact, be distinct—depending on the country of origin for the Latino group, their skin tone, or their immigration status (Bratton 2006).

Moreover, generational status divides the Latino community into two solid groups—on the one hand, those whose families were annexed into the United States or who immigrated many generations ago, and on the other, those whose families or who themselves immigrated recently (Kehrberg and Butz 2006). The gulf between legal and undocumented immigrants further exacerbates generational divisions (Suro 1999). Documented Latino immigrants and their children may have little empathy for those who bypassed the hurdles of legal immigration.

While few scholars find that attitudes toward immigration vary meaningfully by country of origin, acculturation does appear to influence attitudes across Latino subgroups. De la Garza et al. (1991) show that among Mexicans, self-identification as a “Mexican” increases support for immigration. These scholars advance a cultural affinity thesis: the more a person remains attached to his or her ethnic heritage, the more positive he or she will feel toward new immigrants from Latin America and the more affinity he or she will feel toward Latinos remaining south of the boarder. Hood et al. (1997) also demonstrate that Latinos who are more acculturated are less supportive of increased immigration.

But both studies also argue that increased contact with illegal immigrants diminishes support for immigration.<sup>103</sup> It may be that native-born Latinos fear that their own status and acceptance within the majority population will decline with a rapid increase in illegal immigration to their area (see, for example, Garcia Bedolla 2005 for some discussion on this point). Or, as Burns and Gimpel (2000) argue, Latinos may be more likely to call for decreased immigration because their economic positions make them “the most threatened by the increased competition for jobs, services, and housing caused by recent immigration” (221) (also see Camarota 1997; Waldinger 1997).

Despite these many divisions, opinions toward immigration in the Latino community are surprisingly uniform. According to the PEW Hispanic Center’s 2007 National Survey of Latinos, over half of all Latinos feel that there are too few or the right amount of immigrants living in the United States and over eighty percent feel that illegal immigrants help the economy. Their perspectives on immigration policies are also very cohesive. Almost 86 percent of Latinos feel that local police should *not* take an active role in immigration control and 82 percent disapprove of workplace raids as a means for controlling immigration. And in 2008, a PEW survey found that 70 percent of Latinos disapprove of criminal prosecution of employers who hire undocumented immigrants and a majority disapproves of requiring employers to check with the federal government to verify employment eligibility of new hires (Lopez 2008). Although approval of such anti-immigrant programs is higher among citizens than non-citizens and among those whose families have been in the country longer, there is still a striking amount of

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<sup>103</sup> In fact, Hood et al. (1997) show that, holding other variables included in the model at their mean, Latinos who live in states in which 4 percent of the population is made up of illegal immigrants are more than twice as likely to favor reducing immigration rates as Latinos living in states with no illegal immigrants (642).

agreement among Latinos of the desirability of these programs. For example, according to the 2007 PEW Survey, 82 percent of Latino citizens disapprove of giving local police immigration powers (compared to 91 percent of non citizens). Among citizens, 72 percent of third generation Latino immigrants disapprove of this policy (compared to 87 percent of first generation immigrant citizens). Thus while there is certainly somewhat varying support depending on generational status, Latinos across subgroups are overwhelmingly unified in their attitudes about immigration.<sup>104</sup>

### **Latino Descriptive Representation and Immigration Policy**

Given widespread Latino support for immigration and opposition to punitive immigration policies, Latino legislators should oppose punitive immigration bills. However, Latinos in government may not always be very representative of the Latino population in demographic terms. Legislators are rarely reflective of the general public in terms of income, educational attainment, or other demographic factors (Mills 1956; Dye 1994) and Latino legislators are no different. In fact, in their investigation of the Latino elite, Zweigenhaft and Domhoff (1998; 2006) found that Latino elites were more likely to have light skin and high-status social backgrounds and were more similar to European Americans than the Latino electorate (2006; 166). Given this fact, Latinos in elected office who often do not hail from Latino immigrant communities may be more hostile toward the new Latino immigrants than the general Hispanic population, even while they maintain significant electoral safety representing homogeneously Latino districts made up largely of first and second generation Latino immigrants. It is also important to note

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<sup>104</sup> Newton (2008) also finds that Latino representatives in Congress were adamant in their opposition to employment sanctions because of the potential for increased discrimination against Latinos in the workplace. Thus, at least at the Congressional level, Latino elites also appear to disapprove of these policies.

that Latino legislators who represent largely Latino districts are likely be more aware of the burden placed on community services and the financial strain created by the presence of new immigrants in traditionally Latino enclaves. As a result, Latino legislators may also feel compelled to curtail the flow of new immigrants regardless of the potential social costs to some Latinos in their districts.

So, how should we expect Latino legislators to vote on punitive immigration bills? The discussion above leads to two contrary hypotheses. On the one hand, increased Latino representation should decrease support for punitive immigration bills—as Latinos should be less likely to vote in their favor. However, given the potential bias of the Latino legislators to be drawn from the Latino elite, and not immigrant communities, and for Latino legislators to be particularly attuned to the costs of illegal immigration in their communities, Latino elected officials may be just as likely to vote in favor of punitive immigration controls as their white counterparts. In this case, some Latino legislators should vote in favor of punitive immigration bills even though they represent largely Latino immigrant communities.



Table 7.1 Latino Population and State Legislative Representation

State	Latino Proportion of the Legislature (2007)	Latino Population (2007)	Difference	State	Latino Proportion of the Legislature (2007)	Latino Population (2007)	Difference
Nevada	.04	.25	-.21	Arkansas	.00	.05	-.05
California	.15	.36	-.21	Wyoming	.02	.07	-.05
Texas	.17	.36	-.19	Delaware	.02	.06	-.05
New Mexico	.27	.44	-.18	Maryland	.02	.06	-.05
Arizona	.12	.30	-.17	Indiana	.01	.05	-.04
Colorado	.03	.20	-.17	Wisconsin	.01	.05	-.04
Florida	.09	.21	-.12	Pennsylvania	.00	.04	-.04
New Jersey	.05	.16	-.11	Iowa	.00	.04	-.04
Utah	.01	.12	-.11	South Carolina	.01	.04	-.03
Illinois	.05	.15	-.10	Louisiana	.00	.03	-.03
New York	.06	.16	-.10	Michigan	.01	.04	-.03
Rhode Island	.02	.11	-.09	Minnesota	.01	.04	-.03
Oregon	.01	.11	-.09	Tennessee	.01	.03	-.03
Idaho	.01	.10	-.09	Alabama	.00	.03	-.03
Connecticut	.03	.12	-.08	Ohio	.00	.02	-.02
Hawaii	.00	.08	-.08	South Dakota	.00	.02	-.02

Table 7.1 Latino Population and State Legislative Representation (Continued)

State	Latino Proportion of the Legislature (2007)	Latino Population (2007)	Difference	State	Latino Proportion of the Legislature (2007)	Latino Population (2007)	Difference
Washington	.01	.09	-.08	Kentucky	.00	.02	-.02
Nebraska	.00	.08	-.08	Montana	.01	.03	-.02
Oklahoma	.00	.07	-.07	New Hampshire	.00	.03	-.02
Massachusetts	.02	.09	-.07	Mississippi	.00	.02	-.02
Georgia	.01	.08	-.06	Missouri	.01	.03	-.02
North Carolina	.01	.07	-.06	North Dakota	.00	.02	-.02
Kansas	.02	.09	-.06	Vermont	.00	.01	-.01
Virginia	.01	.07	-.06	Maine	.00	.01	-.01
Alaska	.00	.06	-.06	West Virginia	.00	.01	-.01

### **Non-Hispanic Representation on Immigration Policy**

Latinos remain vastly underrepresented in state legislatures. Table 7.1 shows the difference between the population make up and the percent of the state legislature made up of Latinos. Latinos are particularly underrepresented in the states in which they are the largest proportion of the population. For example, in Nevada, only four percent of the state legislature is Latino although Latinos make up about a quarter of the population. Likewise, in California, Texas, Arizona, and New Mexico, where the Latino populations are not only large but have lived for many generations, they are also greatly underrepresented. There is a twenty percentage point gap between the Latino population and the make up of the state legislature in California, the difference between population and legislative diversity are almost equally imbalanced in Arizona, New Mexico, Texas, and Colorado. In states that have newer Latino populations, representation is almost non-existent, particularly in new destinations in the South, such as North Carolina (1 legislator), Tennessee (1 legislator), and Georgia (3 legislators). Sixteen states have no Latino representatives at all, including Oklahoma which last year passed the most comprehensive anti-immigrant bill in the nation. This is a natural consequence of immigration; incorporation takes time. But meanwhile, who represents Latino interests?

Substantive representation is not contingent upon descriptive representation. Many scholars and political commentators consider liberal Democrats substantive representatives of minority communities (Swain 1993; Lublin 1997a; 1997b; 2000). The electoral connection (Mayhew 1975) increases the likelihood that representatives of all sorts will represent the interests of the affected group even if the member does not have

an interest in the legislation themselves—*as long as* they perceive that their reelection is contingent upon the group’s vote (Mansbridge 1999, 635; Lublin 1997). Thus, Democrats who represent districts with substantial Latino voting blocks may be cautious of casting supportive voices toward legislation with negative consequences for Latino communities. African American legislators may also be adverse to this legislation. African American legislators have led the fight in Congress and state legislators in combating discrimination in employment, law enforcement, and other areas. Given their own historical experience with discrimination, Black legislators may be ideologically opposed to legislation that potentially increases discrimination against any minority group, even if it is not their own (Bratton 2006). That said, African Americans are also among the most likely to be competing for jobs and the spoils of government with new immigrant populations (Burns and Gimpel 1999; Kaufmann 2003; Citrin et al. 1997), which may increase their support for punitive immigration policies. Of course, Latino and African American legislators often vote together and participate in bi- or tri- racial caucuses even if no “rainbow coalition” exists in their districts.

### Data and Methods

#### **Latino Legislative Voting Behavior**

Using the Migration Policy Institute’s “State Response to Immigration” data set for 2007 and the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) list of state laws relating to immigration and immigrants for 2006, 2007, and 2008, I created a list of all the punitive immigration reform laws for the three years that sought to increase penalties for employers for employing illegal immigrants or that gave or expanded immigration enforcement powers to local and state police (see Chapter Five). Unfortunately because

the NCSL list only includes bills enacted into law, in years 2006 and 2008, I can only include bills that were enacted into law. I am working on compiling a list of all legislation for 2005 through 2008. While it is unfortunate to be unable to include more analysis of voting behavior on failed votes, very few bills receive an unfavorable vote in state legislatures. In general, when a bill is going to fail on the floor, it is never called for a vote. So if the bill receives a negative vote in committee, it will never receive a full vote. In addition, if the bill is sufficiently controversial that the leadership expects a negative vote, they will often allow bills to expire instead of spending time debating an ultimately doomed bill. The Migration Policy Institute's data set includes bills that expired and bills that failed in addition to those passed. Using this data set to track down failed bills confirms this position. Bills in only two states actually faced a floor vote and failed (Virginia and Montana), all others marked as failed in the MPI data set either received an unfavorable motion out of committee or never got an up or down vote in at least one chamber (after having passed out of a single chamber).

Once the list of laws for each year was complete, using state legislative websites, I tracked the votes for each of the bills that received a recorded vote. Since it is impossible to disaggregate voice votes, only recorded votes were included. I also used the state legislatures websites for the four states included in the case study to search for immigration bills introduced in 2006 and 2008. Using this approach, I was able to include more votes for the case study states than for the analysis of the entire sample.

Using the 2006, 2007, and 2008 Directories of Latino Elected Officials available from the National Association of Latino Elected Officials (NALEO) Educational Fund, I identified the voting behavior of Latino state legislators on each of these bills and

recorded whether they voted in favor or against the measure. Using *The Almanac of State Legislative Elections* (Lilley III et al. 2007), I include data on the legislative district attributes of Latino legislator's districts. In addition, I include individual level data for the state legislators including the gender, race, ethnicity, and political party affiliation of the legislators attained from the state legislature websites. Individual legislator data for Arizona and Texas was also acquired from Kathleen Bratton's state legislative data. Given the very small number of these bills and relatively small number of legislators in state governments, I only present descriptive data. Description and sources of the data are available in Appendix B.

## Results

### **Latino Legislators and Punitive Immigration Legislation**

How controversial are punitive immigration bills? Unfortunately, this question is almost impossible to answer because most states do not keep transcripts of committee debates or archive written or oral testimony submitted for bill hearings. However, the limited information we can gather from floor votes indicates that ease of passage varies by state. Table 7.2 presents a list of all the punitive immigration laws that came out of state legislatures in 2006 and 2008 and all the bills that either passed *or* failed in 2007. The results indicate that there is a lack of consensus among legislators as to the desirability of these state immigration controls. In three states—Pennsylvania, Colorado, Nevada, and Virginia—at least one bill received unanimous votes in both chambers. Despite the presence of a few Latino legislators in both Colorado (5) and Nevada (3) and a single Latino legislator in both Virginia and Pennsylvania, not one legislator stood in opposition to these bills. In most other states, these bills received little opposition,

although in almost every state a minority of legislators openly opposed these bills. While the opposition was small, and unable to defeat the legislation, it is meaningful that voices of dissent were present in most states. In only a few states was the opposition strong enough to defeat the bills; most bills that failed were bills that received a favorable vote in one chamber but failed to receive a vote in the other before the legislative session concluded. Montana was the only state in which *several* bills were actually voted down. AS Table 7.2 shows, These bills garnered the most opposition in the final vote in Montana, Arizona, and Georgia.

How do Latino legislators vote on punitive immigration bills? Table 7.2 also includes how many Latino legislators voted in support (and in opposition) to each these bills. Again, there seems to be a lack of consensus between Latino elected officials as to the worth of these policy tools. Many voted in favor of this legislation while others opposed it. The little evidence available indicates that the Latino policy elite may in fact be inclined to vote in favor of bills that penalize undocumented immigrants and potentially increase discrimination. Taking all of the punitive bills as a whole, more Latino legislators voted in favor of these policy tools than voted in opposition. That said, it appears that the more Latinos are in the legislature, the more diversity there is in the Latino caucus. To examine this relationship closer, I examine the votes taken in Texas and Arizona.

Table 7.2 Latino Voting Behavior on Punitive Immigration Legislation, 2007-2008

Year	State	Bill	Vote	Topic	Latinos in State Legislature	In- Favor	Opposed	Not Voting
2006	Arizona	HB 2577	Y:49 N:31	Established fines for businesses who employ illegal aliens and provided money to train law enforcement in immigration procedures, and deny education benefits to immigrants	17	0	14 (11 House) (3 Senate)	3 (1 House) (2 Senate)
2006	Colorado	HB 1017 *House vote only	House Y: 53 N: 11	Establishes fine for employing unauthorized aliens.	7	5 (5 house— only)	0	0
		HB 1001	Senate: Y: 33 N: 2 House: Y: 63 N: 0	Verification of legal status of workers for economic development incentive awards.		6 (5 House) (1 Senate)	1 (1 Senate)	0
		HB 1343	Senate: Y: 35 N: 0 House: Y: 60 N: 3	Prohibits state agencies from contracting with businesses that employ unauthorized immigrants		7 (5 House) (2 Senate)	0	0



Table 7.2 Latino Voting Behavior on Punitive Immigration Legislation, 2006-2008 (Continued)

2006	Georgia	SB 529	House: Y: 119 N: 49 Senate: Y: 20 N: 33	Requires public employers to participation in federal work authorization program, authorizes the state to negotiate a memorandum of understanding for 287(g) program; and other provisions	3	1 (1 House)	2 (1 House) (1 Senate)	0
2006	Louisiana	SB 753	House: Y: 91 N: 5 Senate: Y: 26 N: 9	Establishes fine for employing unauthorized aliens.	0			
2006	Pennsylvania	HB 2319	Unanimous in both Houses	Prohibits use of illegal immigrants on state projects, provides for remedies for those found guilty of doing so.	1	1 <sup>a</sup> (1 House)		
2006	Tennessee	HB 111	House: Y: 81 N: 10 Senate: Y: 29 N: 0	Prohibits state agencies from contracting with businesses that employ illegal immigrants	1	1		
2007	Arizona	HB 2779	Y: 67 N: 15	Establishes penalties for hiring illegal immigrants.	17	7 (4 House) (3 Senate)	9 (6 House) (3 Senate)	1 (House)
		SB 1265	Y: 53 N: 31	Establishes probable cause for denying bail if the person is suspected of being in the country illegally.		2 (2 Senate)	15 (11 House) (4 Senate)	0
2007	Arkansas	HB 1024	Y: 117 N: 8	Prohibits state agencies from contracting with businesses that employ unauthorized immigrants.	0			

Table 7.2 Latino Voting Behavior on Punitive Immigration Legislation, 2006-2008 (Continued)

2007	Colorado	HB 1073	unanimous	Prohibits state agencies from contracting with businesses that employ unauthorized immigrants.	5	5 (3 House) (2 Senate)	0	0
2007	Montana	SB 346 *failed	Senate: Y: 33 N: 17 House: Y: 14 N: 86	Prohibits state agencies from contracting with businesses that employ unauthorized immigrants. (Legislation failed)	1	1 (1 House)	0	0
		HB 185 *failed	House: Y:94 N: 5	Creates a penalty of \$300 for employing an illegal immigrant.		1	0	0
		House vote only						
		SB 389 *failed	Senate: Y: 25 N: 25	Gives authority to police officers to stop an individual if the police officer has a “reasonable suspicion” that the individual has violated federal immigration law.		0	0	0
		Senate vote only						
2007	Nevada	AB 383	Unanimous	Establishes penalties for hiring illegal immigrants.	2	2 (2 House)	0	0
2007	Oklahoma	HB 1804	Y: 126 N: 19	Prohibiting state contracts with contractors who employ unauthorized immigrants and directs the Attorney General to enter into a Memorandum of Understanding between the State of Oklahoma and the United States Department of Justice or the United States Department of Homeland Security, as provided by Section 1357(g)	0			

Table 7.2 Latino Voting Behavior on Punitive Immigration Legislation, 2006-2008 (Continued)

2007	Tennessee	SB 1604	Y:125 N:1	Directs Tennessee to enter into a Memorandum of Understanding between the State of Oklahoma and the United States Department of Justice or the United States Department of Homeland Security, as provided by Section 1357(g)	1	1	0	0
		HB 729	Y:31 N:1 <sup>d</sup>	Establishes penalties for hiring illegal immigrants.		1	0	0
2007	Texas	HB 1196	Y:166 N:4	Requires a business that submits an application to receive a public subsidy to include in the application a statement certifying that the business, or a branch, division, or department of the business, does not and will not knowingly employ an unauthorized worker.	35	26 (26 House, voice vote in Senate, unanimous)	1 (House)	3 (House)
		HB 13	Y: 138 N: 3 <sup>e</sup>	Authorizes subdivisions to enter into 287(g) agreements.				
2007	Virginia	HB 2926 *failed—no vote taken in Senate	House: Y:92 N: 6	Expands the powers of state and local law enforcement officials to include immigration powers conferred upon the law enforcement agency by agreement with the US Department of Homeland Security.	1	1 (1 House)		
2007	West Virginia	SB 70	Y:94 N:5	Establishes penalties for hiring illegal immigrants.	0 <sup>p</sup>			
2008	Arizona	HB 2745	Y: 63 N: 20	Increases and expands employer sanctions and other immigrant employment issues.	17	4 (3 House, 1 Senate)	8 (6 House, 2 Senate)	5 (2 House, 3 Senate)

Table 7.2 Latino Voting Behavior on Punitive Immigration Legislation, 2006-2008 (Continued)

2008	Colorado	SB 193	House: Y: 58 N: 7 Senate: Y: 34 N: 0	Prohibiting state contracts with contractors who employ illegal aliens, sets up program to determine citizenship.	6	6 (4 House) (2 Senate)	0	0
2008	Georgia	SB 350	House: Y: 99 N: 68 Senate: Y: 38 N: 8	Requires police to determine the nationality of persons driving without a license.	3	1 (1 House)	1 (1 House)	1 (1 House)
2008	Missouri	HB 2058	House: Y: 135 N: 12 Senate: Y: 30 N: 4	Prohibits the use of tax credits by businesses that employ unauthorized aliens.	1	1 (1 House)	0	0
		HB 1549	House: Y: 124 N: 16 Senate: Y: 27 N: 7	Requires state highway patrol to be trained in accordance with immigration law (287(g)); requires public contractors to verify eligibility of employees and denies company further contracts for 3 years for violation or permanently denies for 2 violations.		1 (1 House)		
2008	Mississippi	SB 2988	Senate: Y: 52 N: 0 House: Y: 112 N: 8	Prohibiting state contracts with contractors who employ illegal aliens, sets up program to determine citizenship, imposes fines.	0			
2008	North Carolina	HB 2436	Senate: Y: 32 N: 14 House: Y: 97 N: 20	Calls for participation in 287(g) program.	2	1 (1 House)	1 <sup>c</sup> (1 Senate)	1 <sup>c</sup> (1 Senate)

Table 7.2 Latino Voting Behavior on Punitive Immigration Legislation, 2006-2008 (Continued)

2008	South Carolina	HB 4400	House: Y:89 N: 23 Senate: voice e vote	Prohibits state contracts with contractors who employ unauthorized immigrants and establishes a penalty of felony conviction and up to 5 years in prison for employers who hire unauthorized immigrants. Requires a Memorandum of Understanding with DHS or DOJ to train law enforcement in immigration enforcement. And other measures	1	1 (1 House)
2008	Utah	SB 81	House: Y: 56 N: 15 Senate: Y: 24 N: 4	Requires a Memorandum of Understanding with DHS for the enforcement of federal immigration law by state and local law enforcement personnel. Requires state contractors to use federal work authorization program	3	0 3 (2 House) (1 Senate)
2008	Virginia	HB 926	Unanimous in both houses	Prohibits business entities from hiring illegal aliens. Terminates corporate existence for violation	1	1 (1 House)
		HB 1298	Senate: Y: 40 N: 0 House: Y: 96 N: 3	Prohibits contractors from knowingly employing unauthorized aliens.	1	1 (1 House)

<sup>a</sup> Voice vote unanimous.

<sup>b</sup> The NALEO database does not list Jon Amores as a Latino elected official, but there is much speculation on the internet that claims he is. He has long been known to be the critical opponent in the West Virginia House of Delegates that prevented English only legislation from being passed until a legislative maneuver was used to bypass his committee. Amores voted against SB 70.

<sup>c</sup> Senator Apodaca is listed as both not voting and as having voted against but "Paired" with Senator Hoyle who voted in favor of the bill.

<sup>d</sup> Only senate vote found

<sup>e</sup> House vote, Senate taken by voice, unanimous.

### **Case Studies: Texas and Arizona**

In Texas, despite the large number of Latino legislators, House Bills 13 and 1196 were passed with overwhelming majorities. Only three legislators, all Latino, voted against House Bill 13, a bill calling for local police to be trained and to act as immigration officers. But on House Bill 1196, a bill to make public contractors legally attest to not employing undocumented workers, only one legislator (a non-Hispanic Democrat) voted in opposition—no Latino legislators objected. Despite significant co-ethnic representation in the Texas State House, Latinos, particularly non-citizens, in Texas appear to reap few rewards through legislative empowerment.

Arizona had four punitive immigration bills during the 2006 through 2008 time span. Arizona's House Bill 2577 established fines for businesses that employ illegal immigrants *and* established a 287(g) agreement to train local police to enforce immigration policy. For this bi-faceted bill, the entire Latino delegation voted in opposition. Seventeen other legislators—primarily Democrats, but also a few Republicans—joined the Latino delegation in opposition. A majority of the Latino delegation also voted in opposition to House Bill 1265—a broad and vague measure that established a policy of denying bail to people accused of a crime if there was “probable cause” to believe the person was in the country illegally—along with 16 other Democratic members of the legislature. No Republicans voted in opposition. Both of these bills appear to have united the Latino delegation in opposition.

On the other hand, House Bill 2779, a bill creating penalties for employers found guilty of hiring undocumented workers, split the Latino delegation. Of the 17 Latinos in the Arizona legislature, 7 voted in favor of the legislation and 9 voted in opposition (one

did not vote). Again, the opposition included several other non-Hispanic Democrats and no Republicans voted in opposition. The division in the Latino delegation repeated itself in 2008 with House Bill 2745, when the legislature again voted to increase employer penalties for hiring undocumented workers. In this case, 11 Democrats and 1 Republican joined eight Latino legislators in opposition to the bill.

It is important to note that all of the Latino legislators in Arizona are Democrats, so partisanship was not driving the divisions between them. However there was also no uniform agreement among the Latino members. It appears that immigration policy is a contentious issue within the Latino delegation despite the relative consensus among Latino constituents on this issue.

If ethnicity is not what unites legislators on these issues, what does? Looking at the demographics and politics of legislative districts can elucidate some of the variation in voting behavior present between Latino delegates and delegates more generally. In this section I seek to understand what demographic and political factors drive disagreement about how to regulate (or if to regulate) immigration between Latino legislators and legislators more generally. Again, the Arizona case study illuminates the underlying differences between legislators who vote in favor and legislators who oppose these bills. Using demographic information for Latino legislators, presented in Table 7.3, it appears that although there were no differences between legislators who voted for or against the bills in terms of the education levels or poverty levels of their districts, Latino legislators who voted in favor of these bills had significantly more whites and fewer Latinos in their districts. For the three bills that divided the Latino delegation, Latinos

Table 7.3 Arizona Vote Broken Down by Individual and Demographic Factors

			HB HB 2577 (2006)	SB 2779 (2007)	1265 (2007)	HB 2745 (2008)				HB HB 2577 (2006)	HB 2779 (2007)	SB 1265 (2007)	HB 2745 (2008)
Bill Number													
Individual Variables							District Demographics						
Party	Democrat	Support	4%	57%	16%	44%	Mean Percent Hispanic	All legislators	Support	20.27**	23.94**	21.29**	24.26**
		Oppose	96	43	84	56			Oppose	42.91	51.26	47.01	44.76
	Republican	Support	89	100	100	98	Mean Percent Hispanic	Latino Legislators Only	Support	-	47.01**	26.35**	46.95**
		Oppose	11	0	0	2			Oppose	54.61	57.07	55.02	60.12
Gender	Female	Support	50	82	57	76	Mean Percent White	All legislators	Support	68.41**	61.6**	67.32**	62.75**
		Oppose	50	17	43	23			Oppose	41.28	34.34	36.4	36.34
	Male	Support	56	81	66	75	Mean Percent White	Latino Legislators Only	Support	-	38.91**	58.95**	36.8**
		Oppose	44	19	34	24			Oppose	30.09	27.86	29.96	25.29



Table 7.3 Arizona Vote Broken Down by Individual and Demographic Factors (continued)

		HB		SB						HB			
		HB 2577	2779	1265	HB 2745			HB 2577	HB 2779	SB 1265	HB 2745		
Bill Number		(2006)	(2007)	(2007)	(2008)			(2006)	(2007)	(2007)	(2008)		
<u>Individual Variables</u>						<u>District Demographics</u>							
Latino	Non-Hispanic	Support	74	91	76	83	Mean Percent in Poverty	All Legislators	Support	10.19**	13.6**	11.21**	12.77**
		Oppose	26	9	24	17			Oppose	20.59	20.44	21.04	21.58
	Hispanic	Support	0	44	12	33	Mean Percent in Poverty	Latino Legislators Only	Support	21.52	20.68	14.7**	21.8
		Oppose	100	56	88	67			Oppose	-	20.56	21.35	21.58
N		80	82	84	83								

who supported the bills represented significantly fewer Latinos, and significantly more whites. In addition, their districts had significantly higher incomes (not shown) than the Latinos who voted against the bills. Latino legislators who supported these bills also came from more politically competitive districts than the opposition, although only moderately so. Latino delegates supporting HB 2779 on average won their last election with 73 percent of the vote, while the average electoral victory for Latino delegates who opposed the bill was 89 percent—both highly uncompetitive margins. The same factors were significant among the non-Hispanic legislators. The opposition had more Latinos in their district and fewer whites than supporters, and supporters represented much more wealthy districts. The opposition, in short came from more uncompetitive districts where Latinos were the overwhelming majority and many more residents lived below the poverty line. Whereas support for these bills came from areas in which few immigrants live and where immigrants are not using local resources, opposition came from the very places where the impact of immigration is greatest.

The trends evident in Texas and Arizona indicate that Latino empowerment is not a magic panacea but instead the quality of representation derived from co-ethnic empowerment depends on the context in which the Latino representatives serve. While Latinos in Texas appear to have few friends in the legislature, Latinos in Arizona seem to be gaining empowerment through their co-ethnic representation, but also through white Democrats who represent districts with significant Latino voting blocks. Residential segregation of Latinos appears to help their political prospects in Arizona but hurt them in Texas. In Texas, legislators have political cover by representing largely uncompetitive Latino legislative districts. In 2006 only twelve of the thirty-six Latinos (about one-third)

in the Texas legislature won their seats with under seventy-five percent of the vote.

Legislators have little reason to fear repercussions for voting against the interests of their constituents when they win with such large margins. The Texas state legislature is also part time and may garner little public scrutiny. They meet for 140 days, once every two years. How salient their actions are to the general public, particularly those with limited English skills and educations, is questionable. Arizona also only meets for about 4 months, but they meet every year and in addition have frequent special sessions to deal with legislation on an ongoing basis. Potentially, the more professionalized legislature may enable constituents and interest groups to take a more active role in the governing process. Unfortunately, this is just conjecture. More research into the strength of immigrant and Latino organizations in these states is required to corroborate my hypothesis.

The investigation into Arizona also led to some observations about the differences between Latino delegates' behavior on employment versus law enforcement related bills. The limited evidence from Arizona indicates that Latino legislators may feel more leeway voting for employer sanctions than for increasing police powers. It may be that the potential for abuse and discrimination is more easily equated with law enforcement.<sup>105</sup> But while Arizona legislators may be more attuned to the potential discriminatory effects of empowering police than of fining employers, outside of Arizona, it is important to note, there remains no across-the-board relationship between Latino representation and voting on bills to give immigration powers to local law enforcement. In Utah, all three

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<sup>105</sup> In fact the some law enforcement in Arizona is well known for using racial profiling to identify illegal immigrants and to use immigration as publicity stunts. Sheriff Joe Arpaio of Maricopa County, which includes Phoenix and its sprawling suburbs, has marched immigrant prisoners through the streets in pink underwear, built tent cities to house illegal immigrants on public display, and is currently under investigation for civil rights abuses (see [www.aclu.org](http://www.aclu.org)).

Latino legislators voted against HB 81, which called for state police to be trained under the 287(g) program. But in North Carolina, the vote for the 287(g) program split the Latino delegation and in Missouri and Tennessee the lone Latino legislators voted in favor of their 287(g) bills. Latino legislators were also split in their decisions in Georgia, despite a strong block of opposition among primarily democratic lawmakers. I will discuss the Georgia votes in more depth in the next section. As discussed, in most states Latinos lack consequential representation; thus in the next section, I look at two states where these bills received significant opposition in order to discover where Latinos find representation when they are not discriptively empowered.

### **Case Studies: Georgia and Montana**

Georgia and Montana are the two states in which, despite small levels of Latino empowerment, punitive immigration bills met the most opposition. But from whom did this opposition come?

Georgia has a high rate of both Latino immigration and illegal immigration. It is considered a “new destination” for Latino immigrants and the Latino population has been increasing rapidly. However, given the relative newness of the Latino population, they have yet to gain significant political empowerment.

In Georgia, two distinctions between supporters and the opposition are evident. Overwhelmingly, Democrats and female legislators opposed these bills (see Table 7.4). Only twenty percent of the Democratic caucus supported House Bill 350 (requiring police to determine the nationality of persons driving without a license) and twenty-eight percent of the Democratic caucus supported Senate Bill 529 (punishing employers and establishing a 287(g) program). Women were also much less likely to vote for these bills.

Perhaps the most interesting factor of the opposition that arises in Georgia, however, is the racial make up of the opposition. Overwhelmingly, Black legislators opposed these bills. Only 2 Black legislators (about 5 percent) voted for SB 529 and only eight (about 15 percent) voted for SB 350. The Latino delegation was also split on these bills, but with only three members (2 Democrats and 1 Republican), it is difficult to make any significant conclusions from the findings. On both bills the Republican voted in support and the Democrats present voted in opposition.

Despite the fact that African Americans are the most likely groups to be in competition for jobs and resources with new Latino immigrants, Latinos find political bedfellows in Georgian black legislators. It appears that not only do minority legislators share interests in increasing funds for education and preventing discrimination (Bratton 2006), but they also bond together when minorities are targeted for punitive measures.

Georgian Democrats (primarily African American Democrats) represent Latinos on these issues despite the fact that they represent fewer Latinos than their Republican counterparts. As can be seen in Table 7.4, supporters of these bills had higher populations of Latinos in their districts than the opposition. This is primarily due to the partisan nature of the votes. White Republicans represent the vast majority of Latinos in the Georgia statehouse. This finding is consistent with Lublin (1997) who posits that Republicans with large Latino constituencies tend to be more conservative.

Table 7.4 Georgia Vote Broken Down by Individual and Demographic Factors

Bill Number			SB 350 (2008)	SB 529 (2006)				SB 350	SB 529
<u>Individual Variables</u>					<u>District Demographics</u>				
Party	Democrat	Support	20%	28%	Mean Percent Hispanic	All legislators	Support	7.77	7.69
		Oppose	80	72			Oppose	6.46	6.69
	Republican	Support	93	100	Mean Percent White	All legislators	Support	66.98**	66.89**
		Oppose	7	0			Oppose	44.34	36.47
Gender	Female	Support	32	43	Mean Percent in Poverty	All Legislators	Support	18.99**	14.89
		Oppose	68	56			Oppose	13.51	17.86
	Male	Support	71	76					
		Oppose	29	24					
Race	Black	Support	15	5					
		Oppose	85	95					
	White	Support	77	88					
		Oppose	23	12					
N			221	220					

Republicans represent 60 percent of the districts in which Latinos make up over ten percent of the population. Of these districts, only 3 Republican members voted against SB 350 and not one of them voted against SB 529, while 63 percent and 65 percent of the Democrats who represent heavily Latino districts voted in opposition, respectively. Of districts in which Latinos make up over 15 percent of the population, not one Republican voted against either bill. In short, Latinos appear to be gaining surrogate representation primarily in African American legislators outside of the districts in which they are the most populous.

These findings highlight the importance of increased participation among Latinos in the political process. In two-thirds of the Republican districts with over 10 percent Latino constituents, Republicans faced no opposition in the 2006 election cycle and only 6 (about 18 percent) of them retained their seats while gaining less than sixty percent of the vote. Of the 32 heavily Latino districts represented by Republicans, in 6 of them whites are the minority, and in 17, whites are under sixty percent of the population.<sup>106</sup> It is unlikely that these members, who vote overwhelmingly in favor of punitive policies, would hold their seats (or at least would be so dismissive of Latino interests) if the minorities they represent were fully enfranchised.

Georgia has a history of grappling with racial divides. As a “Winn Dixie” state and former part of the confederacy, the political parties have been at least partially shaped by racial divisions in the electorate. As a result the African American delegates may be particularly attuned to racial undertones in debates and policies that exacerbate discrimination. Thus, it is important to also look at a state in which racial divisions are

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<sup>106</sup> In districts in which the population is over 10 percent Latino and under 60 percent white, not one Republican legislator voted in opposition to these bills. Democrats representing similarly composed districts were split but a majority voted in opposition.

not a strong dividing force. Montana is, for this reason, an appropriate additional case study.

Montana's legislature is almost entirely white. Not one African American is elected in Montana and there is only one Latino. The minority representation presently comes from a few Native Americans and a single Asian representative. Montana also has a very small Latino and immigrant population, and a small immigration rate compared to the rest of the country. That said, in the course of a single year, three bills were introduced that fit my criteria and five more anti-immigrant bills were introduced.

Montana is also a highly competitive state. Over a third of the legislative seats in Montana were won in 2006 with less than 60 percent of the vote and only 16 percent faced no competition. Montana is a traditionally Republican state but one in which the Democratic Party has retained significant strength and is able to fight for control of the statehouse (Lilley III et al., 210). The votes on the three bills included in this analysis—House Bill 185, creating penalties for employing illegal immigrants; Senate Bill 346, prohibiting contracts with businesses employing illegal immigrants; and Senate Bill 389, giving authority to police officers to stop individuals if they have reasonable suspicion that the person is an illegal immigrant—produce extremely different results. House Bill 185 (establishing financial penalties) was defeated with overwhelming majorities of both parties. However, the vote on SB 389 was just about split down party lines. Every single Republican voted in favor of allowing police officers to stop people for suspected immigration violations and only one Democrat joined the Republicans to vote in favor of this legislation. Senate Bill 346, prohibiting state contracts, produced a much more nuanced vote. About a third of both parties voted for the legislation. On this vote,



women overwhelmingly opposed the bill. Only six of the 31 women in the legislature voted for the bill (two Republicans and three Democrats), the other 25 opposed it.

Given the overwhelmingly homogeneity of Montana's population, it is not surprising that a few district demographic variables produce statistically significant differences. The only bill to produce meaningful differences was SB 389. The districts of supportive legislators on this bill have significantly fewer Latinos, more whites, and fewer people living in poverty. However, although the differences are statistically significant, the overall differences are extremely small and not substantively meaningful.

The Montana case study suggests that when immigration is not a pressing political issue, more members of both parties are able to publicly vote against punitive immigration bills and that Democrats in particular vote against bills that reek of racial and ethnic discrimination. Contrasting it with the votes in other states, where immigration is a more pressing political issue, suggests that when immigration is a politically salient issue, it breaks down the party and ethnic structure of the state legislature as legislators posture to look tough on immigration and pander to a loud and active minority of anti-immigrant constituents.<sup>107</sup>

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<sup>107</sup> SB 346 in Montana was the only state and bill in which there was significant variation and enough observations to run a multiple regression analysis. I ran a regression analysis on Senate bill 346 including party, gender, urbanicity, Hispanic population, below poverty population, election margin in the last election and district white population as independent variables. Party, Gender, Hispanic population, election margin, and white population were all highly significant.

**Table 7.5 Montana Vote Broken Down by Individual and Demographic Factors**

Bill Number			HB 185	SB 346	SB 389	HB 185 SB 346 SB 389					
Individual Variables						District Demographics					
Party	Democrat	Support	2%	34%	4%	Mean Percent Hispanic	All legislators	Support	2.06	2.76	2.37**
		Oppose	98	66	96			Oppose	2.61	2.56	2.89
	Republican	Support	8	30	100	Mean Percent White	All legislators	Support	83.8	89.61	92.26**
		Oppose	92	70	0			Oppose	88.47	87.36	83.4
Gender	Female	Support	4	16	11	Mean Percent in Poverty	All Legislators	Support	18.14	18.49	19.90**
		Oppose	96	84	89			Oppose	21.63	21.39	17.39
	Male	Support	93	37	59						
		Oppose	7	63	41						
N			100	150	50						

## Discussion

In this chapter, I investigated votes taken on punitive immigration bills in four states. In Texas and Arizona Latinos are large portions of the electorate and have attained a significant number of co-ethnic representatives in state government. As is the case with every state that houses a large Latino population, these are places where immigration is a politically pressing and salient topic. My two other case studies, Georgia and Montana give insights into the political climate where Latinos are not empowered. In Georgia, immigration is also a salient political issue and the number of Latinos in the state is quickly on the rise. Latinos now make up a large portion of many legislative districts but they have not yet gained significant co-ethnic representation. In Montana on the other hand, Latinos neither make up a large proportion of the state nor are they immigrating in large numbers. In Montana, immigration has little reason to warrant significant legislative attention. The diversity of these case studies illuminates the problems inherent to making blanket conclusions about where Latinos garner representation, both among co-ethnics and where they are not descriptively represented. The evidence suggests that the salience of immigration issues and the historical party and race relations of the state are critical to the level of representation that Latinos can expect on these issues.

The Arizona and Texas case studies suggest that when immigration is an important political topic, empowerment is not a guarantee for substantive representation on punitive immigration policy. It is important to note that in these states, a wider chasm in the Latino community may exist on immigration attitudes. Faced with both the economic and social consequences of uncontrolled immigration, Latinos and non-

Hispanics alike may be more split about what policy tools are justified. Both Texas and Arizona have large illegal immigrant populations *and* loud anti-immigrant interest groups. Research has shown that Latino citizens who live around many illegal immigrants may have more negative views towards immigration (Hood et al. 1997). Thus, in these states where illegal immigration is rampant, the diversity of opinion in the Latino community may be greater. Descriptive representation requires *either* monolithic opinion on policy issues *or* sufficient representation of the group to adequately represent the diversity of opinions the group holds (Mansbridge 1999). In neither Texas nor Arizona are these qualifications met. In both states the number of Latino legislators is far smaller than the proportion of the electorate they represent. In Texas, where Latinos make up 17 percent of the legislature (and 36 percent of the population), few legislators stood in opposition to punitive immigration bills. However, in Arizona, where Latinos hold 12 percent of the legislative seats (and make up 30 percent of the population), many co-ethnic legislators led the opposition but the Latino delegation resisted as a unified block only rarely. The diversity of opinion evident in Arizona is most likely warranted given the salience of the issue in the state, but the under-representation of Latinos in the legislature dilutes their admittedly diverse voices. While the presence of descriptive representatives, regardless of their numerical strength, should provide the insights and perspectives that deliberative institutions miss when they have no ethnic minorities represented, in actuality, “disadvantaged groups often need the full representation that proportionality allows in order to achieve several goals: deliberative synergy, critical mass, dispersion of influence, and a range of views within the group” (Mansbridge 1999, 636).

The case studies of Arizona and Texas speak to the consequences of segregation and the safe seats segregation produces. The final and potentially most harmful cost of descriptive representation lies in the safety descriptive representatives garner in their elections (Mansbridge 1999, Brace et al. 1995; Swain 1993; Guinier 1994; Thernstrom 1987; Canon 1999). “The descriptive characteristics of a representative can lull voters into thinking that their substantive interests are being represented even when this is not the case” (Mansbridge 1999, 640).<sup>108</sup> One of the problems derives from a lack of accountability. Out of the 36 Latino representatives in Texas, only 11 were elected with less than 70 percent of the vote in 2006. It is hard to think there is much accountability when legislators enjoy such large electoral victories (but see Gay 2007).<sup>109</sup>

The Georgia and Montana cases demonstrate that when immigration is not as salient, representation takes different forms. In Georgia, which has a history of racial intolerance and has some of the most draconian city and county anti-immigrant laws in the country, Latinos are a newer population and have not gained significant representation. But in this state, Latinos find surrogate representation not in the members who represent the districts in which the most Latinos live but in African American Democrats who often have relatively few Latino constituents. In states with large African American delegations, Latinos may find more political bedfellows willing to combat punitive immigration legislation than in states with smaller black populations.

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<sup>108</sup> Carol Swain (1993) found evidence of this in her formative work on Black representatives in Congress

<sup>109</sup> Moreover, Brace et al. (1995) argue that the electoral security of these districts decreases turnout because uncompetitive districts discourages participation and reduces the incentives for candidates and parties to mobilize voters. However, Barreto et al. (2004) find that for Latinos, living in a majority minority district increases Latino turnout.

Finally, in Montana, we see that when immigration is not a salient topic or an important issue, few legislators have the incentive to vote for punitive immigration reform, but when they do, a partisan divide emerges. Republicans back proposals to give police extensive immigration enforcement powers while Democrats oppose such measures.

### Conclusion

In Robert Dahl's (1961) classic *Who Governs?*, he argues that local policy making is done through pluralistic means—where passionate minorities on *both sides of the issue* fight for their side, sometimes winning and sometimes losing. But Dahl noted that minorities and the poor were absent in these discussions. When political issues affect the wealthy and the poor equally, the socioeconomic bias against political participation is not likely to be as important as when the proposed policy (1) overwhelmingly affects a group that does not participate and (2) is simultaneously demanded by extremely active constituents. This appears to be the case with punitive immigration policies in states with immigration problems. The passionate minority of anti-immigrant activists is loud and demands recognition, while the constituencies these bills punish are silent and absent from debate. Low levels of political participation, both at the polls and in more time-consuming democratic processes, disenfranchise the Latino population in state and local governance. In this instance unequal participation is certainly translating into unequal representation and the passage of punitive policies that harm their communities. As a result, Latinos are losing on these bills even when they are somewhat politically empowered through co-ethnic representation.

Latinos are a large and politically important constituency in American politics. Over the next few decades, Latinos will become the largest minority group in the United States. Immigration policy and the rights accorded to immigrants are policy areas that are particularly meaningful and consequential to the majority of the Latino population. If the African American experience is at all illustrative, then the party that solidifies itself on the right side of the immigration issue in the eyes of Latinos should be able to count on crystallizing enduring support by this increasingly vital electoral demographic group.

However, few legislators appear to be taking a long-term view of the electoral consequences of their actions. In President George W. Bush's last address to the media before leaving office, he warned his Republican colleagues that taking draconian positions on immigration was a fatal error that could cost the party control of the government in the long run. "We should be open-minded about big issues like immigration reform, because if we're viewed as anti-somebody—in other words, if the party is viewed as anti-immigrant—then another fellow may say, 'Well, if they're against the immigrant, they may be against me.' We've got to be a party for a better future" (Ruttenberg 2009). President Bush's words are true for both parties on the state level and are even more pertinent to the legitimacy of American democracy in years to come. If Latinos feel disenfranchised and oppressed by the system and if neither party stands up for their positions, it is likely that this new group of potential voters will continue to be disaffected from the system, have little faith in governing institutions, develop low levels of political efficacy, and lack an attachment to the polity as a whole.

As it stands, Latinos lack sufficient substantive representation on these punitive measures. The low levels of political participation in the Latino community have made

their policy positions unrecognized in policy debates. In order to combat punitive immigration legislation, Latinos must participate at a rate analogous to the anti-immigrant activists. The implications of this paper are quite depressing. A vicious cycle could be on its way in which Latinos are not participating, so draconian legislation is implemented that harms their community. In turn these harms disenfranchise the community and produce even lower levels of political participation. Fortunately, in the U.S., minorities, including Latinos have a history of activism in response to oppression. When Latinos were attacked in California, they responded with increased naturalization rates and in turn higher political participation rates (Pantoja, Ramirez, and Segura 2001). This response is certainly the best-case scenario.



## Chapter 8: Conclusion

We can say with certainty that the future trajectory of Latino civic participation will have substantial consequences for the American political system and the U.S. economy. Latinos are the nation's largest and fastest growing minority group, and they are the majority in many cities and towns. In addition, new immigration patterns have brought Latinos into communities that were, until recently, racially homogeneous. Thus, Latino population growth will affect not only traditional gateway destinations such as New York and California but new destinations such as Tennessee, North Carolina, Washington, and the Dakotas as well.

For most of the nation's history, white voters held the power in American cities and states, and in national electoral contests. This power already has begun to wane. According to Census estimates, within the next few decades, the United States will become a majority-minority nation and Latinos will be the dominant minority group, having long superseded the numerical power of African Americans. If current population trends continue, even without additional immigration from Latin America, someday Latinos are likely to outnumber whites.

Unfortunately, academic research has not kept pace with population trends. We have only begun to fully appreciate the barriers to socioeconomic mobility and political participation for Latino immigrants and their families, or how Latinos fare in the policy making process. This dearth of knowledge leaves policy makers without quality research to guide policy development, and scholarly and popular accounts of Latino political interests focus almost exclusively on immigration reform, overlooking the broader

political interests of the Latino community, such as education, housing availability, neighborhood revitalization, and language access.<sup>110</sup>

Certainly, immigration reform is more important to Latinos than any other group, especially as it pertains to country quotas, family reunification, and the precarious fate of undocumented immigrants. However, immigration reform is largely a smoke screen for the more significant problems Latino Americans face today. The almost exclusive focus on immigration by Latino advocacy groups limits the potential for both inter-ethnic mobilization and sustained political action by Latino Americans if immigration reform is achieved. As the chapters of this dissertation have made clear, the interests of Latino Americans go well beyond a singular focus on federal immigration policy. If segregation of the Latino community is allowed to expand, it is likely that any relative increase in the socioeconomic status of future generations in the Latino community will be inhibited and, as a result, the potential voice of the Latino community will be muted. Without major investments in and enforcement of the Fair Housing Act, additional coverage by and funding for the Community Reinvestment Act, and state and local policies that increase opportunities for minorities to live in diverse environments and boost their educational attainment, the future of Latino political power is bleak.

Residential segregation appears to keep Latinos out of sight and out of the minds of elected officials and political parties. In this dissertation, I have argued that Latinos

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<sup>110</sup> This phenomenon is perhaps most common in the popular press. For example, when President Barack Obama announced that he would be undertaking comprehensive immigration reform, a New York Times article stated that in his campaign, Obama promised "that comprehensive immigration legislation, including a plan to make legal status possible for an estimated 12 million illegal immigrants, would be a priority in his first year in office. Latino voters turned out strongly for Mr. Obama in the election" (Preston 2009). This statement implies that the main reason Latinos voted for the Democratic candidate was because of his stance on immigration, despite the fact that in most recent Pew surveys, education and the economy were the most important issues to Latino voters.

would benefit greatly by living in more integrated settings. Thus, housing and other policies designed to integrate Hispanics into mixed-race and mixed-income housing in mixed-income and mixed-race political jurisdictions are the most pertinent policies this dissertation addresses. However, policies focusing on education and immigration, as well as those aimed at increasing and expanding civic and political participation, also are critical to overcoming the damage to Latino socioeconomic and political integration created by residential segregation and failing schools. In this concluding chapter, I review my findings and discuss how segregation creates an invisible Latino electorate. I then suggest several policy proposals for overcoming these problems.

### *What We Learned*

At its core, democracy rests on citizens participating in the political process. However, even recent, rosy pictures of the state of participation in the United States, including voting and other political acts, point to the uneven distribution of participation across class, racial, and ethnic lines (National Conference on Citizenship 2006). As Hanjal and Trounstein (2005, 515) note, “The skewed nature of the vote raises real concerns about how well the interests of different groups are served in democracy.”

Most studies of the factors that influence political participation look primarily at whites and, through the use of statistical controls, wash away the effects of racial group dynamics (Leighley 2001). This omission has severe consequences for the explanatory power of contemporary theories of political behavior. In this dissertation, I have attempted to add to our understanding of Latino political behavior and how Latino political behavior affects representation. I have argued and presented qualitative and quantitative evidence that segregation results in political and social isolation for Latinos

in the United States. Segregation and social isolation constrain socioeconomic mobility, limit access to political information, and decrease political efficacy and motivation. As a result of low political participation by the Latino community and residential segregation on the local, state, and regional levels, Latino Americans suffer politically. The intersection of their residential segregation and their lack of political power creates a situation in which local communities and elected officials react sharply with punitive and discriminatory legislative actions at least partly because they have no understanding of the interests and needs of these communities.

In Chapters 3, 4, and 5, I showed that the Latino community suffers from residential segregation. Segregation creates neighborhoods in which political participation is unlikely and at times even discouraged. Residents live under the radar in an attempt to keep the authorities at bay. Fear and distrust are rampant, and residents often accept very poor living and employment conditions. The fact that residential segregation is highly correlated with concentrated poverty constrains the socioeconomic mobility of the Latino community. Schools in segregated poor areas are not only more challenged by social factors (such as parents with low education levels who cannot help with homework, students working full time jobs outside of school, higher malnutrition rates and health problems, more student turnover, and a higher concentration of English learners), but because of the heavy reliance of many school systems on local funding sources, these schools tend to have fewer financial resources. In concentrated neighborhoods, Latinos are less likely to graduate from high school or go on to higher education if they do receive their diplomas. Even when taking education into account, in segregated environments, both U.S.-born Latinos and Latino immigrants earn lower

incomes than Latinos in more integrated neighborhoods. Although segregated Latino neighborhoods usually have a comparatively higher number of employed adults than segregated African American neighborhoods (Wilson 1996), segregation still takes its toll on the socioeconomic mobility of the Latino community. The educational and economic opportunities available in concentrated Latino communities are simply far fewer than in integrated neighborhoods.

The socioeconomic stagnation created by segregation has real political consequences. In these chapters I discuss how residential segregation leads to low political and civic participation. One thing is clear: the higher an individual's socioeconomic status, the more likely she is to participate in the political process. Education and highly skilled occupations decrease the costs associated with political participation and make civic and political engagement more likely. As I show in Chapter 5, by constraining socioeconomic mobility, segregation indirectly suppresses Latino political participation. However, consistent with social network theory and Wilson's work on concentrated poverty, segregation directly reduces civic engagement in the Latino community. Latinos in segregated communities are less likely to have friendship networks that include non-Latinos. Diverse friendship networks may be particularly important to the Latino community, since political discussion and involvement among Latinos is so low. Segregation also greatly diminishes community-building civic engagement.

The low civic participation in Latino communities should cause concern for two reasons. First, people gain skills necessary for political participation through civic activities, and civic associations facilitate political discussion (Verba, Schlozman, and

Brady 1995). Second, communities are stronger and more stable when community members are more engaged civically (Putnam 2000). Because of low civic engagement, poverty-ridden Latino neighborhoods may begin to mirror the social disorganization historically seen in African-American neighborhoods with concentrated poverty (Massey and Denton 1993; Wilson 1990; Wilson 1996). If this is true, substantial investment from state, local, and federal government agencies will be required to help Latino neighborhoods. Unfortunately, the low civic and political participation rates in segregated communities make that investment unlikely. Because local and state governments operate under significant financial constraints, communities and groups compete for services and money for pet projects (Kaufmann 2004; Judd and Swanstrom 2005). In these competitions, the loudest voices tend to win (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). As the first part of this dissertation showed, Latino neighborhoods are unlikely to have the loudest voices.

Chapters 6 and 7 turned our attention to how the low decibel level of the Latino political voice affects state policymaking. In these chapters, I looked at the political, demographic, and economic factors associated with the introduction and passage of anti-immigrant policies in the areas of law enforcement and employment. The correlations suggested that state legislatures, including those with significant numbers of Latino representatives, may perceive new Latino immigrant populations as a threat when immigration results in Latinos comprising a greater proportion of a state's population. Although Latinos find political representation in some co-ethnic representatives, the link between co-ethnic representation and substantive representation in this policy area is weak. The segregation of Latinos into concentrated Latino legislative districts dilutes

their political power and removes them from the electoral considerations of state legislatures. These chapters show that to gain more substantive representation, Latinos must take a more active role in the democratic process, hold elected officials accountable, and have power in more legislative races.

*Out of Sight and Out of Mind: Lessons from Concentrated Latino Communities*

In their recent book *Better Together* (2003), Robert Putnam and Lewis Feldstein report the experience of teachers at Palmer Elementary School in Pharr, Texas. They recount how teachers and administrators at Palmer began working with a coalition of church and school groups to organize parents and residents to improve the school. The story they tell is one of success in building social capital in communities without an organizing tradition and is a model for activists interested in how to engage segregated Latino communities. What is most important here, though, is that despite the lengthy history of Latino immigrants in the Rio Grande Valley, it was not until the 1990s that the public schools began to reach out to parents and engage the community. Until then, a chasm existed between the Latino residents and community and governmental institutions. Moreover, the reaction those teachers reported during their initial attempts to engage the community exemplifies the problems residential segregation has for the Latino community. As reported in the book, instead of asking parents to come to the school to discuss reform, teachers and administrators

...Made visits to students' homes, asking parents about their hopes and worries regarding the school and their children. For many parents, it was their first real connection with the school, the first time anyone had bothered to ask their opinions. For the teachers it was a first glimpse of their students' lives outside of school. In *Valley Interfaith and School Reform*, author Dennis Shirley quotes school principal Salvador Flores: "When we first started doing our home visits, some of the teachers would

come back to the school crying when they saw the conditions that the children were living in.” (Putnam and Feldstein 2003, 11-12)

There are two important take-away points from this story. First, concentrated Latino neighborhoods often are excluded from community institutions even if their residents are not newcomers to the area. Second, segregation separates people who control institutions and services from those who rely on the institutions. It is instructive that the teachers had no experience with the living conditions of their students. If teachers are unaware of the residential conditions and needs of the community they serve, how likely is it that elected officials conducting business in far-off county and statehouse buildings (or, more to the point, bureaucrats who implement policy) will have any experience with the community they claim to serve?

Integration brings people who lack resources into communities that possess institutions with longer histories of community engagement, socioeconomic opportunities, and better schools. It also ensures that those who govern the area are consistently informed about the needs and problems facing everyone in their jurisdiction. In integrated settings, the problems facing one part of the community affect everyone. In segregated settings, it is easy to be ignorant of social problems because they exist in both a literally and psychologically removed location—even if just a few blocks or miles away. When social problems affect only one part of a society and not the rest, it is easier for politicians and the unaffected parts of the community to ignore the detrimental effects of those problems if the residents do not live in proximity to one another. One need only look to the slow and ineffective reaction by federal, state, and local authorities to the crack cocaine crisis in the 1980s to see how severe problems facing society can be ignored when they mainly affect isolated, usually poor populations. It is not until social



problems make their way into middle and upper class communities that they gain sufficient political attention to instigate change. Segregation slows this process, whereas integration accelerates the pace at which political leaders become aware of (and accountable for) community problems.

The evidence from the cumulative chapters of this dissertation shows that Latinos are often hidden from the view of political decision makers. Despite the attention Latinos garner from both anti-immigrant groups and politicians, on the one hand, and Latino interest groups and their allies, on the other, Latino concerns rarely produce more than blips on the political radar screen. Efforts to meet their educational needs are constrained by the limited budgets of their local governments and the low tax base that characterizes impoverished communities. Political leaders do not invest in their neighborhoods in ways that increase wages and bring upwardly-mobile job opportunities because they are out of view; they lack the political power necessary to compete with more engaged communities for government-issued resources such as job training centers, clinics, and school funding. This situation is exacerbated by the fact that so many "illegals" live in Latino neighborhoods and it is politically risky to give public services to undocumented immigrants. In addition, as discussed in Chapter 7, when Latinos are targeted on the state and local levels, their inactivity and lack of political power create a situation in which even some Latino elected officials are able to justify voting in favor of bills that are harmful to the Latino community because there are no consequences come election time.

The low political participation rates of Latino Americans hurt Latino neighborhoods and the progression of Latino interests. To increase pressure on elected officials to institute substantive policy changes, Latino communities must increase their

engagement in the political process and use the ballot box and other participatory techniques to generate political power commensurate with their numbers. Unfortunately, as this dissertation shows, segregation decreases the likelihood that Latinos will be civically and politically engaged. Therefore, I conclude by discussing a few public policies that could, at least somewhat, alleviate these problems.

### **Socioeconomic Mobility**

Socioeconomic status is the key to political participation and social equality.

Residential segregation continues to hold socioeconomic mobility in the Latino community to a snail's pace. Thus, something must be done to rectify the state of the public schools and the economic opportunities available in segregated Latino areas. If there is one thing that research tells us, it is that diluting poverty in schools increases student outcomes. As Orfield and Lee (2005, 5) argue, "If skin color were not systematically linked to other forms of inequality, it would, of course, be of little significance for educational policy. Unfortunately that is not and never has been the nature of our society. Socioeconomic segregation is a stubborn, multidimensional and deeply important cause of educational inequality." Because the majority of Latino students in the U.S. are locked into segregated, majority Latino schools in which almost half of the student population is poor, whereas the average white student in the public schools attends a majority white school in which less than a quarter of the students are poor (Orfield and Lee 2005, 18), it is impossible to say that education for Latino students is "separate and equal." In addition, if we do not remedy the situation soon, economic differences between racial and ethnic groups will increase as a result of the cumulative advantages of white areas and cumulative disadvantages of minority areas. Recent

Supreme Court decisions such as *Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District* (2006) make desegregation efforts based on race unlikely. Economic integration is thus a more appropriate policy tool and perhaps one that is more politically palatable (Wilson 1993, 204). Race and ethnicity are in a way irrelevant; regardless of skin color, the simple fact is that living and going to school in an area suffering from concentrated poverty is detrimental to socioeconomic mobility and educational success for students of every race and ethnicity. Thus, new policies promoting economic integration of the schools would perhaps be the most politically feasible and effective recourse.

Beginning in the early 1970s, school systems across the country used busing plans to integrate schools. While busing is somewhat effective at bringing students who do not live together into the same school buildings, it often prevents parents from being engaged in the education of their children. It is simply too great a barrier to attend PTA meetings and parent conferences when a child's school is far away. Busing students to far-off destinations for school also does nothing to increase economic opportunities after graduation in the neighborhoods in which they live. In addition, it is very difficult to overcome the fact that most upper-income parents can simply opt out of the public school system if their children would have to endure long bus rides to unsafe neighborhoods, making school integration virtually impossible.<sup>111</sup>

Land use policies are critical to reducing school segregation and concentrated poverty (Orfield and Lee 2005, 43). Inclusionary zoning guarantees lower-income

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<sup>111</sup> Perhaps the greatest problem with busing plans is the way they play out in reality. While the optimal goal is to have some upper-income students bused into poorer areas and poorer students bused to upper-income areas, the result usually is that only the poorer students are bused because the upper-income parents refuse to have their children sent to less desirable locations and are able to pay the price of private schools instead.

families opportunities to live in upper-income zip codes and increases the diversity of the public schools without politically (and legally) controversial school diversification plans. More economically integrated communities also would help equalize funding for local schools and other services. However, it will take strong action on the part of the federal government to promote the use of inclusionary land use policies. Congress, the President, and the Department of Housing and Urban Development should consider proposals to boost federal funding for redevelopment projects that include mixed-income housing and other incentives for local governments to pass and enforce inclusionary zoning laws. For decades, the federal government has used its purse strings to encourage state and local governments to adopt policy changes such as those affecting speed limits and educational testing; it is time it does the same to increase residential integration.

### **Political Socialization**

Political scientists have recognized for decades that the key to civic and political participation is found in socioeconomic status. Therefore, policies that increase educational attainment and occupational opportunities for ethnic minorities should result in more equal political and civic participation. However, Latino participation often lags despite socioeconomic achievements. To ensure that democracy remains stable, states and the federal government should invest in large-scale projects that increase political knowledge and participation by immigrants, their children, and low-participation neighborhoods.

As discussed in depth in Chapter 3, the residential segregation of Latinos makes political organizing easier, particularly for immigrant and Latino interest groups. Without geographic information systems or large databases of consumer trends and

household statistics, interest groups focusing on Latinos and immigrants can go door-to-door in concentrated Latino areas without lists or targeted mobilization materials. They can easily find meeting spaces that are accessible to everyone, with little concern about multicultural correctness or language barriers. Ethnic homogeneity can facilitate bonding social capital; thus, mobilization by ethnic-oriented interest groups can be very effective. Unfortunately, these groups often lack resources. They generally run on tight budgets and frequently find themselves with two (or ten) too few organizers to take on large-scale mobilizing campaigns. When they are able to get a grant or large donation, they staff up for a single election, but mobilization is unsustainable under grant-based mobilization models. This forces them to make tough choices about which elections to contest, with which issues to engage, and to what extent to focus on political organizing versus providing necessary social services.

At the same time that residential segregation makes mobilization easier for Latino and immigrant interest groups, it also allows political parties and more resource-rich interest groups to ignore Latino areas and focus on traditional high-turnout locations. Political parties and most interest groups maximize their resources by focusing get-out-the-vote efforts on locations with a proven participation record. When looking for donors, political parties and candidates return to the same people, social networks, industries, and neighborhoods that are sure to deliver contributions (Gimpel, Lee, and Pearson-Merkowitz 2008). Come primary election time, candidates (including even those who benefit from Latino turnout) mobilize "super voters" using highly targeted voter records. In the general election, parties, candidates, and interest groups focus on individuals and neighborhoods with historically high turnout rates (Gershenton 2003).

Mobilization is simply easier in high-turnout areas. Rather than convincing people to vote, one simply must remind them when and where to vote.

Because they have the resources and know-how to perform sustained mobilization campaigns, extensive name recognition, and field offices in every state in the nation, the two major political parties are perhaps the most suitable organizations to take advantage of the concentration of Latinos. Traditionally, this was a major role of the political party—to help socialize and recruit new immigrants into the political system, thereby stabilizing and expanding their base. Today, political parties have lost track of their role in sustaining democracy in the face of large-scale immigration (Wong 2006). As pointed out in Chapter 2, recruitment by political parties and interest groups is the most effective political mobilization technique available (Green and Gerber 2004). Thus, some authors argue that a return to party-based individual, face-to-face mobilization could be very important to the future of Latino political incorporation (Wong 2006). Unfortunately, however, the parties have little incentive to engage in this activity. Political parties maximize resources because the battles they wage are short-lived. The end goal is the next election, and for this reason they put all their resources towards winning that election through the most cost effective means possible—by mobilizing and convincing likely voters to cast ballots for their candidates.

We cannot leave the task of political incorporation to underfunded ethnicity-specific organizations. Democracy rests on political participation from all interested stakeholders, not just those who are able to guide themselves through the convoluted labyrinth that is our political system. As stated by the APSA Committee on Civic Education and Engagement,

Government is legitimate only when the people as a whole participate in their own self-rule. Insofar as important classes of citizens are considerably less active and influential than others—especially when participatory inequalities are a consequence of the design of the political system—then the reality of collective self-rule is doubtful, and the legitimacy of the political order is compromised (Macedo et al. 2005, 4).

It is time for a renewed push on the part of the federal, state, and local governments to engage *all* residents in *all* locations of the United States in the democratic process. It is no longer acceptable to leave political mobilization solely to interested elites. This system all too frequently has reproduced and exacerbated inequalities in participation.

Some scholars and commentators argue that schools should take the lead in socializing the next generation for political and civic engagement (see, for example, Campbell 2006). Unfortunately, placing the onus for political socialization and instilling civic virtues on the school system is misguided. Certainly schools, to the extent that they can, should encourage political and civic engagement. However, schools, particularly in underprivileged areas, already are struggling to ensure that students can read and write at grade level. Expecting schools to also instill a sense of civic duty in students with little exposure to political stimuli outside of school is not pragmatic. Further, placing this responsibility on the schools is likely to exacerbate inequalities in participation. Schools with sufficient resources, upper-middle class students, and few other challenges can afford to promote civic engagement. On the other hand, schools that lack resources and struggle with attendance, language barriers, and lack of parental engagement surely will emphasize reading, writing, and arithmetic and neglect political and civic education.<sup>112</sup> A

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<sup>112</sup> See, for example, Judith Torney-Punta, Carolyn Barber, and Britt Wilkenfeld's (2007) work on civic education in the schools. They find that Latino students, particularly in high-Latino

mobilization strategy focused on adults (which consequently also socializes children) has more immediate prospects for equalizing participation. Such an approach also releases the schools to focus on getting students to attain the basic skills needed for civic participation, such as sufficient organizational and communication skills, which already is part of their duties (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1993). The schools have a role to play in political socialization, primarily in teaching children the skills they need in all walks of life, but schools are not able to fill every hole or cure every malady left by other institutions and American culture.

Delegating political socialization to public schools and private interest groups results in a de facto political apartheid where some groups are systematically socialized and incorporated into the system and others are socialized out. Extending citizenship and voting rights to the currently disenfranchised immigrant masses would end the official political apartheid we currently endure, where almost 10 percent of the workforce is legally denied the vote. However, with no initiative to educate and socialize these new immigrants and their children about the political system and their role in it, political and social inequality is sure to continue, even if official voting rights are granted to currently disenfranchised immigrants.

Bill Bishop (2008) argues that America has undergone a "big sort." Americans have avoided cultural and political controversy by moving into homogeneous neighborhoods in which there is little reason for conflict. However, this transformation also came at a time of increasingly targeted political campaigns and underfunded and weak political parties. Political parties now systematically cross off neighborhoods and

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schools, have lower levels of civic knowledge and fewer prospects for future engagement than students in majority white schools.



zip codes from their mobilization lists, focusing on those that are "up for grabs" (competitive neighborhoods/states, etc.) while leaving behind locales that traditionally have supported the other party. Instead of steadily building up a base of support in areas in which they are a minority, they retreat, leaving the majority party to reign supreme. When there is little political activity outside the walls of the schools, the job of engaging students in the political process can be insurmountable. It is critical to increase political activity beyond the school walls if we expect citizens to be more engaged.

I propose a renewed effort on the part of the political parties to engage new immigrants and traditionally low-participation neighborhoods. However, because political parties undoubtedly will continue to maximize their resources to win elections, it will take an outside infusion of capital (with strings attached) to motivate them to reach out to new groups in areas they have left behind for years or even decades. Funding for political parties, particularly state and local party organizations, often is scarce, and frequently comes with the tacit condition that it be expended directly on elections. Thus, it is difficult for political parties to justify undertaking the sustained mobilization campaigns necessary to engage new constituencies in areas with historically low participation. Therefore, I suggest that the federal government take an active role in engaging new voters, particularly from underrepresented groups, by creating a grant or funding line for political parties to use *for the sole purpose of* mobilizing low-participation locales.

The federal government currently funds two organizations to develop political parties overseas—the National Democratic Institute and the International Republican Institute. A similar model could be followed within the borders of the U.S. I propose

that the federal government institute a funding line for each political party (including smaller "third" parties) to be used solely for ongoing voter registration, recruitment, and mobilization efforts in *neighborhoods that have historically low voter turnout and political participation*. Such a program would both increase political participation and help offset the growth in the number of uncompetitive jurisdictions.

The project could be overseen by the Federal Election Commission (FEC) to ensure that the money is spent in the intended manner. While sufficient oversight would be necessary, the parties are the most efficient means by which to increase political participation. They have the know-how and the ability to be in every location that no other group possesses.

### **Immigration Reform**

[E]verything today's immigrant-bashers say—that immigrants are insufficiently skilled, that they're too culturally alien, and, implied though rarely stated explicitly, that they're not white enough—was said a century ago about Italians, Poles and Jews.... [N]ow we're living in the second Gilded Age. And as before, one of the things making antiworker, unequalizing policies politically possible is the fact that millions of the worst-paid workers in this country can't vote. What progressives should care about, above all, is that immigration reform stop our drift into a new system of de facto apartheid.

--Paul Krugman (May 25, 2007)

Finally, one cannot write a dissertation about the barriers facing Latinos without addressing immigration reform. Comprehensive immigration reform is necessary if for no other reason than to legitimize the millions of people living in the United States with no political rights. As economist Paul Krugman states, very little progress can be made on social and economic policy beneficial to the poor when so many of them are systematically excluded from the political process. Federal immigration reform also is necessary for several other reasons, including: 1) to stop the expansion of state

immigration policies that harm Latino immigrants, Latino citizens, and concentrated Latino neighborhoods and 2) to maintain consistent immigration policy across all 50 U.S. states. Finally, comprehensive immigration reform legitimizing Latino immigrants is necessary to build both bonding and bridging social capital in Latino-immigrant neighborhoods and ensure that Latino residents have the power to engage the police and other institutions in taking care of their communities.

To facilitate the economic and political incorporation of a large swath of Latino Americans, comprehensive immigration reform must include both a pathway to citizenship for the millions of adult immigrants currently living in the United States as well as educational opportunities for undocumented children who came to the United States as infants or small children.<sup>113</sup> The Urban Institute estimates that about 65,000 undocumented students who came here before they were 16 years old graduate from U.S. high schools each year in addition to the tens of thousands of undocumented children who fail to complete high school. Denying tuition, grants, and loans to students who know little of their home country and desire a higher education creates a de facto educational apartheid. It lowers standards and gives undocumented children few reasons to stay in school. It is important to remind my readers how denying educational opportunities to so many Latino immigrants affects concentrated Latino neighborhoods. When so few people have the opportunity to go on to college, the bar for success is lower for all students in these areas (Orfield and Lee 2005). Because Latino students share

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<sup>113</sup> The Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors (DREAM) Act would facilitate access to college for immigrant students in the United States by restoring states' rights to offer in-state tuition to immigrant students residing in their state. The bill also would provide a path to citizenship for immigrants who wish to pursue higher education but were brought to the U.S. as young children and lack documentation. The DREAM Act has become an essential component of "comprehensive immigration reform" and is critical to ensuring that immigrants (and those who share their neighborhoods) have opportunities for socioeconomic mobility.

neighborhoods and social networks, policies that inhibit the educational advancement of undocumented immigrants have grave consequences for the U.S.-born as well.

Immigration reform proposals continue to place a high value on recruiting and establishing immigration opportunities for highly skilled professionals. A consistent theme in immigration debates is the fact that the United States fails to produce enough engineers, scientists, doctors—just about everything except lawyers. For these reasons, businesses and politicians call for increasing H1B visas to recruit and retain educated professionals from across the globe. Yet the debate rarely turns to developing highly skilled individuals in the U.S. Comprehensive immigration reform should address the fact that we are failing to educate and train people in the United States to perform highly skilled jobs. Foreign-born Indians and Asians are not inherently smarter or culturally superior to Latino or Black Americans, as many immigration reformers suggest (see, for example, Richwine 2009); rather, colleges and universities have no incentive to enroll low income students who will need significant financial and sometimes academic assistance over foreign students who can pay their own way or whose home countries will pay the cost of their out-of-state tuition.

Comprehensive immigration reform should not only address the current legitimacy crisis but also prepare the U.S. to produce the best and brightest from within our own borders. Companies that hire foreign workers should be required to establish scholarships for economically disadvantaged students in academic disciplines where foreign students currently are overrepresented, such as the hard sciences. They could even be required to provide work-study opportunities for scholarship students similar to those offered under the federal Work-Study Program. Such a policy would allow

employers to hire the employees they need today from abroad while helping to develop a highly skilled workforce for the future. It simply makes more sense to let immigrants fill low-skilled jobs while helping the U.S.-born, or at least U.S.-raised, become upwardly mobile, instead of the other way around. The current system sets a glass ceiling for U.S. students while providing the best educations to foreign-born elites and gives no incentives for companies or institutions of higher learning to invest in U.S.-born (or -raised) students over cost-free immigrant students. We live in a globalized marketplace in which transporting workers from one nation to another is increasingly easy. Thus, businesses have little to no motivation to invest resources in training workers. When the supply of trained workers is insufficient to meet demand, they can either move or import new workers. The government must do something to increase incentives for companies to train potential employees.

In effect, immigration reform could tackle many of the issues facing the United States today through a single wide-reaching policy initiative. It is not enough to increase H1B visas and provide a path to citizenship if we do not also provide a path for socioeconomic mobility for all U.S. residents and decrease the demand for highly skilled foreign workers. The immigration reforms proposed by business elites favor the “cream of the crop” from other countries while leaving behind people raised within our borders. Instead of focusing on why so few American citizens are becoming engineers or encouraging companies to develop a home-grown workforce, all too frequently people look at the current state of affairs in the U.S. as eugenicist-style justification for immigration reform. Maybe it is time for policy to focus on propelling our working poor

currently locked in urban and rural poverty to be the engineers, doctors, and computer programmers of the future.

Some policy makers might object to my suggestions because they will give impoverished immigrants even more incentives to find ways—legally or not—to enter the U.S. when their children are small. I agree that this is likely the case. As long as the United States is the land of opportunity and many people in Mexico and Latin America remain in abject poverty, immigrants will continue to come in droves, border fence or not. As former Arizona governor and now Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano famously said, "You show me a 50-foot wall and I'll show you a 51-foot ladder." However, it is important to note that we do not have massive immigration from Canada, even though that border is even more porous and larger than the one to the south. It makes little sense to sacrifice the well-being and economic opportunities of residents of the United States simply to reduce unwanted immigration. If we wish to control illegal immigration, we should invest in Mexico and the other Central and South American countries so that the green grass grows on both sides of the fence. Similarly, if we wish to reduce legal immigration, we must invest in individuals who currently reside within our borders to diminish the demand for foreign-born labor.

Immigrant integration has always been a process molded by public policies. It is convenient to tell immigrant success stories as if they happen in a black box—immigrants come, they find jobs, and their children gain education and move up the socioeconomic ladder. The black box story is one of elbow grease and motivation. In reality though, such success stories are molded by the policies that make them possible. The same immigrant story can be told in two ways: Mateo came to America as an undocumented

immigrant. He worked hard and his son is now a professor at a prestigious university.

Or, Mateo came to America as an undocumented immigrant in the 1920s; he worked in a union shop that kept his wages stable and enabled him to work his way up to management. During World War II he became a citizen as part of the GI Bill after enlisting in the Army. His son attended good schools in an integrated community and attended college because of affirmative action policies aimed at increasing minority enrollment.<sup>114</sup>

It is time policy makers and academics alike begin to address the policies that make socioeconomic mobility for all residents of the United States possible.

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<sup>114</sup> This story is a version of one told by Professor Manuel Pastor Jr. of the University of Southern California at the Thinking Big, Thinking Forward conference on February 11, 2009, in Washington, DC. The video of his speech is available at: <http://thinkingbigconference.org/>.

# Appendices

## Appendix A. Institutional Review Board Approval



UNIVERSITY OF  
MARYLAND

INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD

2100 Blair Lee Building  
College Park, Maryland 20742-5125  
301.405.4212 TEL 301.314.1475 FAX  
irb@deans.umd.edu  
www.umresearch.umd.edu/IRB

January 5, 2008

### MEMORANDUM

*Application Approval Notification*

To: Dr. Karen Kaufmann  
Department of Government and Politics

From: Roslyn Edson, M.S., CIP *RE*  
IRB Manager  
University of Maryland, College Park

Re: IRB Application # 07-0689  
Project Title: Separate but Not Equal: Segregation and  
Participation among African Americans and Latinos

Approval Date: January 4, 2008

Expiration Date: January 4, 2009

Type of Application: Initial

Type of Research: Nonexempt

Type of Review: Expedited

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The University of Maryland, College Park Institutional Review Board (IRB) approved your IRB application. The research was approved in accordance with the University's IRB policies and procedures and 45 CFR 46, the Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects. Please reference the above-cited IRB application number in any future communications with our office regarding this research.

**Recruitment/Consent:** For research requiring written informed consent, the IRB-approved and stamped informed consent document is enclosed. The IRB approval expiration date has been stamped on the informed consent document. Please keep copies of the consent forms used for this research for three years after the completion of the research.



**Continuing Review:** If you want to continue to collect data from human subjects or analyze identifiable private information from human subjects after the expiration date for this approval, you must submit a renewal application to the IRB Office at least 30 days before the approval expiration date.

**Modifications:** Any changes to the approved protocol must be approved by the IRB before the change is implemented except when a change is necessary to eliminate apparent immediate hazards to the subjects. If you want to modify the approved protocol, please submit an addendum request to the IRB. The instructions for submitting an addendum request are posted on the IRB website at [http://www.umresearch.umd.edu/IRB/irb\\_Addendum%20Protocol.htm](http://www.umresearch.umd.edu/IRB/irb_Addendum%20Protocol.htm).

**Unanticipated Problems Involving Risks:** You must promptly report any unanticipated problems involving risks to subjects or others to the IRB Manager at 301-405-0678 or [redson@umresearch.umd.edu](mailto:redson@umresearch.umd.edu).

**Student Researchers:** Unless otherwise requested, this IRB approval document was sent to the Principal Investigator (PI). The PI should pass on the approval document or a copy to the student researchers. This IRB approval document may be a requirement for student researchers applying for graduation. The IRB may not be able to provide copies of the approval documents if several years have passed since the date of the original approval.

**Additional Information:** Please contact the IRB Office at 301-405-4212 if you have any IRB-related questions or concerns.


**Attachment B**

Initials \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_

**CONSENT FORM**

<b>Project Title</b>	Separate but Not Equal: Segregation and Participation among African Americans and Latinos
<b>Why is this research being done?</b>	<i>This is a research project being conducted by Shanna Pearson-Merkowitz at the University of Maryland, College Park. We are inviting you to participate in this research project because you have intimate knowledge of a minority community and have actively worked with either African Americans or Latinos to increase their political participation. The purpose of this research project is to understand the barriers to political mobilization in African American and Latino communities and how these barriers are affected by segregated housing patterns.</i>
<b>What will I be asked to do?</b>	<i>The procedures involve at least one interview and a possible follow-up interview regarding your experiences mobilizing African Americans and/or Latinos. The interview should only last about 1 hour.</i>
<b>What about confidentiality?</b>	<p><i>We will do our best to keep your personal information confidential. To help protect your confidentiality, your name and organization will not be included on any notes or the transcript from the tape, instead a code will be given that identifies you to the researcher only. Further, tape recordings from the interview, notes, and transcriptions will always be kept in a locked cabinet and in pass-word protected computer files. If we write a report or article about this research project, your identity will be protected to the maximum extent possible. Your information may be shared with representatives of the University of Maryland, College Park or governmental authorities if you or someone else is in danger or if we are required to do so by law.</i></p> <p><i>The research requires making audio recordings of you to ensure that the researchers do not miss any information you provide during the course of the interview. Audio tapes will only be used for the purpose of transcription and to enable through analysis of the information provided.</i></p> <p>___ I agree to be [audiotaped] during my participation in this study.</p> <p>___ I do not agree to be [audiotaped] during my participation in this study.</p>
<b>What are the risks of this research?</b>	<i>There are no known risks associated with participating in this research project.</i>

<b>Project Title</b>	Separate but Not Equal: Segregation and Participation among African Americans and Latinos	
<b>What are the benefits of this research?</b>	<i>This research is not designed to help you personally, but the results may help the investigator learn more about the obstacles to political participation in African American and Latino communities. We hope that, in the future, other people might benefit from this study through improved understanding of the problems associated with segregation and discrimination as well as how to overcome the barriers these problems create.</i>	
<b>Do I have to be in this research? May I stop participating at any time?</b>	<i>Your participation in this research is completely voluntary. You may choose not to take part at all. If you decide to participate in this research, you may stop participating at any time. If you decide not to participate in this study or if you stop participating at any time, you will not be penalized or lose any benefits to which you otherwise qualify.</i>	
<b>What if I have questions?</b>	<p><i>This research is being conducted by Shanna Pearson-Merkowitz] at the University of Maryland, College Park. If you have any questions about the research study itself, please contact Shanna at: 3112 Tydings Hall University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742. 240-602-7426 or <a href="mailto:spearsonmerkowitz@gvpt.umd.edu">spearsonmerkowitz@gvpt.umd.edu</a></i></p> <p><i>If you have questions about your rights as a research subject or wish to report a research-related injury, please contact: Institutional Review Board Office, University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland, 20742;</i></p> <p><i>(e-mail) <a href="mailto:irb@deans.umd.edu">irb@deans.umd.edu</a>; (telephone) 301-405-0678</i></p> <p><i>This research has been reviewed according to the University of Maryland, College Park IRB procedures for research involving human subjects.</i></p>	
<b>Statement of Age of Subject and Consent</b>	<p><i>Your signature indicates that:</i></p> <p><i>you are at least 18 years of age;</i></p> <p><i>the research has been explained to you;</i></p> <p><i>your questions have been fully answered; and</i></p> <p><i>you freely and voluntarily choose to participate in this research project.</i></p>	
<b>Signature and Date</b>	NAME OF SUBJECT	
	SIGNATURE OF SUBJECT	
	DATE	



*Appendix B. Measurement and Coding of Variables*

Table B.4.1 Measurement of Variables

Variable	Measurement	Range	Mean	Standard Deviation
Residential Isolation (neighborhood)	Factor Score of the percent immigrant, percent non-English Speakers, and percent Latino in the Census tract of the respondent	-.87, 6.2	1.04	1.52
Residential Isolation (MSA)	Isolation index as computed by Massey and Denton (1988) and Iceland, Weinberg, and Steinmetz (2002). Data available at: <a href="http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/housing_patterns/housing_patterns.html">http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/housing_patterns/housing_patterns.html</a>	.007, .95	.55	.21
Citizenship (CPS)	Answered that their citizenship status was "Foreign Born, U.S. Citizen by Naturalization"	0,1	.10	.29
Citizenship (SCBS)	Citizens =1 non citizens =0	0,1	.70	.46
English Language Acquisition (CPS)	Only Spanish is spoken in the home.	0,1	.25	.43
English Language Acquisition (SCBS)	Chose to take the survey in English, not Spanish	0,1	.71	.45
Education (CPS)	Highest level of education completed. Ranges from less than high school to doctoral degree.	1,8	2.07	1.36
Education (SCBS)	Highest level of education completed. Ranges from less than high school to doctoral degree.	1,7	2.8	1.75

Table B.5.1. Measurement of Variables for Social Capital Benchmark Survey. Latino sample only.

Variable	Measurement	Range	Mean	Standard Deviation
Residential Isolation (neighborhood)	Factor Score of the percent immigrant, percent non-English Speakers, and percent Latino in the Census tract of the respondent	-.87, 6.2	1.04	1.52
Citizenship	Citizens =1 Non citizens =0	0, 1	.70	.46
English	Chose to take the survey in English, not Spanish. English=1, Spanish=0	0, 1	.71	.45
SES	Factor Score of income and education	-1.8, 2.18	-.52	.97
Friendship Diversity	Has a personal friend that is white, African American or Asian=1. No friends of other racial groups=0	0, 1	.73	.44
Age	Age in years for those 18 and over.	18, 93	36.98	13.91
Political Interest	Attends church=1, does not attend church=0	0, 1	.49	.50
Civic Engagement	Composite score of the number of non-political groups and events the person participated in.	0, 18	2.5	3.0
Political Participation	Factor score of the number of political acts	-.62, 4.31	0	1
Voter Registration	Registered to vote=1. Not registered=0. Only used with citizens.	0, 1	.75	.43
Voted	Voted in the 1996 election=1. Did not vote=0. Only used with those who are registered to vote.	0, 1	.68	.47
Church Attendance	1=attends church, 0= does not attend church.	0, 1	.52	.49

Table B.5.1 Coding and Distribution of Independent Variables

Variable	Coding	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Unemployment Rate (2006)	Percent Unemployed in 2006. Source: U.S. Labor Department	50	4.40	1.00	2.50	6.90
% Latino Legislators (2007)	Percent of the Legislature that is Latino Source: National Council of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials	50	0.03	0.05	0.00	0.27
Democratic Legislature (2007)	Percent of the Legislative seats held by Democrats Source: Congressional Quarterly	49	0.54	0.14	0.25	0.87
Liberalism	Percent of the state that is “liberal” in 2006. Source: Erikson, Wright, and McIver (1993).	50	19.14	4.88	11.3	39
Immigration Rate (2000-2006)	Rate of immigration to the state. Source: Migration Policy Institute	50	27.54	13.36	-1.00	53.10
Percent Foreign Born (2000)	Percent of the people in the State that are foreign born. Source: Census Bureau	50	8.32	6.08	1.20	27.20
Latino Population (2007)	Percent of the state’s population that is Latino. Source: Census Bureau	50	0.10	0.10	0.01	0.44
Latino Population Increase 2000-2007	The increase in the percentage of the state that is Latino between 2000 and 2007. Source: Census Bureau	50	0.02	0.01	0.00	0.05
Latino Immigration Rate (2000-2007)	Immigration Rate of Latino immigrants 2000-2007. Source: Census Bureau	50	1.37	0.18	1.05	1.69
Cropland	Percentage of the state that is made up of cropland	50	0.37	0.58	0.00	3.23
Education and Healthcare Spending Per Capita	Number of dollars per capita spent on education and health care. Source: CQ’s State Rankings 2006	50	2489.0	512.0	1577.1	4108.7
Education and Health Care As Proportion of the Per Capita Tax Rate	The percent of the per capita tax rate that is spent on education and health care. Source: CQ’s State Rankings 2006	50	0.25	0.05	0.15	0.40

Table B.6.1

Variable	Coding		
<b>Individual Demographics</b>			
	Source: Compiled from Multiple sources including: List of Black Caucus members, pictures of representatives cross referenced with bibliographies, and Kate Bratton's data on state legislatures through 2005 available at: <a href="http://www.lsu.edu/faculty/bratton/research.htm">http://www.lsu.edu/faculty/bratton/research.htm</a>		
Black Legislators		Black	Non-Black
Arizona		2	92
Georgia		62	264
Montana		0	150
Latino Legislators	Source: National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials	Hispanic	Non-Hispanic
Arizona		17	77
Georgia		4	264
Montana		1	149
Female Legislators	Source: Compiled by author using pictures of the elected officials.	Female	Male
Arizona		32	62
Georgia		54	264
Montana		112	38
Party	Source: Compiled by author using state legislature websites	Democrats	Republicans
Arizona		43	51
Georgia		115	149
Montana		75	74

Table B.6.1 (continued)

District Demographics			
Percent			
Latino	Source: Almanac of State Legislative Elections	Mean	Min, Max
Arizona		29.05	6.6, 68.3
Georgia		7.22	1.1, 51.0
Montana		2.62	.8, 10.9
Percent			
White	Source: Almanac of State Legislative Elections		
Arizona		56.03	17.8, 82.7
Georgia		57..30	10.8, 92.2
Montana		88.06	31.4, 96.8
Average			
Income	Source: Almanac of State Legislative Elections		
Arizona		\$56,650	38,144, 103,008
Georgia		\$62,315	33,484, 195,622
Montana		\$47,120	32,858, 77,002
Percent in			
Poverty	Source: Almanac of State Legislative Elections		
Arizona		15.16	5.1, 32.5
Georgia		15.86	2.4, 34.9
Montana		18.55	8.9, 32.0
Electoral			
Margin			
(2006)	Source: Almanac of State Legislative Elections		
Arizona		69.18	49, 100
Georgia		88.51	51, 100
Montana		67.71	48, 100



*Appendix C. Supplementary Tables*

Table C.6.1 2007 State Immigration Legislation Introductions, Types and Frequency

Type of Policy	Number of Bills	Number of States	Type of Policy	Number of Bills	Number of States
<b>Law Enforcement - TOTAL</b>	<b>187</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>Education - TOTAL</b>	<b>106</b>	<b>30</b>
Law Enforcement - Federal cooperation	77	20	Education - Enrollment denial	13	9
Law Enforcement - State enforcement of immigration law	70	21	Education - Status information collection	12	9
Law Enforcement - Prohibit sanctuary cities	19	10	Education - In-state tuition*	44	19
			Education - K-12 English language instruction	7	6
Law Enforcement - Non-enforcement	7	5	Education - Other	30	13
Law Enforcement - Other	14	8	Housing	12	9
Firearms Permits	6	4	Identification	120	41
Family Law	21	15			
Criminal Justice & New Offenses	106	29			
<b>Employment - TOTAL</b>	<b>364</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>Health Care - TOTAL</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>48</b>
Employment - Civil penalties & license revocation	72	32	Health Care - General health benefits**	48	16
Employment - Criminal penalties	26	13	Health Care - Emergency services	5	4
Employment - State contracts	80	35	Health Care - Medicaid	6	4
Employment - Professional and commercial licenses	23	14	Health Care - Children's benefits	19	8
Employment - Employment benefits^	43	21	Health Care - Other	13	9
Employment - Other	120	34			
<b>Integration - TOTAL</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>19</b>	Requests for Federal Reimbursement	19	10
Integration - English as official/common language	9	6	Resolutions to Federal Government	83	28
Integration -Translation/interpretation & public documents	10	7	Task Forces & Studies	74	30
Integration - Adult English language education	3	3	Trafficking	114	28
Integration - Other^^	34	15	Voting	41	20
Public Benefit Eligibility	116	38	Other	42	22
Regulation of Immigrant Service Providers	29	13			

^Includes both legislation denying benefits to undocumented workers and those providing benefits to undocumented workers

^^Mainly symbolic legislation such as declaring Immigrant awareness days, and calling on local jurisdictions to be mindful of human rights when crafting immigration legislation

\*Includes both legislation that expands instate tuition to undocumented students and legislation that prohibits instate tuition for undocumented students.

\*\*Includes both legislation expanding benefits to immigrants and denying benefits to immigrants

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